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THE WAR IN EUROPE

THE WAR IN EUROPE

ITS CAUSES AND RESULTS

BY

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

PROFESSOR OF THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT
AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK AND LONDON
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
1914

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I cannot expect to be free from errors of fact, though I have taken pains to verify statements that seemed likely to be questioned. Doubtless there are also mistakes of inference and deduction. At least it may be claimed that such as may be found in these pages do not arise from prejudice for or against any of the contestants; for I have spent happy days and formed friendships alike in Germany, Austria, France, England, and Servia.

The book is intended to be a study of facts, conditions and probable results, and not to be an argument. Upon many critical questions relating to the war, necessary evidence has not yet reached the world. Upon many others, where the facts are established, there is opportunity for honest differences of opinion. Upon few issues are the materials so abundant that a conclusion may be safely reached in the thick of the struggle. Whatever the faults of judgment, they are the author's own; the book has been written without aid or revision from others. The purpose is to treat the subject fairly and impartially. While sympathizing with all the peoples involved, there is one nation in favor of which I feel an unalterable partiality: it is the United States of America, which has her anxieties and interests also in the tremendous struggle.

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART.

Cambridge, October 17, 1914.

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THE WAR IN EUROPE

PART I. CONDITIONS

CHAPTER I

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

WAR IN OUR TIME

WAR is woe. War is destruction. War is death. War is hell. Against war pulls the natural shrinking of every living man, woman, and child from pain and danger. War is a denial of the most elementary basis of political economy, which assures us that men habitually act upon what they suppose to be their interests. War fills with consternation the great owners of property who see impending the poverty of individuals and of nations. War is the enemy of culture, art, education—of everything that exalts the mind. War is contrary to the Christian religion, denying the brotherhood of man and the love of one's neighbor. The responsibility of bringing about war shocks the greatest statesmen and disturbs the most ruthless soldiers.

War is obsolete. War is discredited. For fifteen years the Hague Conferences have been hopefully searching for a way of preventing war and thought the world on the brink of the millennium.

Yet a few weeks ago suddenly burst out the most terrific war ever known to mankind, the largest, the farthest reaching, the most destructive of life. When in 1883 the great volcano of Krakatoa blew itself into fragments, the sound was heard ten thousand miles away on the coast of England. So the clamor of the armed host in Europe crosses the ocean and disturbs the peaceful life of the whole western hemisphere.

Notwithstanding its horror the war seems remote; it is hard for Americans to realize, even after weeks of undiminished excitement, that other countries are being torn to pieces by the shock, destruction, and terrors of furious fighting. While the reader in his easy chair opens this book, far away on the other side of the ocean drab-clad masses of troops are trudging wearily —company after company, regiment after regiment, division after division, steering east, west, north, south—anywhere, to find their human prey. At this moment the bugle is sounding a halt. Tired soldiers are opening their haversacks and watching the kettle boil under the tripod of muskets. At this moment an aeroplane is hovering over a hostile town, watching for the chance to drop a bomb which will presently blow into

fragments a group of babies and nursemaids in the park.

While we think about it, a million men are straining every nerve, flogging gun-horses, cursing, tugging, bringing up the transports, parking ammunition wagons, setting out hospital material, digging rifle pits, exchanging shots with the enemy's pickets; they are half dead with fatigue, yet only at the beginning of their toil of getting ready for the coming great battle. A fourth of them are unconsciously preparing themselves for the operating table or the soldier's shallow grave.

Just at this moment noncombatants are fleeing with shrieks of despair from their villages—unarmed men, whitebeards, women, cripples, toddling children, rushing out of the range of the battery which is beginning to drop shells among them. They are leaving their little all, the savings of a lifetime's toil, leaving it to go up in smoke. They cringe at the thought of the fate of the helpless peasants in the Balkan War of last year, for even civilized and Christian soldiers do queer things when they have in their power the wives and children of their enemies.

At this moment a regiment of infantry gives way and the cavalry are riding furiously among them, shooting, sabering, breaking their skulls. At this moment the horses are straining at the big siege guns which are slowly moving forward to get into range of the church spire five miles

away beyond the trees; and within half an hour the church that has lasted through centuries of battles and sieges and is precious with the memorials of twenty generations, will be a heap of ruins.

Out at sea, in the track of the usual cheerful procession of steamers, every craft that thought itself in danger has been scurrying to port—to any port except that of an enemy. The tick of a wireless receiver brings alarm to a captain who has laughed at fifty gales. Out on the North Sea comes the boom of heavy guns, and the periscope of the submarine cuts through the water like the fin of a man-eating shark. Perhaps at this very second a vessel, German, Russian, or English, is hit by the unseen projectile of the monster, and is carrying a thousand brave sailors down to the bottom of the sea.

Within the peaceful boundaries of the United States the war makes distress and fear. Your neighbor is frantic because he has no news from his wife and children, last heard of in Strassburg. The next man had everything fixed for a profitable shipment of grain; his wheat is sidetracked at Buffalo, and it may be months before he can get a vessel. Across the street is a cloakmaker; his materials were to have been shipped from Paris this week, and now he must discharge his hands. Another is calculating up his share of the hundred millions of new taxation which the Federal Government has laid. The next man is

a Serbo-Croatian, called by the Hungarian government to go home and fight his blood-brethren of Servia; and unless he goes he never can show his face again in his Fatherland. No earthquake, no fire, no flood, no hurricane, could cause a tenth of the anguish and terror which has befallen the civilized world.

APPROACH AND EXTENT OF THE WAR

One of the dreadful incidents of the war is the amazing quickness with which it has come on. Most wars which were not sudden inroads of pirates or nomad horsemen have bubbled a long time before the volcano finally broke out. Even Napoleon had a playful way of giving notice that he was about to strike a neighbor by upbraiding the ambassador of that country on some public occasion. The War of the Revolution had been gradually approaching for about a year and a half when it finally broke out in 1775; and even then it was more than a year before the colonies would take the once-for-all step of declaring independence. In the American crisis of 1860-61 there were five months between the secession of South Carolina and the firing of the first gun against Fort Sumter; and up to the very last there were hopeful spirits who thought there would be some kind of compromise. The war of Prussia against Austria in 1866 had been coming

on visibly for a long time; and almost three months passed in preparations and discussions before the Prussian troops actually moved. Even the last war in which Prussia was engaged, in 1870, was preceded by several weeks of exchange of views with regard to the proposed choice of a Hohenzollern to be king of Spain. In 1914, however, Europe appeared to be in perfect peace on the morning of July 23; but on the evening of August 2 six powers were already committed to war.

The war is, or threatens to be, European in its geographical extent, but it is world-wide in its immediate and future effect. The area of terror and damage reaches into every continent and every ocean. The actual theater of land war includes such distant places as Kiao-Chao on the Chinese peninsula of Shan-Tung; the Samoan and Solomon Islands in the Pacific Ocean; and the interior of Africa. The King of the Tonga Islands blends his note of opera-bouffe by gravely announcing the neutrality of his kingdom! The cruisers of the various powers suddenly loom up just outside the three-mile limit near any neutral port of the Atlantic, or Pacific, or Indian Ocean and then disappear. The majestic merchant ships of England, France, and Germany scuttle to port or keep the seas with apprehension. When before this year have the most powerful and fastest merchant vessels in the world been

compelled to put out their lights, blanket their portholes, silence their wireless, and dash through fogs at full speed without the warning whistle? The world is learning the meaning of Kipling's lines:

"The Liner she's a lady, an' she never looks nor 'eeds—
The Man-o'-War's 'er 'usband, an' 'e gives 'er all she needs."

Never since the Armada have the narrow seas been so full of terror, or the broad seas so beset with losses. Of the great fleet of the Hamburg-American line—two hundred and one ships in all—after about ten days of war, not one was afloat on the ocean. Of these only a few have been actually captured, but the stoppage of transit has affected the commerce of the world. Even

"The little cargo-boats, . . . the same as you an' me"

are afraid of capture, and anywhere in the North Sea are afraid of mines.

No country in the world is detached from this struggle. All the small neutral powers of northern and western Europe are in daily fear of being drawn into the contest. The so-called neutrals of the Balkan region are watching their opportunity to leap into the fray at the

dramatic moment. One Asiatic power, Japan, is already engaged in war and China may very easily be brought in. For it is the tendency of such a war to draw into its fearful machinery innocent and unwilling by-standing nations.

Many wars have been waged which, though desperate and long-continued, have little affected the ordinary life of the people. England throughout the Napoleonic period kept up her manufactures and her trade. The North, during our Civil War, grew more populous and richer every year. But the European system of universal military service stops mines, breaks up factories, except those operated for military reasons, depletes capital, and crushes to earth the little business man. The number of men and women who had made a modest success of their workshop or agency or hotel and who are already ruined and never can recover, literally runs into the millions. Where are the flourishing arts of peace? What has become of the attractive exhibition at Malmo in Sweden? Of the great book show at Leipsic? Of the art exhibit at Venice? Who buys pictures, or orders statues, or contracts with prima donnas in such a time as this? Who endows universities, founds schools, builds laboratories, in the midst of the stress and sacrifice of war? Even the arts of peace are, for the time being, almost paralyzed.

EFFECT ON THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The war affects the whole world through its fearful disappointment to those who hope for universal peace. It is a sinister comment on the efforts of the first Hague Conference of 1899 and the second Hague Conference of 1907 and the Hague Tribunal and the Hague conventions, that in the last fifteen years eight wars have broken out; and in not one have the parties availed themselves of the opportunity for a rational discussion of the questions at issue. The Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Italo-Turkish War, the French War in Morocco, two Balkan wars and the Civil War in Mexico and now this European war all ignored the possibility of arbitration by the new machinery.

Still it was hoped that controversies between great European powers would at least give time for discussion in the spirit, if not the precise methods, of the Hague movement. The passions of great nations run too swiftly. Sir Edward Grey in July never hinted at Hague arbitration, though he did his best to bring about a kind of arbitral conference of four powers. The war may bring such disaster to the nations that they will more effectually seek a way of preventing or minimizing war altogether; but it looks as though the slow work of the Hague conferences would need to be done all over again, and even then

would be hampered by the fact that the war has introduced many new problems of methods of fighting and ways of treating neutrals.

The war has unchained new forces all over the world. Unless Europe is beaten to a standstill, unless every nation is so exhausted and miserable that it is willing to start again from the point where it stood when the war broke out, the struggle is bound to result in great territorial changes and new combinations of the powers. Austria-Hungary, excepting for the period of its occupation of North Italy, has had about the same territory for several centuries. France, except for Alsace and Lorraine, has about the boundaries of 1689; but now the map of Europe is likely to undergo adjustments.

Even if it remains about what it was before, the war has shown such diabolical progress in the art of destroying life that it is a question whether civilization can endure, unless airships and submarines are put under some kind of international supervision. Apparently the old science of fortification has broken down. The land transportation of men, supplies, and great guns has undergone a change through the use of motors. Swift sea transport brings distant parts of the globe into the European struggle. The Mongol, the South Sea Islander, and the Afghan have a direct interest in the questions of this war and future wars, and may take a hand in settling them.

SIGNIFICANCE TO AMERICANS

To the people of the United States the war has the direct and immediate significance of making irregular and uncertain many lines of commerce and production. The great wheat farmer and the cotton planter look doubtfully across the sea. The banker who is ready and anxious to finance their shipments finds his capital dormant because of the lack of ships. When ships sail there is the serious question of guaranteeing payment for the cargoes on the other side. The ship-owner hesitates to take over foreign ships under the new registry law because he feels doubtful whether he can keep them busy after the war is over. The whole endless chain of personal and business relations is confused and demoralized by a war to which we are not parties.

This is an opportunity to profit by the necessary changes in the currents of trade. Asia and South America are enormously valuable markets, but they cannot buy unless they can sell their own products in exchange; and it is uncertain how far the United States can either seize upon or hold these opportunities for trade. The people of this country may learn to do without certain foreign articles, or may make good substitutes on this side of the water. On the other hand it is possible that foreign countries will learn to do without some American exports. All we are sure of

is that the world's trade once smashed can never be put together in the same form again.

Americans have enormous commercial and social interests in this war. The actual property of American individuals, firms and corporations abroad runs up to the hundreds of millions. The potential profits on the sale of American breadstuffs, coal, cotton, oil, and manufactures are measured by scores of millions. The vast shipping property forms another link in the chain which binds Europe and America together. Socially we are interested in countries from which have immigrated thirteen and a half millions of our own people. The United States is the largest and most successful champion of popular government as against autocratic government, and that is another issue in this war.

Therefore, Americans, of all people in this crisis, need a knowledge of the causes, conditions, and probable outcome of the titanic struggle. They have less opportunity than Europeans of seeing the circumstances for themselves. Few American travelers penetrate deeply into the countries or the character of the people of Europe. Our diplomats are changeable; and one who has carefully observed the diplomatic service of all nations declares that most ministers never get acquainted with anybody except those of their own set whom they meet at dinners. Business men who trade on their own account with Europe

are more apt to have clear views of the conditions, but they see only a portion of the decisive factors.

To the best informed observers in Europe the relations between men and nations which have at last led to war are singularly intermixed; and the most impartial men hardly know where to fix blame and responsibility. The people of the United States have no alliances and no national prejudices in Europe. During the two recent Balkan wars the popular sympathy went toward what seemed to be an effort to get rid of an obsolete and offensive government. That sympathy has been much disturbed by the rival claims of the Turks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Servians, and Greeks. In the present struggle the United States sympathizes with the Austrian effort to hold members of many races in concord; with the intellectual and scientific greatness of Germany; with the republican government of France; with the Russian desire to have a clear entrance to the world's seaways; with English freedom of commerce. Our desire is to understand what the European nations actually are, and to realize the interplay of those nations upon each other. Still more we need to know what the race elements of Europe are, and how far there is truth in the idea that a race war is unavoidable, and perhaps to be desired.

Each party to the war puts forward its own

statement of the reasons which seemed to that power to make war the better choice of two evils; each power is convinced that its reasons are satisfactory. The ministers and priests of each power pray to the same God for help against each other, and earmark the Almighty as infallibly on their side. Yet to the average American mind in all this turmoil no one reason or series of reasons seems clear or coherent or sufficient to justify a million painful deaths. The only way to form a judgment as to the causes, responsibility, and righteousness of the war is to consider what kind of people they are who have joined battle with such fury and on so tremendous a scale.

CHAPTER II

MINOR POWERS OF EUROPE

SMALL AND LARGE POWERS

THE present map of Europe is the result of many thousand years of occupation by primitive people who have left no records; and of three thousand years of pressure and counter-pressure between organized political groups. Every mile of European frontier has a long record of blood and diplomacy, but the general territorial history has gone through four stages of development. First there were comparatively small tribal or national groups, such as the Norsemen, the Gauls, the Germans. Second, Rome extended her power over southern and western Europe, solidifying these elements. Third, the Empire broke up about 500 A. D., and a multitude of fragments appeared, some of them independent lordships whose territory was little more than the castle in which the lord lived. Fourth, the units were slowly and with great difficulty brought together again, not into one world

power, but into countries varying in size from the Republic of San Marino, with 32 square miles, to Russia in Europe with 2,100,000 square miles.

This process has left marks upon every part of Europe. The Roman walls in England, in central Germany, and in the Balkans were parts of the outer boundary of Rome. The little kinks and curves in the frontier between Switzerland and Italy indicate the results of border wars otherwise long since forgotten. Some of the small powers, like Holland, are pieces broken off of a once larger unit. Some of the larger countries such as Austria-Hungary are mosaics of former nations and pieces of nations.

During the last three hundred years the prevailing tendency has been to compress the remaining small units into powerful nations; and that process has brought about what we now call the six Great Powers—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia; and there is a tendency to create a seventh unit, by combining the numerous Slav elements in the Balkans and adjacent countries into one empire. Alongside the six powers are fifteen weaker countries, some of them very small. In addition there are five nominally independent states which are really protectorates—Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino.

The key to the present situation in Europe is that the great national units do not in any

country correspond to racial units. Great Britain has two elements; one of which, the Anglo-Saxon, is a compound of several races; and the other, the Celtic, is divided among Scotch, Irish and Welsh. France includes a large infusion of original German blood. Germany does not include the Germans in Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, or the Germanic Dutch and Flemings. Italy comes nearest the ideal of one race inhabiting one country, though northern Italy, like northern France, has a strong infusion of German blood. Austria-Hungary and Russia are inhabited by many races which are by no means friendly to their fellow countrymen.

To understand the war it is therefore necessary to know what are the national units of Europe, and at the same time to realize what is the strength of each in territory, population, wealth, fighting men, and military spirit.

SCANDINAVIAN GROUP

The fifteen minor European powers are divided into three groups. First may be mentioned the six prosperous and independent states of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. The three Scandinavian countries have been the breeding place of one of the toughest and most warlike peoples that the world has ever known. The Norsemen conquered England and

left a vigorous strain in the population of that island. They conquered northern France, and Normandy is full of their sons. They set up a kingdom in Sicily; they pushed into Russia. Sweden for a long time held large territories on the south coast of the Baltic. They had the enterprise to discover America in the year 1000, and America has reciprocated by discovering the strength and substance in those people, of whom 1,250,000 are now a part of our Commonwealth.

They have lost most of their former importance in European affairs because of the drift into large units; and to-day the three kingdoms with 313,000 square miles have a combined population of 10,800,000 (Sweden 5,600,000; Denmark, 2,800,000; Norway, 2,400,000), and would be able in case of emergency to put about 450,000 men on a war footing. Though renowned sailors for thousands of years, the Scandinavian countries now have no navies which would be a serious makeweight in a general war; but their countries have a great strategic importance because they flank the Baltic to the west, and because the only international highway from that great sea out to the greater ocean runs through a narrow water, The Sound, which is commanded by their batteries. Hence Germany and Russia are credited with coveting both Denmark and Sweden; and before this great war broke out the Swedes were arming against the possibility of

an attack from the eastward. Though Teutonic in origin and therefore first cousins to the Germans, the Norsemen are not Germanic and have rivaled and fought Germans for ages. As late as 1864 the Prussians proved to the Danes by the resistless logic of bayonets that Schleswig-Holstein was not Danish territory.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM

Holland and Belgium have gone through an interesting history. As the Italian cities were the center of the southern trade, wealth, and culture during the Renaissance, so the cities of the Low Countries, Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, and the rest, were the richest and most intelligent and artistic part of the north. Manufactures and commerce brought them wealth. A system of schools open to a considerable part of the boys, appeared earlier in those regions than anywhere else in Europe. They were parts of the Holy Roman Empire. The Low Dutch language was just as good, and for a long time had as much claim as High Dutch to be the German language. These provinces passed to Spain, revolted against Philip II; and seven of them, of which Holland was the most populous and wealthiest, gathered into a confederation (1579) which has become the modern kingdom of Holland. In its little area of 12,600 square miles live 6,000,000 peo-

ple, who have been among the happiest folk on earth. The country is fertile, the Dutch are good sailors; but the secret of their wealth is the possession of 736,000 square miles of East Indian islands—Java, Sumatra, part of Borneo—which are in a state of vassalage not very far from that of slavery.

Politically and commercially the importance of Holland is that it covers the mouths of the River Rhine. Rotterdam, which has the best and most accessible harbor on the whole coast of the North Sea, except perhaps Antwerp, is an entrepôt of German commerce. Holland is a wall between the German interior and the coast, forcing the Germans to betake themselves to the harbors of Bremen and Hamburg, which are less accessible from the sea side and more remote from the land side, than Rotterdam. The Dutch, who are quite aware of the value of their sea front to other people, have been making an effort to fortify their frontiers and keep up an army.

With their war strength of 175,000 men in Europe and their little navy of fourteen second-class vessels Holland could not defend herself more than a few weeks against any one great enemy; and is not, like Belgium, protected by treaties of neutralization entered into by the Great Powers.

Belgium is the only one of the six northern small powers which has been a party to the

present war, and its experience shows how little any single small power counts in the tremendous combinations of the twentieth century. Belgium, with its 11,000 square miles and its population of 7,400,000, is one of the most thickly settled areas on the globe. In the great struggle with Spain three centuries ago the people took the Catholic side and were long bottled up as Spanish and Austrian provinces, but in 1831 they were allowed to form a separate kingdom, and since that time have flourished. They have quantities of coal and are excellent iron-makers. Their country is a garden. Their late King Leopold, one of the "undesirables" of modern life, contrived to make himself sovereign of an enormous area of 900,000 square miles on the Congo where he substantially made slaves of all the negro population that he could reach. The Belgian nation in 1908 shook him out of that principality and made the Congo a colony of the kingdom. There are great potentialities in this equatorial river region and it would be a lure to any enemy of Belgium.

Belgium, as will be seen further on, is "neutralized" by a general treaty; but it is especially protected by the manifest military interest of Great Britain. It lies opposite the British coast and is closely bound up with Great Britain in trade and business. The royal houses of the two countries are akin. The presence of a hostile

or unfriendly power on that coast would under all circumstances be looked upon by England as a menace, and in 1914 led in a few hours to a declaration of war by England. Like the Dutch the Belgians tried to protect their frontier with modern fortifications, which proved too weak for the recent inventions in siege guns. The Belgian army has a peace strength of 54,000 and a possible war strength of 350,000, and they have shown that though a small country can no longer protect itself against the attack of a large one, it may add considerable strength to an alliance.

SWITZERLAND

The sixth little country, Switzerland, is one of the wonders of our time. Here are two races, Latin and Germanic; four languages, Italian, French, German, and Romansch; twenty-five little states united in a federation; a population under 4,000,000 on an area of 16,000 square miles, of which about half is broken mountains. This is the most democratic of all European countries, with a tradition of six centuries of self-governing cantons. The Swiss are the best hotel-keepers in the world; carry on a profitable dairy industry drawn from pastures above the snow; and are beginning to manufacture on a large scale. No country has ever shown more appreciation of the federal government of the United States, many

elements of which may be found in the Swiss federal constitution.

The Swiss are models to the world of thrift, self-respect, and also of self-protection. They have devised a system of military training under which every able-bodied young man serves at several intervals, making a total of not less than six months under the colors. The result is that within a few hours of the outbreak of war between Germany and France, the Swiss had 200,000 men on their frontier, every one used to marching, camping, and shooting at a mark. They are backed by a mountainous country which in all ages has been easy to defend by a few who knew the ground, against an invading host; and they are likely to go through the war without sending a man across the border or seeing a hostile soldier inside their lines.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Two other small powers are quite out of the radius of the war. Spain with 190,000 square miles, a population of 20,000,000, and an efficient war strength of 300,000, has long since dropped from the once proud position of the strongest power in Europe. Her sympathies are distinctly with France, and the Spaniards would probably throw themselves into the fray if their great Latin neighbor seemed likely to be downed.

The neighboring republic of Portugal, with 34,000 square miles and 6,000,000 people, has for several years been almost torn to pieces by revolutions and counter-revolutions. So far as it has vitality it sides with England as an ancient friend. The more so because Portugal has nearly a million square miles in Africa and finds it desirable to take cover under the wing of the British naval power.

BALKAN STATES

The third group of small powers comes close to the present crisis because the alleged cause of war arose within their boundaries. These are the seven Balkan states, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, and European Turkey. Within twenty-four months these states have been grouped in three different combinations and a fourth seems impending. It is therefore not necessary to consider them separately, except to point out some differences of situation and of relations with the neighboring large powers. There is no unity among them, either of religion, nationality or race; and every one of them is more or less split up into rival races. Their physical make-up is about as given in the table on the following page.

Another Balkan area, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is Austrian territory, and has an area of 20,000 square miles, a population of 2,000,000; a normal

State	Area	Population	Normal War Strength
Rumania	53,000	7,500,000	350,000
Bulgaria	43,000	4,800,000	300,000
Servia	34,000	4,500,000	270,000
Montenegro	6,000	500,000	40,000
Albania	11,000	800,000	40,000
Greece	42,000	4,400,000	250,000
Turkey	11,000	2,000,000	100,000
Total	200,000	24,500,000	1,350,000

war strength of 100,000; and 650,000 Slavs in Dalmatia, which is part of the coast of the Balkan area.

Here are about 26,000,000 people occupying a region which ought to be a geographic unity. The commercial situation is unique, for the Balkans front on the Black Sea, the Ægean Sea, the Adriatic Sea, and the great navigable Danube. The Balkans are also on the only land route between central Europe and Asia Minor, and that is the inevitable line of a continuous railway system stretching from the coast of the North Sea to the coast of the Yellow Sea in China.

The Rumanians think of themselves as a Latin race and the Bulgarians as an Asiatic race, although there seems little doubt that the main constituent in both cases is Slavic. In all these

countries, taken together, the Turks are 2,000,000 in number, the Greeks are 4,000,000, and the Albanians some 1,200,000, leaving a total of Balkan Slavs (if all Bulgarians and Rumanians are included) of 17,000,000.

The military strength of this population is tolerably well known through the wars of 1912 and 1913 in which every one of these powers was engaged and most of them twice over. With the exception of Rumania, which has valuable oil fields, they are all agricultural countries with little mining, manufacturing or shipping. The women are accustomed at all times to work in the fields, and with the aid of the children and old men can summon the fortitude to raise a crop and harvest it. Hence, it is possible to put into the field ten per cent of the whole population for short campaigns. All the armies actually engaged, whether Servian, Bulgarian, Montenegrin, or Greek, have shown a capacity for long marches, hard sieges and tough fighting. It is perfectly clear that if all the Balkan powers, or the Balkan powers south of the Danube, had hung together after the first Balkan War of 1912-1913, that Austria-Hungary would never have dreamed of stirring up a hornets' nest down there. A Balkan confederation which could hang together ten years would have a great effect on European politics, by its ability to defend itself and settle its own problems.

A special weakness in the Balkan situation is the anarchy in Albania, a so-called country which is no country. There are hundreds of thousands of Albanians, speaking one Albanian language; but there never has been an Albanian country, an Albanian government, an Albanian literature, an Albanian national spirit. The so-called Albania is filled with tribes as kindly to each other as the Highland clans of Scotland in old days. Albania is a dead weight upon every effort to settle the Balkans. Another weak spot is Turkey, which will be considered further on as an Asiatic power.

CHAPTER III

THE SIX GREAT POWERS

ITALY

OF the six great powers the smallest in population and resources at present is Italy, though that country has passed through the most spectacular history in human annals. In ancient conditions southern Italy was the geographical center of the world for trade, for war, and for government. It was occupied by a great people who maintained the Roman civilization and with it encircled the Mediterranean Sea during seven eventful centuries. The fall of the Roman Empire is a thing for us moderns to take to heart, for it meant that the highest science and most powerful organization of those times was unavailing against the crush of crude but daring numbers. Italy, which had been the richest and safest country in the world became the prey of Western barbarians who sacked the cities, burned the fleets, threw down the aqueducts, uprooted the government, and

killed a large part of the population. It took fourteen centuries to bring back to the peninsula a common Italian nationality, and the physical ability to defend itself.

That work was finished only the other day; for it was in 1870 when the kingdom of Italy was completed and the capital was removed to Rome. The present population of Italy is 35,000,000, living on 110,000 square miles of territory to which should be added the 406,000 square miles of the new colony of Tripoli with 530,000 inhabitants. Italy has an army based on universal service after the German model; but it has had no recent test except the conquest of Tripoli in 1912. The normal war strength is about 700,000.

In addition Italy has a navy which twenty-five years ago was a factor in international questions, and on which it has recently been spending about $40,000,000 a year. Navies are now reckoned in terms of "dreadnoughts," after an ironclad completed by England in 1906 of a size and power never before reached. Vessels of that type or larger are "dreadnoughts" or "super-dreadnoughts." The previous type of battleship is a "pre-dreadnought" or a second-class ship; and they are still available for fleet operations, as are new-model torpedo-boats, "destroyers" and submarines. Below the pre-dreadnoughts all battleships are antiquated and worthless for fleet operations, and may be left out of account in

taking stock of the forces of the various nations. When, therefore, it is said that Italy possesses six dreadnoughts and twenty second-class cruisers, it is shown to be a respectable naval ally; and the possession of that navy made it possible to occupy Tripoli and to compel Turkey not only to yield her slender claims on that province, but to give up the Greek Islands.

Although without coal, Italy has considerable manufactures and the Italians have revived their ancient shipping trade. They are good shipbuilders and good sailors, and their vessels are found on every sea. It is rather a poor country in comparison with some of its neighbors, the public revenue being under $600,000,000, or about $16 per capita. In addition there are heavy provincial and municipal taxes and it is estimated that more than a fourth of the annual income of the nation goes into the public treasury. The debt of $2,800,000,000, or about four and a half years' income, is out of proportion to the means of the country, especially since Italy has been engaged in no European war since 1866.

FRANCE

Next in order of population is France, the very name of which, curiously enough, is German, for the Franks who pushed into what is now northern France were first cousins of the Saxons

and the Lombards. French novelists still like to make out that the Gascons of southern France are of a different intellectual strain from their northern co-citizens; but there is no country in Europe in which there are fewer visible race and national strains than in France. Gauls, Romans, Teutons, and Normans have been fused into one French race. Except for a few insignificant corners of the country, nothing but French is heard. Provençal and "Felibrism" are rather gentle sports, somewhat like composing modern ballads in the Scotch of Robert Burns. Few educated Frenchmen readily speak any other modern language.

The defeat of 1870-71 by the Prussians sobered and solidified the country. There has been an internal strife between the Clericals and the governors of the Roman Church; and another between Socialists and capitalists. When it comes to a great crisis like the present one, France is a unit: there are no longer parties or factions. That defeat forced France to provide a wonderful system of public schools, well ordered, and very effective: the present illiteracy is only 4 per cent. The defeat also led to a military preparation almost beyond the ability of the country to bear. A part of the army has been used in colonial wars and for colonial garrisons; on the other hand the African provinces furnish black troops.

On 207,000 square miles of territory lives a population of 40,000,000. The peace strength of the army is 570,000; its formal war strength about 1,400,000; and its uttermost strength probably about seven per cent of the population, which would make 3,000,000 soldiers in arms for a short time. The French navy was not many years ago second only to the British but it has failed to keep up with the advance of other countries. It includes nine super-dreadnoughts and dreadnoughts, and about twenty second-class ships. France has made a desperate effort to protect the frontiers with heavy forts; but had not yet come to the point of carrying the system northward along the frontier of Belgium to the sea.

Commercially and financially France is one of the strongest countries in the world. Besides 31,000 miles of railway there are 10,000 miles of canals and navigable rivers. The merchant marine has a tonnage of 1,500,000. The exports are about 1,200 million dollars; and the imports 1,600 millions, part of the difference being paid in the form of interest on French loans to other countries. The mine products are worth 150 millions and the total manufactures are not far from 2,000 millions.

The French people are notably thrifty; and a few years after the "*débâcle*" of the Prussian war of 1871, paid their war indemnity of 1,000

million dollars, and began to save again. The country is heavily taxed—about 700 million dollars a year; and the debt is fearful, 6,576 million dollars, or ten years' national income, and steadily increasing in time of peace when this war broke out. Against this burden is placed the French industry, inventiveness and artistic taste which give to the country leadership in many lines of trade, and a most intense national spirit.

France possesses colonies with the prodigious area of 4,500,000 square miles, and a population of 41,000,000, of which only a few thousand are French. These colonies include Algeria, Tunis and Morocco; large and not immediately valuable tracts in tropical Africa; French Indo-China; and a few small posts and settlements. So far more French money has gone into these colonies than has come out.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

In striking contrast with the two highly centralized and unified countries just described is the Empire of Austria-Hungary. On paper it bulks large; its territory is 261,000 square miles; its population about 52,000,000. It is a central empire, for its boundaries touch those of Russia, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Montenegro, Servia, and Rumania. It has a proud history of victory over eastern and less civilized neighbors, and has

administered a great empire for many centuries. Its capitals, Vienna and Budapest, are among the most splendid of modern cities. The Emperor, who is also the Archduke of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, is head of the imperial family of Hapsburg, which for about five hundred years included the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the leading figure among all German states, whether within or without his domains. Austria was repeatedly the foe of Napoleon, and was one of the alliance which at last overwhelmed him. From his fall in 1815 to 1859, Austria, though never at war with any of her great neighbors, was the leading power in eastern Europe.

When the make-up of the Empire is examined, its many elements of weakness will at once be seen. It includes half a score different races, and four religious confessions. In intelligence and education it is far behind its western neighbors: the illiteracy in Austria is 26 per cent and in Hungary 41 per cent. A fundamental weakness of the Empire is that it is divided into two rival halves, the boundary between which is the River Leitha which enters into the Danube just above Pressburg. They are often called Austria and Hungary, from the principal court in each. More correct terms are for the western half "Cis-Leithia" and for the eastern half "Trans-Leithia," each including all the provinces

in its part of the Empire, which as a whole is commonly called The Dual Monarchy. The western half is further subdivided into seventeen provinces, each with its Diet, such as Upper Austria, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Duchy of Tyrol, and so on. Trans-Leithia is subdivided into two provinces of which the Apostolic Kingdom of Hungary is the most populous.

Here are all the materials for a federal government: a central authority based on nineteen provinces besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, each with its own legislature; and a central government. There is, however, no federal government; first because it would break up the dual arrangement which is a concession to the pride of the Hungarians; secondly, because it would take the numerous Slav provinces out from under the control of Austria or of Hungary and give them an opportunity to combine their forces in a common congress.

On paper Austria-Hungary is rich and powerful. The total governmental revenues for local, provincial, Hungarian, Austrian, and general purposes are about 1,100 million dollars a year, a per capita of about $21; the debt was, at the beginning of this war, 3,800 million dollars, or almost three and a half years' income. The steam tonnage was 560,000, for Austria has a large carrying trade in the Mediterranean, to the Orient, and to New York. The Austrians are

great road builders, as is shown by their 29,000 miles of railroad and 8,000 miles of canals and navigable rivers. The imports are about 680 millions a year and the exports 550 millions, the difference being partly freight money and probably in part an increase of private debt. Austria has coal and some iron and its mines bring it in 100 million dollars a year. The Austrians, especially the Bohemians, are excellent business men, competent to manage large enterprises; but there is a rift between the two sections, because the Austrian side has the only good fuel and contains most of the manufactures, leaving the Hungarian side chiefly agricultural. Austria is the only great European power which has no colonies.

The Austro-Hungarian army has a nominal peace strength of 312,000, which is only about half as great as in France and Germany, and a formal war strength of 900,000. The army looks good to the outsider; the men are well set up, the officers trim and soldierly. The Emperor is a military figure, the spirit and traditions of the people are warlike. Nevertheless the Austrians have been beaten whenever they have gone to war in the last half-century. In 1848 the Hungarians successfully revolted and were only subdued by the aid of Russian troops. In 1859 the French and Sardinians defeated the Austrians at Solferino in North Italy; in 1866 the Prussians took only one month to crush the Austrians at

Königgrätz. In the campaigns of 1914 the Austrians, perhaps for reasons that cast no discredit on their military spirit and organization, were beaten in early battles by the Servians and the Russians.

An element of weakness which has affected all these contests is the make-up of an army in which there are more Slavs than all other races put together. The Austrian policy for many years was to hold down Hungary with Italian regiments and Italy with Hungarian regiments; and now the forces are probably so disposed that Austro-Servians are not set to fight their blood brethren from the Balkans. As a tactical unit, however, the Austrian army is much less to be taken into account than the French, German, or Russian. The navy is very small, with only three first-class ships and fifteen of the second class; since the only seaports are Trieste and Dalmatia there is little chance for naval operations in the open sea.

GREAT BRITAIN

As one of the warring powers, Great Britain has had until 1914 the double advantage of being an island and of possessing the most powerful navy in the world. Von Moltke, the great German tactician, is said to have said that he had worked out three different plans for invading England, but none for getting out again. The distance

across the channel is so short that if an army could be got on board transports lying off the Belgian, French or Dutch coast at nine o'clock at night, it could be disembarked on the English coast at daylight the next morning. What are the material resources which can protect England from this danger of a sudden crushing invasion?

The Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is smaller than any of the Continental powers except Italy. It contains only 120,000 square miles, inhabited by 46,000,000 people. The wealth of Great Britain is its combination of manufactures and commerce. Its mines produce 260 million dollars a year. It exports 2,000 millions a year of manufactured goods and about 1,500 millions more of other products. The total imports are 4,200 millions. To carry this total commerce of 7,700 millions it has 11 million tons of steam vessels and another million of sailing vessels. Its enormous capital is invested all over the globe; and though the French are considered to be the richest European nation, the British are the busiest and the most generally prosperous. The annual income of the home government is about 1,000 million dollars a year, or about $21 per capita. The national debt up to 1914 was 3,500 millions, or three and a half years' income.

In addition to its home wealth England rules the greatest colonial empire in the world, occupy-

ing 11 million square miles of the earth's surface, with a population of 400 million human beings, of whom only 15 millions are European. This empire includes the semi-continent of Australia, the great stretch of Canada, and vast areas in Asia and Africa.

In military strength Great Britain is far behind the continental powers. The regular army includes less than 200,000 men, of whom half are in the colonies; its so-called war strength is 800,000, the greater part of which are, however, raw levies entirely unused to war. At its utmost need the United Kingdom could perhaps call out for defense from invasion another million of green troops. In September, 1914, the war office intimated that it expected to put 1,500,000 men in the field within twelve months.

Nevertheless the British navy makes Great Britain a great and immediate military power. Its first-class ships, dreadnoughts or better, were at the beginning of the war 31, against 21 similar German ships; the second-class ships were 90 against 38 for the Germans. The naval war strength is 130,000 men. Not only is the navy large; it has behind it the traditions and experience of centuries of sea power; and during the first weeks of the war it almost bottled up the Germans. England also succeeded in protecting her commerce through the Mediterranean and Suez Canal and across the Atlantic, and was able

to bring thousands of native East Indian troops to reinforce her army fighting in France.

RUSSIA

Russia has for centuries been a reservoir of compressed political gas, pushing in every direction for an outlet. When Peter the Great came to the throne two centuries ago the Germans and Swedes almost shut him out of the Baltic, and the Tartars cut him off from the Black Sea. War after war was necessary to gain free access to those waters. Meanwhile the Russians pushed eastward through the almost unpopulated area of north Asia, until they reached the Pacific. The Black Sea is only a station on the way to the world's open waters, and the obvious line of approach for Russia is through the Bosphorus and the Ægean Sea to the Mediterranean.

Notwithstanding these geographical disadvantages, Russia is an immense and growing Empire. The area in Europe is 2,100,000 square miles, with a population of 144 millions. Beyond the Urals Russia holds over 6,000,000 square miles with an additional population of 27,000,000. Russia boasts control of the largest number of Europeans that have been held under one sway since the fall of the Roman Empire.

The country is in many ways poor. Its income of 1,500 million dollars is only about $9

per capita. The national debt of 4,500 million dollars is not far from three years' income. These immense sums are possible because of the great numbers of people, each of whom can contribute a little. European Russia is two-thirds the size of the United States and has about 38,000 miles of railroad against 250,000 in this country. The imports have been about 650 million dollars and the accession of Czar Peter, who admired a sixth of the foreign commerce of Great Britain. Mining and manufactures are little developed. The steam tonnage is only 500,000.

As a fighting machine Russia is much less efficient than most other European countries because the country has relatively few railroads and good highways; and the people are on a low intellectual plane, the percentage of illiteracy being at least 50 per cent. This is not simply because they are Slavs, for out of the 144 millions, only about 108 millions are Slavs. It is because of a general low state of social and political development. Nevertheless, the Russian army has good fighting material, though the officers are too few for the troops, and are generally considered inferior in fiber and training to the Germans and Austrians.

Russian wars have been very numerous, but it is a significant fact that since 1762, when the Russian army was fighting Frederick the Great and the accession of Czar Peter, who admired Frederick, suddenly changed Prussia's enemy into

an ally, there has been no war between Germany and Russia. They fought as allies against Napoleon. Bismarck contrived a three-Emperor alliance in 1872, in which the various sorts of eagles learned to nest together for the time. Further, previous to 1914 no serious hostilities ever arose between Russia and Austria, in the whole history of both countries.

The military strength of the Empire is hard to estimate because the army has been undergoing changes since the defeat by the Japanese in 1905. The peace strength is stated at 1,200,000, which is about twice that of any other nation. The war strength is loosely set down at 5,500,000. The number of men actually available is larger than in most countries because Russian levies for war do not break up ordinary occupations. When Germany or Austria mobilizes, many industries stop on a few hours' notice. In Russia, just as in the Balkans, the fields can be tilled for a season or two even though great numbers of men be taken away. Russia might for a few months turn ten per cent of its population into soldiers, as Servia and Bulgaria did in 1913, without commercial ruin. That would make 14,000,000 soldiers; but nobody has ever devised transportation or commissariat for such hordes. Nevertheless a fraction of the population, aggregating 6,000,000, could be raised and yet would leave 96 per cent of the people at home. If an

army of a million were destroyed, another million to replace it would only be about three per cent of the able-bodied males. In addition Russia contains a population of 27,000,000 in Asia.

Two Russian fleets were destroyed by the Japanese ten years ago. The Russian navy was in process of reconstruction when the war came on but had not gone far, for Russia counts only about four dreadnoughts and sixteen second-class ships. Even a larger force would be of little service bottled up in the Baltic or Black Sea. Though John Paul Jones was once Admiral in the Russian navy, that arm of the service has never distinguished itself.

In land war Russia is the only European country that cannot be penetrated by any force that is likely to be brought against it. Napoleon's Grand Army of 550,000 men, probably the most tremendous that up to that time had ever been brought under one command, was defeated by the three great military geniuses, General Frost, General Famine, and General Kutusoff. The Allies in the Crimean War never carried their invasion out of sight of salt water. In the present war the Germans and Austrians for a time occupied part of Russian Poland, but were pushed back when the main Russian army came up. This double quality of a country almost impervious to invasion, which at the same time can pour out almost an indefinite number of men for offense,

gives Russia a power in war and a weight in European councils which has not yet been put to its full proof.

GERMANY

By common consent the greatest military power in Europe is Germany. The area of 209,000 square miles is almost exactly equal to France; but though Germany is inferior to France in natural fertility it harbors a population of 65,000,000. In its colonies, which are chiefly African, the 1,000,000 square miles contain 12,000,000 negroes and only 24,000 white people. Germany by its magnificent system of common schools has banished illiteracy: 99 per cent of the people above ten years of age can both read and write. Probably as many as two or three million Germans know some other language than their own. No country has ever yet succeeded like Germany in adapting science to the arts both of peace and of war. The Germans are wonderful chemists, great manufacturers, fine shipbuilders; and their Krupp guns, their dirigibles, their explosives, are unrivaled.

The country has a magnificent system of railroads and canals and a splendid merchant marine. It contains 38,000 miles of railroad and over 8,000 miles of canals and navigable rivers. The Kiel Canal from the Baltic to the North Sea gives it a water connection within its own boun-

daries which enables it to use its fleet either in the east or the west at its will. Prussia was always a frugal nation and Germany has had a similar reputation, but the national expenditure is not far from 1,000 millions a year, which is about $15 per capita. The public debt is for the Empire about 1,000 million dollars and for the states and cities 4,000 millions more. Ever since the war with France in 1871 Germany has kept a part of the thousand million dollars, exacted from France as an indemnity, as a special military war chest; and it is probably now in use.

The foundations of Germany's intellectual greatness go back to the German Renaissance which included the Reformation, but the country suffered terribly from the Thirty Years' War. In 1618 there were 30,000,000 Germans, who inhabited perhaps the most prosperous and enlightened country in the world, abounding in castles, monasteries, cathedrals, cities, pictures, and statues. In 1648 only 12,000,000 Germans were left from the slaughter of soldiers, the fearful harrying of the country people, and the destruction of proud cities such as Magdeburg. It was two centuries before Germany came back to a population of 30,000,000, and out of poverty and barrenness began to build up a new world of thought. The Germans were the first modern European country to organize university instruc-

tion on the basis of a select and expert body of professors and freedom of choice of their studies by the students. Goethe lamented that the Germans should be so strong in mind and yet so wretched for lack of a national existence.

Bismarck and King William I created the nation by their genius, and founded the German Empire in 1871 on a military system. There is now hardly an able-bodied man in Germany old enough to shoulder a musket, who has not served for a few months or a year or two as a soldier, living in barracks, and carrying his rifle and knapsack, exercising, sweating, marching and maneuvering.

The number of men called up has been increased till the peace strength was officially stated at 790,000 and the war strength at 1,900,000. The Landwehr, who are men in the prime of life, at once raise the available men when war breaks out to about 4,000,000, which is 6 per cent of the total population. The Landsturm, of still older men, would, in a pinch, increase the force available for defense against invasion to 5,000,000 or even 6,000,000, including volunteers not liable for service, and temporary levies.

Those are almost impossible figures, because Germany does not live entirely off her own land, but like England has a great manufacturing population which draws part of its food supply from

outside. To draft 10 per cent of the population into the army would mean such a dislocation of the whole social and business system that, if continued more than a few weeks, it would spell commercial ruin. 6,000,000 men are not much below half the German men between 17 and 45.

The intellectual and military development of Germany is no more wonderful than its extraordinary development in manufactures and commerce. In 1913 Germany was exporting 2,500 million dollars' worth of products of which about 1,500 million were manufactures; and was importing nearly 3,000 million dollars' worth, a total foreign trade almost two-thirds as large as Great Britain's. To help carry this enormous commerce Germany owned 3,000,000 tons of shipping, nearly all steam vessels, which made it the second commercial power in the world, next to, although only one-fourth as large as, Great Britain. The mines of Germany produced 600 million dollars a year. The wealth from these colossal transactions has flowed into banks and financial institutions of every kind: it was shown in the rapid growth of beautiful cities; in magnificent highways; in great railway stations and bridges and tunnels; in the colossal subscription to government loans in 1914. In thirty years the country has been changed from an agricultural nation with some manufacturing and shipping interests, to a commercial nation which rivaled and

pushed Great Britain in all quarters of the globe.

The present German Emperor nearly twenty years ago became a convert to the idea that a German navy must be created to protect and foster German colonies and German trade. He seems to have been influenced by that remarkable book, Admiral Mahan's "Sea Power," of which the central thought was that in time of war the object of naval operations is to destroy the main fleet of the enemy; and then your own fleet can go where it likes, picking up the colonies of the other side. Germany began in 1898 to make great sacrifices to build a powerful navy, which in 1914 reached 21 first-class and 38 second-class ships of war, with a multitude of smaller craft and a force of 200,000 men.

NON-EUROPEAN ELEMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN WAR

It remains to notice some parts of the world outside of Europe which are brought into the pending struggle and share the fortunes of one or the other group of contestants. First come the colonies of the various nations, so far as they are fighting units. Only one great power can and does draw men, ships, and supplies from its outliers: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape Colonies, and India have all proved in the present war that they recognize their part in the

mighty British Empire, and will share the dangers of the mother country in a European war. The number of troops which they can speedily add to the British forces is probably a hundred thousand; and in case things should go hard with Great Britain that number might be doubled or trebled.

A second power, France, has built up in the colonies in North Africa a native army of good soldiers, the so-called Zouaves or Turcos. A few thousand of them fought in 1871 and a larger contingent has been put into the lines opposite the Germans in 1914. In case of a long war there is at least a recruiting ground in Africa for several hundred thousand French troops. The French colonies farther south in Africa, Madagascar, and French Indo-China have not been organized to the point where they can give aid to their mother country.

A third power, Russia, has no colonies over seas, but can draw upon her Asiatic population of 27,000,000 for from 500,000 to 1,000,000 troops, including such renowned fighting men as the Circassians, and the men of Samarcand and Khiva. The new Italian colony of Tripoli is in no position to give effective aid to the mother country. The Germans have a few thousand native troops in their African colonies, but they are too few and too distant to be drawn upon.

Two independent Asiatic countries have shared,

or are likely to share, in the fortunes of the war. Japan has in its limits of 149,000 square miles a population of about 52,000,000; in addition it holds Formosa with 3,000,000 people and Korea with 14,000,000. The peace army is about 225,000, but within ten years Japan has shown a capacity to raise, transport, and supply nearly a million men. The navy, which was strong in 1905, has now been outstripped by western nations. The Japanese have built three dreadnoughts and have perhaps thirty second-class ships. The Japanese are excellent sailors and their ability to place forces of several hundred thousand men where they will on the eastern coast of Asia makes them a power to be reckoned with. In addition Japan is in alliance with Great Britain and under pledge to protect the British interests in the Orient in case of war, and has entered the contest, the first object of attack being the German colony of Kiao-Chao.

The other Asiatic power is Turkey, which till 1913 held territory reaching up till it touched Bosnia, and had still several million European subjects. Through their hold on Constantinople and both sides of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Turks control the entrance to the Black Sea; and they are in a geographical position to throw an army, if they had one, northward through Bulgaria or northwest through Macedonia. Unfortunately there is no Turkish army in the mod-

ern sense. German officers undertook to reconstruct the army in 1912; but in the war of 1913 the Turks were beaten in every pitched battle, and forced to surrender every great fortress that was besieged.

None of the European Balkan powers has any naval strength, except Greece, which in 1914 bought two American ironclads of the second class, intended to offset two vessels ordered by Turkey in England. These latter ships have been taken over by England, but the Turks in August, 1914, acquired two powerful German ironclads which took refuge in the Dardanelles. The Turks are, however, neighbors to the Russians in Armenia and war is not unlikely to break out on that frontier.

CHAPTER IV

NON-POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF EUROPE

INDUSTRIAL UNITIES

MOST of the nations described in the preceding chapter are not only territorial and nearly racial units, but have one or two acknowledged national lines of activity. For instance, the Scandinavian countries are large producers of food and are just beginning to develop their water power into manufactures. None of them has colonial aspirations, except for Iceland, Greenland, and the little group of West India Islands including St. Thomas and St. Croix, which Denmark has twice been on the point of selling to the United States. Holland at home depends on a remarkably intensive tillage, and some manufactures; but lives chiefly from trade. The three great interests of Switzerland, hotels, dairy products, and manufactures, merge easily into each other. Belgium is preëminently a manufacturing country with large and profitable industries of coal, iron, and machinery.

So with the great powers. Italy is a prosperous agricultural country and in the north has large manufactures, and in all parts has a lively shipping trade. England is predominantly a manufacturing and commercial country. Even Ireland, though a prosperous agricultural region, includes the great manufacturing and shipbuilding district around Belfast. France resembles Great Britain in its commercial interests, but in addition is a rich agricultural country, having one monopoly product, champagne, which is attractive both to civilians and military men from surrounding countries. Germany, though it contains a strong constituency of large land-owners who demand and receive consideration for their agriculture, has become an industrial country much ruled by industrial considerations. The manufacturers, forwarders, and vessel-owners have a powerful influence on the government and have been able to direct the policy of the Empire toward foreign trade and colonies. In Austria-Hungary agriculture and industry divide on very nearly the line between the two halves of the Empire, and that causes a serious strain. The Balkans are an agricultural region exporting cattle and grain and every one of them wants its own outports. Russia possesses some mineral wealth, including coal, but the greater part of the people are land-owners or land tillers. The nation is not divided upon any material issues.

SOCIAL UNITIES

From the point of view of social life every one of the European countries is divided into clearly recognized upper and lower classes. The contrasts between the very wealthy and the very poor are nowhere sharper than in many parts of the United States, but they are harder to overcome; partly from the tradition that a family once peasant must remain peasant; partly from the action of the trades unions in cultivating a class feeling. The stratum of wage-earners is much more permanent than in America. The likelihood that the child of a poor family will come to be a man of consequence is decidedly less. The military system tends to divide most of the European countries sharply between the social class from which officers are taken, and the social class of the privates.

These contrasts of material conditions are strengthened by the existence in all European countries, except Switzerland and the Balkan states, of an hereditary nobility, which includes a large number of the great land-owners, is recruited from the richest business men, and enjoys a decided preference for important and well-paid state offices, both civil and military. In some countries the nobility is a tradition instead of an actual factor in the nation's life. Thus in France noble families, whether their titles go back to the

Bourbon kings or the Bonaparte emperors, possess only what might be called a trademark in their titles. They have a legal right to use them and anybody else who assumes them can be prosecuted; but they carry no privileges and the list of general officers in the present French army shows that men without even the "de" may aspire to high military station. Even in plain and democratic Switzerland members of certain families in most of the cantons have an unwritten but recognized preference when they put themselves forward as candidates for election to public office.

In all the other countries, England, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Italy—even in Holland, Denmark and Sweden—there is a caste of nobles who not only think themselves, but are thought by the lower class, to be made of a superior clay. In Germany the privileges of inherited rank are reduced to a system. Nobody can be a general in the army unless he is a "von." If necessary, he receives the distinction when he is promoted. The German nobility, outside of the reigning families, is, in general, not rich. The Emperor is fond of speaking of "my poor nobility" as a class for which he must provide by opening up a military career to its sons. These young men, together with the sons of the industrial and middle class, form the famous "officer class," which is one of the chief buttresses of the German army. In time of peace they are the hardworking drill-masters

and administrators of their commands, the adored heroes of the middle-class maidens, the uniformed and sometimes proprietary ornaments of the city streets. In time of war they furnish a body of highly skilled professional soldiers, filled to the brim with genuine patriotism, devoted to their work, furiously loyal to their Emperor, prodigal of their lives, the like of which the world has seldom seen. On the other hand some Germans complain of the current notion that the officers are superior in ability and character to all their countrymen.

The growth of democracy has brought about severe strains within several of the European countries, strains which somewhat weaken several of the contestants in the war. Even in Germany the Social Democratic party casts over 4,000,000 votes, which is more than a third of the total voters, some of whom recently played a practical joke by electing a Socialist member to the Reichstag from the district in which His Imperial Majesty has his usual residence. Up to the outbreak of the war there were many declarations that they would overwhelm the military party by a general strike of workmen in case war should come on. In Norway the democratic spirit has been so strong that the country nine years ago almost became a republic; and the people, like the English in 1688, elected their own king. In England the people at large, including workmen and

agricultural laborers, have gradually got control of the government; and their head representative, the Prime Minister, is a parliamentary king of far greater significance to the nation than the crowned king and his court.

None of the countries now involved, however, has in this crisis suffered from a public opposition to the war; partly because the war broke out in such a manner as to make every country believe that it must fight or perish; partly because the man subject to military duty who questions the righteousness of mobilization is likely to be shot; partly because even the Social Democrats would not venture to link with their movement and its destinies the odium of having weakened their nation at a critical moment. Whatever the result of the war, the democratic spirit is likely to come up again and there may be social revolutions like that of Russia only nine years ago. Still the principle of a privileged and titled class is dear to most Europeans, and it is not likely soon to disappear, no matter what defeats the military men may suffer from others than their countrymen.

RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

The completeness of national spirit just now in Europe is the more striking because there are several systems of grouping on that continent

which pay little attention to national boundaries. Five churches, most of which have a prodigious number of members, are scattered through Europe, subdividing several countries into religious groups which have for ages been suspicious of each other. In round numbers there are in Europe 110 million Greek Catholics, 180 million Roman Catholics, 98 million Protestants, 8 million Moslems, 9 million Jews, a total of 405 million inhabitants between the Ural Mountains and Iceland. In general terms the Greek Catholics and Moslems all live in the east and southeast; the Roman Catholics in southern and central Europe, the Protestants in northern and western Europe; the Jews are widely distributed with large numbers concentrated in Poland and some other districts of Russia, and in the eastern provinces of Austria.

If there were five nations corresponding to these five religious groups the present war could be better understood, for from the days of Constantine the Great, the first Christian Roman Emperor, to the Balkan Crisis of 1912, religion has been one of the chief motives for European wars. The fearful Thirty Years' War was a conscious effort of German Catholics and German Protestants each to stamp out the other's religion. There is vague talk of proclaiming a Holy War of all the Moslems in behalf of Turkey in this year 1914. If all the Protestants would

act together, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, North Germany, England, Wales, and Scotland, and parts of Switzerland and Hungary would be fighting side by side. If all the Roman Catholics would organize, France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, South Germany, Austria, most of Hungary, German, Russian, and Austrian Poland, and part of Albania would be firing back across the Protestant entrenchments. If the Greek Catholics were moved by one religious impulse, the greater part of Russia, almost all the Balkans, and several million Austrian subjects would take the field. If the Moslems pulled together, the remnant of Turkey, part of Albania, 600,000 Albanians, 600,000 Bulgarians, and 6,000,000 Russian subjects in Europe would be sharpening their scimitars around the same crescent.

Such wars would at least have behind them some clear and positive rule of action; and such wars may conceivably come again. The Turks carried the Koran as far as Vienna as late as 1683. The Prince Bishop of Salzburg exiled his Protestant subjects as late as 1730, and some of them came over to Georgia and built another Salzburg. The Jews in Rumania and in Russia have been put into a kind of social and political inferno, as a non-military way of fighting them. Why is it that the religious motive has almost no place in the present war?

Chiefly because, though every nation involved

has a state church, every nation also admits the right of its subjects to choose and practice some different religion; and to sound the trumpet of a religious war would mean in most countries to begin a civil war. The present policy of every modern state, including even Turkey, is to call every one of its subjects to the patriotic work of war and to avoid religious distinctions. Few would care to encounter the stigma of belonging to a non-militant church in the midst of a population otherwise all liable to military service.

LACK OF RELIGIOUS RIVALRY IN THE WAR

A few simple statistics will show clearly why every one of the great powers carefully avoids religious issues. Italy is from the religious point of view the most unified of the six powers. Professed Roman Catholics make up about 34,000,000 out of the 35,000,000 people. There are in the country only 40,000 Jews and 70,000 Protestants. Yet all the world knows that at least half the men in Italy would oppose any State policy which tended to give the Catholic Church greater power and authority than it now has. In France the conditions are much the same. Over 38,000,000 out of 40,000,000 are officially Catholics, and there are no less than sixty-seven Catholic bishops in the country. Nevertheless, ever since 1901 there has been a political struggle

going on between the majority in the French legislative bodies and the Church authorities, in which the State has relentlessly dissolved more than five hundred Catholic associations. The French Protestants are 1,500,000 in number, and much resemble the Church of England people in Great Britain. They are prosperous and in some parts of Southern France are a strong and vigorous element, but are intensely patriotic. When the war broke out, Catholic priests returned from exile to join the army, and Protestant pastors are fighting alongside them.

Great Britain is far more divided in a religious point of view than most people realize. Out of the 46,000,000 inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland, 6,000,000 are Catholics, of whom 3,250,000 live in Ireland, as against 600,000 Irish Episcopalians and 450,000 Irish Presbyterians. The rivalry between Catholics and Protestants agitated England from the Reformation in 1534 to the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, but not a trace of it appears in the attitude of the British people toward this war.

In Germany the situation is even more striking because in the population of 65,000,000 there are 24,000,000 Roman Catholics and 600,000 Jews. Even in Protestant Prussia there are 15,000,000 Catholics out of 40,000,000, and in Alsace-Lorraine, Bavaria, and Baden there are more Catholics than Protestants.

Germany has gone through long religious quarrels in the Imperial Reichstag and especially in the Prussian Landtag where Bismarck for years fought the claims of the Catholic Church and supported the "Falk Laws" of 1880, intended to curb that Church. Not a vestige of that controversy appears in the German preparations and campaigns of 1914.

Even in the Balkans, now that the Moslems are turned out, there is little religious controversy except that the Greek, Bulgarian, and Servian national churches each has an organization which is as much political as religious. The two countries in which religious dissensions ought to play the largest part are Austria and Russia. In Austria-Hungary there are 34,000,000 Roman Catholics, 10,000,000 Greek Catholics, 4,500,000 other Christians, including the lively Calvinists and Unitarians of Hungary, and 2,500,000 Jews. Here are elements for endless difficulty, particularly since the Hapsburg imperial house is strongly Roman Catholic. However, Austria long since learned that toleration is the only possible system for an Empire so loosely knit together.

In Russia the situation is peculiar because four of the five European churches have millions of adherents in that Empire; and because the government has for many years been distinctly hostile to any church or organization outside the official and highly centralized state Greek Catho-

lic Church as established in Russia. Though the Balkans and Russians were brought into the Christian faith by missionaries of the Greek faith that Church has for the last thousand years shown little missionary spirit. Wherever its adherents go priests and bishops follow them; but the Russian Church has never made an effort to convert either other Christians or the heathen outside its own dominions. Perhaps for that reason it has been the more arrogant and intolerant over its own subjects. Nevertheless it has been necessary to give freedom of religious worship to the 14,000,000 Moslems in European and Asiatic Russia. Poland was a Roman Catholic country when divided in 1775, and Russian Poland continues Catholic to this day in spite of all efforts to break up that church. There are more than 12,000,000 of this faith. The 6,000,000 Jews have, in spite of all obstacles, maintained their faith and there are some prospects that, because they have taken up their military service so unhesitatingly, they may receive the privileges of Russian subjects. The Poles are encouraged to fight the battles of Russia because they will thereby earn the right to remain Roman Catholics.

RACE DIVISIONS AMONG MINOR POWERS

Social and religious subdivisions clearly play a small part in the rivalries which have brought on the war. How far have the differences of race

been a factor? The race map of Europe is even more confused and puzzling than the map of religions; but it is easy to trace the effect of races upon the grouping of the present belligerent nations. The 405 millions of Europeans are subdivided into four great groups: the Slav; the Asiatic; the Teutonic; and the Latin; each of which is again subdivided into smaller portions. In round numbers the Slavs number 140 millions; the Latin peoples—that is, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Italy, together with the Swiss and Austrian Italians and the kindred Greeks—make up 110 millions. The Germanic peoples, including nearly all the Germans, the Scandinavians, Dutch, Flemish Belgians, and English, together with northern Switzerland, are 127 millions, and to them may be added the remnants of the Celtic race in Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, making in all 135 millions. The Asiatic races include the Finns, the Magyars, the Turko-Tatars of Russia, and perhaps the Bulgarians, and the remnants of the Turks in the Balkans, together about 20,000,000.

These are the gross figures, but they are far from representing the real effect of race in dividing countries and creating race antipathies. Taking first of all the minor countries, the three Scandinavian powers and Holland, Spain, Portugal, are each of a nearly pure native stock and subject to no race strains from within; still their

foreign policy is somewhat affected by relations with neighbors of the same stock as themselves. For example, the Dutch are probably suspicious of the Germans because of the possible claim that people of substantially the same race ought to be in one nation. Belgium has a Flamand element, which refuses to speak French, and there has been a neat interior quarrel between the two languages and the two race elements that constitute them; but the rift closed up when the Germans came across the border. Switzerland is divided between the Germanic and German speaking cantons on the north and the Latin cantons speaking French, Italian, and Romansch on the south and west. Nevertheless, no people in the world are more united and more determined to stand together for mutual protection than the Swiss.

In the Balkans the race strains are fiercest and most enduring because that peninsula has been the haunt of warring races ever since the Roman Empire; and within its borders may be found Slavs, Bulgarians, Turks, Rumanians, Greeks, and Albanians, all of whom look upon themselves as separate races. In fact, the Bulgarians not only took over the Slav language of the Servians after they had conquered their present seat, but there can be little doubt that they took in a large amount of the Slav population; so that probably the present Bulgarian race is far more Slav than Asiatic. The Rumanians call themselves a Latin

people because they have Latin words in their language; but it is nearly fifteen centuries since the Roman people of that district lost their identity and the Rumanians are presumably in large part a Slav race.

In the 24,000,000 of Balkan population, including Rumania, and what is left of European Turkey, the race elements are about as follows:

Slavs	15,000,000
Greeks	4,000,000
Turks	2,100,000
Albanians	1,200,000
Jews, Gipsies, Russians, Magyars, etc.	1,700,000
	24,000,000

But this population is not subdivided into four corresponding territorial groups. About 1,000,000 Bulgarians are now living in Servia or Greek Macedonia. About 220,000 Greeks are in Bulgaria and Constantinople. About 100,000 Rumanians are in Bulgaria and Servia. About 900,000 Turks are left in Macedonia and Bulgaria. The Albanians are an undoubted primitive race, as old as the Greeks or Etruscans, but they are divided into 400,000 Catholics, and 700,000 Moslems and 100,000 Greek Catholics.

It is this mix-up of races, religions, and na-

tions which has caused the frightful wars in the Balkans. The Bulgarians, Servians, and Greeks last year adopted and practiced to some extent the simple policy of putting an end to the race issue by exterminating the people within their boundaries who did not correspond to the national unit. Greeks massacred Bulgarians, and Bulgarians massacred Greeks, and the Servians took the precaution to massacre Albanians who were beyond the Servian border, but even murderers sometimes lack thoroughness and the work of destruction was left uncompleted.

RACE DIVISIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN

Among the great powers several are almost entirely free from race stresses. In Italy and France there are some Germanic elements, but they have long since been merged in the main population. Neither of those powers has the slightest fear of a back-fire being lighted after the troops have gone to the front. Great Britain is nearly in the same condition. The British have for several hundred years had an Irish question which of late has taken the form of a demand for local self-government in that island. The German statesmen seem to have entirely misconstrued the spirit of the Irish, who, when war broke out, instantly asserted their loyalty. As an Empire Great Britain has the responsibility of keeping order

and content in the imperial dependencies, particularly India. Here is a practical opportunity for appealing to race hatreds, for the English are conquerors, and as recently as 1857 had to fight for their lives. Even that far-distant land of people far more remote from the English in culture and point of view than the most ferocious Greek or Bulgarian "comitadjis," is eager with spontaneous gifts and offers of men. Native princes seventy years old demand the right to lead their forces to the field in France, or wherever the King of Great Britain and Emperor of India may need them. In South Africa the supposed German sympathies of the Dutchmen, their assumed gratitude for Emperor William's interest in their war fifteen years ago, has had some effect; a force of Boers has joined the Germans. So far, most of them seem to feel a sense of membership in the British Empire which is in danger; they have buried their differences and are ready to take ship for the scene of battle. The 46,000,000 inhabitants in the British Islands are the nucleus for 300 million people of varied races in India, in Burma, in the Straits Settlements, in the Federated Malay States, in Egypt and Soudan. To this must be added 1,500,000 Europeans in the Union of South Africa, 8,000,000 Canadians, 5,000,000 Australians, and 1,000,000 New Zealanders, many of whom are not of English race.

RACE DIVISIONS IN GERMANY

Germany has some curious small elements which still adhere to their language and are consciously non-German. There are over 100,000 Lithuanians; 100,000 Cassubians; 100,000 Wends, who are the remnant of a once dominant Slav people. Much more significant are the nearly 3,500,000 Poles, the greater part of whom are settled by themselves in the Prussian province of Posen and speak no tongue but the Polish. Every effort to Germanize those people has failed, including the method of settling German emigrants and giving them special inducements to prosper. The Poles simply adopted the same methods and have been even more prosperous. These people are Slavs and speak a Slavic tongue; they have held fast to their language and nationality through a hundred and forty years of Prussian control. They lie on the frontier of Russia and are blood brothers of the Russian and Austrian Poles. Of course, they perform military service like other people and their young men are somewhere at the front. The Czar of Russia has during the war offered to unite them with the Poles in Russia and to give them free use of their language and religion and "autonomy" under the Russian crown (whatever that may mean).

The one uncertain part of Germany is Alsace-Lorraine, the province which was conquered and

annexed from France in 1871. The population is about 2,000,000. In Lorraine French was the habitual language in 1871, and in Alsace German was spoken among the peasantry and in many of the towns. Apparently the greater part of the population of both districts at the time deeply resented the transfer. Many thousands emigrated into France and the German government so suspected the annexation that for many years they were administered as "Imperial Territories." There is little doubt that though only 200,000 people are now officially reckoned to be French speaking, the language and the sentiment of devotion to France have been cultivated in a great number of families. Here is the curious spectacle of a people who were part of the Holy Roman Empire until about 1680, and who are most of them entirely German in descent yet who include a strongly anti-German element.

RACE DIVISIONS IN RUSSIA

The extreme of race divisions and stresses is felt by the two great powers in eastern Europe. Russia is generally supposed to be almost wholly Slav, but that is a great mistake. There is no recent census available, but semi-official estimates show about the following race proportions: Out of 144 million people estimated for the Russian Empire in Europe in 1912, apparently about 108

million were Slavs, including 9,000,000 Poles in Poland and other parts of the Empire; over 6,000,000 were Jews; about 4,000,000 were Finns; 8,000,000 to 9,000,000 were Turko-Tatars; 2,000,000 owned to being Germans (the actual number is probably much greater), leaving about 17,000,000 of other races, most of whom were Europeans in origin. Leaving out the Poles, the Russian Slavs, who are the ruling race of the Empire, must be a little under 100 million or not much more than two-thirds of the whole population.

The Russians are racially somewhat different, because many other race elements have in the course of ages been amalgamated in the Russian race. Finns, Germans, Poles, Turks and Mongols have intermarried and accepted the Russian language and culture. There is a little reason in Kipling's dictum that "Russia is not the most eastern of western nations, but the most western of eastern nations." The effect of domination by the Mongols is still seen in Russian absolutism, and the sharp separation of the ruling class. Yet no people so easily acquire western languages and manners.

The 9,000,000 or so of Poles living in Poland have furnished Russia with much the same controversy as that in Prussian Poland, with the addition of a Jewish population of over a million, and with the aggravation that the Russians have

made a much more determined effort than the Prussians to break the Polish national spirit. In 1830 and again in 1863 the Poles revolted and attempted to restore their independent nation. They have been suspected, persecuted, deprived of privileges; yet the Russian government is driven at last to offer to loyal Poles the greater part of that which they have so long demanded. The Poles have been racial and Slav champions; they have proved the possibility of a comparatively small race fraction of the Empire keeping its individuality and at last achieving for itself a local status. Not as a reward for this devotion to their race, but in recognition of their willingness to fight for their former harsh masters, the Poles seem likely to secure for themselves something like the degree of self-government that is possessed by every state in our Union.

The Finns present a somewhat different problem, for they were a recognized part of Sweden from 1323 until 1809; they are of an Asiatic race, closely akin to the Magyars; they preserve their own language; and though the Czar of Russia was their sovereign, they were for many years not included in the Empire. They have had their own coinage and, until twenty-five years ago, their own postal system. Out of a population of 3,000,000 there are only about 10,000 Russians. The world has looked on with sympathy at the brave efforts of this little people to preserve

rights which were denied them simply because they did not fit in with the general Russian system of a centralized government, carried on by a small Russian aristocracy. In the present war their loyalty has been suspected, but unless Russia should suffer serious reverses there is no likelihood of their getting out from under the Russian crown. If autonomy is granted to Poland, however, the argument that all Russia must be uniform falls away, and the Finns may come into their own again.

RACE DIVISIONS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The immediate cause of the present war was the fear of the government of Austria-Hungary that race rivalries were about to break up that Empire. That this fear has much reason may be seen from a brief statement of the actual race divisions in the Dual Monarchy. The total population, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, is as follows: Cis-Leithia (the Austrian half), 29,000,000; Trans-Leithia (the Hungarian half), 21,000,000; Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are a sort of dependency of the whole Empire, 2,000,000, a total of 52,000,000. Among these 52,000,000 may be found members of every race of central and eastern Europe. The Germans are 12,000,000; Magyars, 10,000,000; Italians, about 1,000,000; various miscellaneous races,

1,000,000; Slavs, 28,000,000. Of these last 5,000,000 are Poles, 7,000,000 are Serbs (Servians and their blood brethren, the Croatians, Slovenians and Bosnians); 4,000,000 are Ruthenians (i. e., people speaking Russian, but living within the boundary of the Empire); Bohemians, 5,000,000; Moravians, Slovaks, and other Slav people, 7,000,000.

Not only are the Slavs in the majority in the Empire by the proportion of 28 to 24, but they are in a majority in the Austrian half by 18,000,000 Slavs against 10,000,000 Germans, and 1,000,000 Italians. In Hungary there are 11,000,000 non-Magyars against 10,000,000 Magyars, but out of the 11,000,000 about 3,000,000 are Germans and other non-Slavic people, and 3,000,000 more in Rumania who do not consider themselves Slavs.

Then how does it come that both on the Austrian side and on the Hungarian side the Slavs are completely under the dominion of the other races? First of all, because they are subdivided into many provinces which are not geographically grouped together. Bohemia is on the northwestern frontier, close against Germany; Galicia, which is Austrian Poland, is on the northern frontier, close against Russia, and that is the reason that Lemberg and Cracow were so furiously attacked by the Russians in August, 1914. The Slav mountain provinces of Carniola and

Gradiska are on the west, almost alongside Italy. Croatia and Slavonia lie on the south; and Bosnia is next door to Servia. Thus the Slav provinces make a circle around the great provinces of Hungary and Austria from Rumania back to Montenegro. The eastern Slav states are fast in a vise between Hungary and Russia; the western are hemmed in by Hungary and the Austrian-Germans on the one side and the German Empire and Italy on the other. It is politically impossible for those provinces ever to form an empire which shall not include the Magyar and German central states.

That patent difficulty does not in the least prevent a tremendous race pressure. Hungary considers itself a separate kingdom having the same sovereign as Austria, and within a few years has hinted that it might get on as an independent kingdom. Nobody who has not been in the country understands the intense feeling between the Magyar and the German, based on the fact that in the dual monarchy there is only one king and he is a German, is surrounded by Germans and is infused with a policy of close friendship and mutual enterprise with the Empire of Germany. There was a time when Vienna nearly overcame the Hungarians. Maria Theresa a hundred and fifty years ago drew the great nobles to her court, attempted to attach them as courtiers to the capital, made them wear German clothes, swear

in German, and even speak the hated language.

The Hungarian grandees were land-owning magnates, who liked the extraordinarily manly and picturesque costume of their noble fathers, were fond of making their own decisions, and at last broke away from this de-Magyarizing influence. In 1848 they came to the point of declaring their own independence and actually had it so far as Austria was concerned, till Russia obligingly sent troops to destroy the new republic and restore its people to the Austrian domination. One result of the defeat of the Austrians by the Prussians in 1866 was a new understanding between the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Empire in 1867 under which each had its government and the Monarchy should act for both sections in foreign relations, military matters, and common finances.

This gave the Hungarians nearly a free hand in an attempt to Magyarize the Slavs, which has gone on steadily until the outbreak of this war. In earlier times the Austrian government deliberately planted Germans, Rumanians, and Servians on the outer borders of Hungary, as a partial curb upon that proud people. The effort of Hungary to break down the racial feeling of those units has been a failure, as has been the similar effort of the Germans over the Bohemians and Italians on their side of the Empire. The success of the Serbs in the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913

stiffened the courage of all the Slavic units, especially on the Hungarian side; and led to a belief in the minds of Hungarian and German leaders that some of the Slavs in Bosnia and Croatia were on the point of revolt.

CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES AND STRAINS

TRADITIONAL NATIONAL HATREDS

THE political, religious, and racial divisions of Europe account for a part of the passions which brought about war, but when the issue was once joined many other causes combined to bring one nation after another into the struggle and to arrange them in two hostile groups. The first of these is a set of rather obscure national hatreds. For about five hundred years the English and the French, though separated by only twenty-two miles of water, cordially detested each other, and with few exceptions found themselves on opposite sides in any European war. The Napoleonic struggle in which England remained the only power which kept up the war year after year (with the short interval of the Peace of Amiens in 1802) strengthened this feeling; but after Napoleon's fall the two countries became reconciled; then friendly; then,

in the Crimean War of 1854, allies. Later difficulties arose chiefly out of rivalries for territory in central Africa; but for some time before the war the two countries were not only friends but cordially united for common defense. Months ago, before there was a glimmer of war, the British government made an agreement by which the French fleet was to be concentrated in the Mediterranean, and the British fleet in the Channel.

For several generations England and Russia were at swords' points, of late years over the territorial question of the boundaries in central Asia, and it is only sixteen years ago that Rudyard Kipling denounced the Russians.

"When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer,
THAT is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of the Bear!'

Nevertheless of late years, the conviction which has arisen in the minds of both countries that there was nothing in the world which they both wanted to such a degree that one must yield or the other would fight, has removed that animosity; and the two countries are now coöperating.

The Germans and the French were fearfully exasperated with each other through the conquests of Napoleon and his harsh handling of conquered countries and places, but Germany, like England,

had no quarrel with the Bourbon monarchy that was restored in France after Napoleon was overthrown. The thing that brought war in 1870 was that France under the Second Empire was the last obstacle to a German Empire. Having overthrown the French, the Germans took away what to their minds seemed a mislaid part of their own country, since it had been French only a matter of two hundred years. That detail adjusted, from that time to the present the Germans have shown the gracious conqueror's willingness to be forgiven. The French have consistently hated the Germans and all their works with the same kind of resentment that the Prussians felt when Napoleon desolated their country in 1806. Still even in the midst of terrible fighting the Germans have a much kindlier feeling for the French, whom they recognize as people with a grievance, than against the English who, to their minds, have come into the war when they had received no injury to themselves.

The hatred between Germany and England is a thing of recent date. The King of England from 1715 to 1760 was also Elector of Hanover. In the eighteenth century England was the helpful friend and ally of Prussia, against France and Austria. Indeed the war of 1914 is the first serious conflict in history between the Anglo-Saxons and their close racial kinsmen, the Germans. The English stood by and saw the

French abjectly defeated in 1871 without interfering. Bismarck and Disraeli acted together cordially in the settlement of the Balkan question in 1878. The mother of the present German Emperor was a daughter of Queen Victoria. Suspicion between the two powers which ripened into hatred goes back to the beginning of a German navy about fifteen years ago, which put the English to the expensive task of keeping up a navy which should at all times be as large as that of Germany, combined with that of any other power in the world. The English thought that the Emperor William sympathized with the Boers in the South African War of 1899. The Germans felt that the English were unwilling to give them a fair chance in Africa and took the side of France in the complications over Morocco in 1911. Somehow in both countries people at large caught the idea that the other fellows meant them harm. Nevertheless, we have the best of documentary evidence that for some time up to the actual declaration of war the Germans were trying hard to come to an understanding with England and through England with France, so as to form a "block" in western Europe.

These national dislikes were weak in comparison with the hatred felt between Austria-Hungary on one side and Servia and Montenegro on the other. Since the Servians had no seaport they were dependent for an outlet upon Austria, which

has long treated them with rudeness and contempt. The Austrians on the other hand, especially since the recent Balkan wars, have considered Servia the leader in an effort to break up the Empire. Anyone who has been in the Balkans catches the evidence of this fierce and burning race hatred between the Serb and his powerful neighbors, the Magyars and Germans.

MILITARY RIVALRIES

National ill-feeling has been very much heightened by the universal military service which now obtains throughout Continental Europe. It means that every boy, as he grows up, looks forward to military service and puts into shape the reasons why so many soldiers are needed. Frenchmen or Germans are taught that they are serving their country by getting ready to repel the attack of Germans or Frenchmen. Every general staff takes pains to learn what is going on in the neighboring country and what its spirit is. The officers particularly feel it a professional matter to think ill both of the character and the military preparations of their neighbors. For months the officers of the German navy are said to have been drinking a toast, "To the Day"; that is, to the day when their fleet would clash with that of the English. Doubtless there has been a similar spirit among British officers.

Part of the military preparation is the fortifying of cities and frontiers. In the Alps along the boundary between Italy and Austria mountain peaks have been taken, galleries have been constructed behind cliffs, forts have been built thousands of feet above the valleys, railroads and highways are protected by batteries and forts. The French about twenty-five years ago began to construct a system of powerful forts along their frontier from Switzerland to Luxemburg, flanked by smaller forts and aided by redoubts and entrenchments which made almost a continuous line. The effect of that system was to hold the Germans for many weeks at the beginning of the war from an invasion of France by that route.

Great cities like Paris are provided with a modern system of forts, a hundred miles in circumference. Other cities like Vienna and Berlin are protected chiefly by the armies on the frontiers; but even in peace cities are occasionally put under what the Germans call a "secondary state of siege," in which the police have unusual powers over visitors and residents. The effect is to create in the public mind the feeling that war is inevitable; that every precaution must be taken all the time; that somebody beyond the border is simply watching for the opportunity to leap at the throat of one's country.

Armies in time of peace are kept within their own boundaries except for a few visits of show

troops; but navies go all over the world. Whether or no trade follows the flag, international jealousies are likely to follow the flag. Sometimes light upon a state of feeling is shed by incidents of the official courtesies of naval intercourse. When the United States, for instance, sent in 1908 a fleet of ironclads to make a friendly visit in Japan, the Japanese with punctilious courtesy announced that they would send a fleet of an equal number of vessels to meet and escort the Americans to their anchorage in Yokohama.

Nobody quite knows in Europe how many soldiers are called into service, or how many forts are building, but all military authorities with eagerness watch the annual list of new naval vessels, and the accounts of new types of destructive craft. War feeds on war; every battle leaves behind it something to avenge. The prestige of defeating an army; the ambition of the commanding generals; the desire for an opportunity of distinction, all play their part in pushing a country into war. A new pace was set in 1913 by the unexpected success of the Balkan allies against Turkey. Emperor William at once announced that the results of the war compelled him to enlarge the German army; and he also pushed through the Reichstag a special war tax of 1½ per cent on the property of Germany. France took alarm at what seemed to her a disturbance of the military balance, and in 1913 passed a bill

providing in future for a three-year military service for all able-bodied young men. Instead of making this immediately effective by keeping the "class of 1910," which had already served two years, the government called up in the same year the class that had reached the age of 20, and also the class that was 21 years old, thus increasing the army under the colors by something less than one-third. These preparations made the Germans think war was approaching. The air was full of a military spirit.

COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES

From the days of the Carthaginians and the Punic Wars down to the present time a fruitful cause of war is the desire of nations to secure a trade and the profits thereof. In the old days, when the seas were beset by pirates, no permanent trade was possible that was not protected by a military or naval force; and when so protected it became a monopoly. Our modern conditions are different; civilized powers unite to clear the seas of pirates and the general tendency is to open the ports of every nation to the vessels of every nation. The two principal restrictions are protective tariffs, which aim to prevent international trade, and the rigid colonial system which keeps colonial ports closed except to vessels of the empire to which they belong. In spite of tariffs, all

the contesting powers have been trading among each other and with other powers which have remained neutral. The old-fashioned colonial systems have almost broken down except in Russia, whose colonies lie next door to them on the mainland of Asia. Never since the world began was trade as broad and as profitable as in the year 1913.

The evidence of this is the tremendous volume of business reported by statisticians. The carrying trade between nations busied about 23,000,000 tons of shipping; the new ships built in that year aggregated about 3,000,000 tons; the total value of international commerce was 42,000 million dollars. Every one of the six powers shared in this prosperity. The total value of English imports and exports combined was 6,900 million dollars; that of Germany was 5,000 million; and France 3,900 million; of Austria 1,250 million; of Italy 1,200 million; of Russia 1,450 million, making a total of 19,700 million in those powers alone. The external commerce, out and in, of the United States in that year was 4,300 million. Since every export from one country is an import into another, these totals divided by two give 12,000 million dollars as the approximate value of the commodities transported across the boundaries of the six great European powers and the United States. The profits upon that trade could hardly have been less than 2,000 millions.

England was the greatest carrier and had the most populous colonies, but Germany was constantly raising the skill of her manufactures, the enterprise of her merchants, the industry and attention to business of her selling machinery in other countries. Germany's actual and proportional trade increased from year to year. Apparently Great Britain was not anxious on that score because her trade was never so great as in 1913 when England imported goods to the value of 394 million dollars from Germany and exported a value of 292 million dollars to Germany. There is no evidence that England had formed any purpose of shutting German goods out of her colonies or excluding German ships from any of the high seas. On the contrary, England looked on without a protest at the founding of the Germany colony of Kiao-Chao in 1898, which was expected to grow into an entrepôt of Chinese trade. In fact, the English did not find their colonial trade the chief source of national wealth; inasmuch as the exports from Great Britain to all the British colonies were only 1,024 million dollars out of a total export of 3,112 million dollars. Of course, if England really desired to destroy or to damage German commerce, a war would be the readiest way of bringing it about, provided England could keep control of the seas.

For many years there has been a competition

of nations in picking up points of vantage for future trade. The British, as one of the four great colonizing and trading nations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had an opportunity to choose their seats early, especially as they fought and in the end overcame the other large maritime powers, the Dutch, the Spaniards, and the French. Think of the spots which the English soldier "painted red" in those early times! Boston, New York, Chesapeake Bay, Charleston, Jamaica, Honduras, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Ceylon, Singapore, Gibraltar, Malta, Puget Sound, Cape Town, Melbourne, New Zealand, and later Hong Kong, Aden, Egypt, Cyprus. Pickings were good when England began. These fortified posts give England protection all the way from London through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, to India, China, and Japan. The purchase of the Suez Canal in 1875, which has remained a British public work, completed this magnificent chain.

Something was still left for future collectors of commercial points of vantage. The Dutch have their East India Islands, which would, however, be simply a weakness if they entered into this war. The French have established themselves in North Africa, Mauritius, Madagascar, retain Martinique and French Guiana, and have taken up a convenient set of stations in southeastern Asia. The United States has planted its flag in

Porto Rico, the naval stations of Cuba, the Panama Canal strip, the Hawaiian Islands, and Manila. Nevertheless there was not much available for the Germans. Their African possessions, though large, lie entirely off the great highways of the world's commerce. Their Pacific Islands are of little account. It was natural to feel that they were crowded out and that war might give a chance to upset the English chain of islands, dependencies and fortified places.

The Germans appear to be convinced that a main cause of the war was the formal decision of the British government that German trade and German shipping must be driven from the sea. No steps were taken in that direction by Parliament; none by the British colonial governments. The splendid North German Lloyd line, by its intelligence and courtesy, became the best from Europe to Eastern Asia. German goods were sold in every British market. The German inference from this fact was a deep-laid, long-planned conspiracy to pool the British colonial trade policy with the French Alsace-Lorraine policy and the Russian pan-Slavic policy, all watching for a convenient moment to force Germany and her allies, Austria-Hungary and Italy, into war. This was the method of the English with the Spaniards from 1577 to 1807, with the Dutch from 1651 to 1689; with the French from 1689 to 1815. Germany was the fourth rival

commercial nation, and thought it logical that an attempt should be made to ruin her in the same way. The fact that the Dutch, the Spaniards and the French have to-day a large commerce in spite of English opposition a century ago, may or may not affect this argument. The United States has an immense foreign trade, on every sea; yet has not been conscious of any purpose of Great Britain to kill that trade, by laws or by dreadnoughts. How far Great Britain seems to have sought to force a quarrel at this time will be discussed later in this book. The German conclusion on the subject is in the nature of the case not based on documentary evidence, for none bearing on this question of restriction of trade has been made public.

TRANSPORTATION RIVALRIES

The sea roads are open to all nations, and will be so long as there is a system of civilized powers; but the land roads are monopolies, and the countries through which they run are likely to adhere to the power that controls the highway.

Several unofficial statements by Germans of the disabilities under which Germany has labored argue that one of the objects of German policy is to build and control a railway from western Europe to southern Asia. For this purpose there is only one possible direct route. It goes down

the upper Danube; southeastward through the Balkans to Constantinople; thence eastward through Asia Minor, rounding the northeast coast of the Mediterranean; across to the valley of the Euphrates; down that river to the Persian Gulf; thence eastward through Persia till it strikes the Indian Empire.

The conception is a magnificent one, and would long ago have been carried out in some fashion but for the masterly success of Turkey in preventing any radical improvement in the conditions of its Empire, and the objection of the English, who had no wish to let others find a short road to India. Considerable parts of this line are already built or under way. From Berlin to Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade there is a well-traveled route. From Belgrade lines through Servia and Bulgaria and the remnants of Turkish territory reach the Golden Horn. Three miles away across the Bosphorus is the handsome station of the German-owned railway through Southern Asia Minor to Eregli. Thence the road is under construction eastward, and there is a concession from the Turkish government all the way to Bussorah, which was a famous place three thousand years ago when the Hebrew prophet asked, "Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bozrah; this that is glorious in his apparel, traveling in the greatness of his strength?" Thence probably a line will be con-

structed through Persia and Baluchistan to Kurrachee, where it would connect with the Indian system. Before many years a line will certainly be built from the eastern end of that system, in Burma, through the mountains to Southern China and Canton.

There is ground for the German feeling that the world has not been fair to them in their relations with the Orient. The Russians have continuous territory to the Pacific, and the Trans-Siberian railway, which is an international highway. The English are the masters of the short sea line via the Suez Canal, because they possess naval power against anybody else, because of their fortresses, and because of their ability to block the Suez Canal against their enemies in time of war, whatever the Convention of 1888 may say to the contrary. The Germans had the capital, wanted to invest it in a railroad, and secured a concession from Turkey. Failing an official announcement, we are left to guess how far the Germans felt reasonably entitled to such political control in the Balkans as would be necessary to give them a world-route.

The idea of making any considerable part of this line a German enterprise, backed up by the government as a national work, conflicts with several serious difficulties. The first is that Germany does not reach to the Balkans; but Austria-Hungary does, and one of the presumed reasons

for the alliance between the two Empires is to keep open that route as far as Austrian influence goes. If, then, Austria can ever reach a long arm down through the Balkans to Constantinople, that link in the world-route will be brought substantially under German influence. To accomplish that result means the rousing up of 24,000,000 Balkan people who can in case of need put about 2,000,000 experienced soldiers into the field; and they would all die in their trenches before they would admit the Germans directly or through the Austrians into their country. They have been under the Turkish yoke for five centuries, and having had the vitality to free themselves are (as a matter of prediction) not likely to accept the control of a distant power representing a different race and culture from their own.

The next section of the road has also its difficulties, because though a track can be laid and trains can be run by a German company, there can be no such thing as a German national highway that does not involve the conquest and holding of a considerable part of Asia Minor. That would cut the Turkish Empire in two, and neither fragment could keep up a national existence.

COLONIAL RIVALRIES

The war on both sides is in part a war for the acquirement or the protection of colonies.

Old as the word and the practice is, we do not always realize that in the modern world the most successful colonies are not planted by any one power. The largest European colony in existence is the United States of America, in which every person except the full-blooded Indians is a colonist or a descendant of a colonist. There are now living within our boundaries 9,000,000 people of German or German-Austrian parentage; 10,000,000 of English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh; 3,200,000 Slavs, inclusive of 1,700,000 Poles· 3,000,000 Scandinavians; 2,000,000 Italians; 130,000 Greeks. Similar colonies, especially of Italians and Germans, exist in the Argentine Republic and in Brazil. Germans in all three countries buy their share of German goods and thus increase the wealth and trade of the mother country.

There seems to be an inherent feeling among nations that there is a special advantage and profit in possessing, governing, and selling goods to areas over which your country shall have full control. Plenty of money can be made out of colonies consisting of people of the European stock who have complicated and expensive wants. Money can be made, though less readily, from trade with a thickly-settled and populous country like India; the average buying power of the natives is low but there are many of them. The English have enjoyed an advantageous trade there for three hundred years.

The ultimate profits to be drawn from colonies in equatorial Africa are doubtful because the purchasing power of the natives is small, and because it is hard to induce them to labor. Some years ago two live young American business men attempted to start business in Venezuela. They were proceeding in a river steamer and had on board a mule. At a landing they called to a man on shore in Spanish, "Look here! If you will come down and look after our mule we will give you a dollar." To which the answer was, "I have a mule up here in the village; if you will come on shore and look after my mule, I will give you a dollar." That is the weak spot in all attempts to plant European colonies among savage or barbarous races. Unless they can be stirred up by a European desire for something more than shelter and daily food, they can be induced to work only by some kind of force. The Dutch have for many years practised in their Asiatic islands what they called a "labor system," which was a mild slavery. King Leopold on the Congo and the rubber companies on the upper Amazon have tried the most barbarous and destructive methods of inducing the natives to furnish the necessary labor for getting out the raw products upon which the white traders may make a profit. The Portuguese colonies, which are several centuries old, are almost a failure.

Only three of the six European great powers

have colonies which bring in an income. Russia has Asiatic provinces which under the protective tariff of the country are to a large degree reserved for Russian trade. France has found a field for capital and also a nursery of soldiers in Algeria and Tunis, and is now taking possession of Morocco. In addition France has large colonies on the Niger and Congo and the Island of Madagascar; and Tongking, Anam, Cambodia and Cochin China, grouped under the general term of French Indo-China. In 1898 they seized the port of Kwangchau Wan from the Chinese. France is generally supposed to spend far more than she gets from her colonies, even counting to the good both the local taxes and the profits of French traders. It was bad fortune for the French, but a great blessing to the United States of America that they lost the Ohio Valley and subsequently had to part with Louisiana, since Providence had decreed that those regions were to make up part of a western republic.

Great Britain is the great colonizing nation of modern times—very early on the ground, from the first attacking the Spanish and the French colonies, uprooting the Dutch in New Netherland, seizing many of the West India Islands, building up a magnificent empire in India and Burma, planting colonies and ports all the way from England to China, and in recent years tak-

ing Egypt and a considerable part of the African continent.

The Italians have had bad luck with their colonies. Their settlement at Eritrea on the Red Sea has been a failure. The French took Tunis out from under their very nose in 1881, and it is only two years ago that they wrested Tripoli from its slender connection with the Turkish Empire. Doubtless they would be glad to receive a block of anybody else's colonies anywhere, for they are fine sailors and have a large merchant marine.

Germany was three hundred years ago in an excellent strategic position for the possession of colonies. The German Hansa was the largest, strongest, and best managed commercial enterprise of the period, and practically controlled the whole Baltic trade. The Germans were good sailors and had a population of farmers and artisans who would have made the best kind of colonists. The world was then young and they might easily have planted themselves on the coast of America or in the West Indies. The Thirty Years' War ruined Germany and prevented her taking advantage of this opportunity. For the last hundred years the Germans have been enriching other independent countries with the labor, the intellectual forces and profits of their immigrants; yet in 1913 the Germans had only about 25,000 of their own people in all their colonies, of whom

2,000 were in the German Pacific Islands and a few hundred in Kiao-Chao, besides a military garrison of unknown strength. It seems clear that few Germans are willing to go to tropical or Asiatic coast settlements, even with the aid and incentive of their officials.

Nevertheless Germany has an increasing population from which it might well spare several hundred thousand a year to build up a distant colonial empire. The question is where to find the space. Parts of South America are attractive to the Germans, of whom some hundreds of thousands may be found in the La Plata Valley; but the only way that German colonies could be founded would be by military conquest, for no Latin-American power would willingly admit so powerful a neighbor. Athwart all schemes of European powers in South America stands the Monroe Doctrine, as applied and emphasized by President Roosevelt in correspondence with Germany in 1901. Any valuable part of Asia would have to be taken by force from Russia, France or Great Britain. The Pacific Islands are poor picking so far as colonization and trade go. Africa is now completely subdivided among the various European powers. The most obvious collection of colonies is the British; and in any future readjustment on a large scale, it would be Great Britain who would give up the territory, if Germany could compel the transfer. Or the

French might be deprived of North Africa, or their Asiatic colonies, which lie in a more favorable zone than colonial Africa. Even there the question would arise which perplexes the United States in the Philippines: how to govern and satisfy a population among whom none of the people from home are willing to pass their lives and bring up their children.

RACE BITTERNESS

As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, the sharpest antagonism nowadays is between race groups. The suspicions and prejudice between European neighbors is paralleled by the state of feeling between Japan and China and between China and the Western powers in general. At present the race issues have been much intensified by the experience of the Balkans where for five centuries there has been the most bitter feeling between the conquering Turks and the subject Christian races. Slowly the weight of the Turks has been rolled off, almost disappearing after the first Balkan war of 1912; but that brought into relief the race hatreds between Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians, when free to rage without even the small control formerly exercised by the Turkish government. So long as there are thousands of Bulgarians, Greeks and Servians living outside their national boundaries

and each group claiming a special national status within the country in which it lives, there will be no peace in the Balkans.

Until there is peace in the Balkans there will be no permanent peace in eastern Europe. Three outside nations have long worked upon the Balkan people: Turkey, Russia, and Austria. Turkey is for the time being out of commission, so to speak, but Russia has a genuine national interest in fellow Slavs and coreligionists, and, in addition, a determination sooner or later to take Constantinople by the water route through the Black Sea or by the land routes through Bulgaria and Asia Minor. Austria has also a racial interest in the Balkans; a race antagonism between the Germans and Magyars on one side and the Balkan Slavs and Bulgarians on the other side; a race sympathy between the Croatians, Slovenes, and other Slav peoples and their brethren south of the Danube. In general all the Balkan peoples cordially detest Austria, partly because that country has not been obliging in trade relations.

This race hatred was raised to a high pitch by the murder of Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian imperial throne, at Sarajevo, Bosnia, June 28, 1914. The actual murderer and some of his accomplices were Austrian subjects; but the Austrians laid the crime at the door first, of Servians who had a hand in the conspiracy; second, of

minor Servian officials who were believed to have been a party to the murder; third, of the Servian government which had not prevented the affair; and fourth, of the whole Servian people who maintained that government.

This outbreak is only the high tide of a race feeling which has been evident in eastern Europe for many years. The Germans, both in Germany and in Austria, look upon the Slavs as an inferior but dangerous people. All the efforts of the last century and a half to Germanize them have come to naught, both within and without the German and Austrian Empires. Many Slav groups are doing well; for instance, the Bohemians who show an excellent capacity for business and finance. The Slavs are in general a less active, pushing and planning race than the Germans, and have offered an india rubber resistance to the attempt to lead them into a culture which they did not desire. Yet there is no evidence that the Slavs are incapable of building up strong communities and of developing republican forms of government. So far as equality of conditions go the Servians, with their multitude of small land-holding farmers, are one of the most democratic peoples in the world. One of their offenses is that they show a capacity to do well; while they were weak and behind the rest of the world, there was little to fear. The thing that most aroused Europe in the Balkan wars was

that Slav armies could take the field, fight desperate pitched battles, and hold their own against a strong opponent.

The Germans have been aroused by the so-called pan-Slavic movement, a vague effort, headed by Russia, to bring all the Slavs in eastern Europe into some kind of accord, which meant of course the drawing away of Slav subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary. That movement is undeniably hostile to Germanism, but it has already lost vitality for the simple reason that not a single Slav unit, either in the Balkans or in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, desires to be a part of Russia or a part of any empire in which Russia is predominant. The Servians are doubtless grateful to Russia for backing them up in the present war, but they would turn their armies upon Russia and fight till the last man dropped rather than be Russianized. So far as there is any danger that Russia may try to pick up fragments of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the principal obstacle is that there is apparently not a single Austrian province that would not think itself worse off on the Russian side of the boundary than on the Austrian.

Nevertheless, Germans and Slavs believe mutually each that the other race is bent upon conquest; and that if successful each will try to stamp out the peculiar ideas and culture of the other side. Protestant and Roman Catholic Ger-

mans are to be forced into the Greek Church, or, *per contra*, the Servians and the Russians will be compelled to accept the Roman or a Protestant Church. The fierce and long-continued Russian effort to break up the Finnish and Polish national culture has been and is a strong argument on the Germanic side.

Up to 1914 it was doubtful whether Russia had the slightest intention or wish to take Germans or Magyars inside her boundaries. It is doubtful whether even in the case of a great success Russia will demand any territory inhabited by Slavs except perhaps Prussian and Austrian Poland. The question of the future of mankind is not to be settled by the Slavs calling the Germans pig-headed, obstinate, and bent on world rule; or by the Germans calling the Russians half-barbarous Asiatics. The main result of this state of things is, or has been, that when the crisis came the leading Slav power and the leading German power were ready to believe the worst of each other's morals and intentions.

PART II. WAR

CHAPTER VI

WAR IN THE BALKANS

THE BALKANS TO 1878

MOST wars finally turn upon a single incident which may be the culmination of a long and acrid controversy, but is accepted as the reason for hostilities. In 1861 everybody knew that the war actually began with the firing on Fort Sumter. In 1870 the last official reason was the insistence, or supposed insistence, of the Emperor of the French upon a pledge from the King of Prussia that he would not in future allow any Hohenzollern to occupy the throne of Spain. In the present struggle, however, so many powers are involved, so many relations and cross-relations have to be taken into account, that the precise moment when the temple of Janus burst open is, and will always be, impossible to fix. For reasons hereafter given, August 1, 1914 marks the extinction of the last

possibility of peace and may be considered the date of the beginning of the war.

Inhabitants of a seasoned wooden house sometimes smell smoke, then see little wreaths floating out from the eaves; while they are rushing to and fro, calling for the fire department, suddenly the flame, which has been gaining ground within, shoots up through the roof, and all you can say about it is, "Fire! Fire!" So it is with the present conflict. Eight nations were placing their troops in the field before any one of them could give a solid and substantial reason for the war, other than that they were compelled to defend themselves against a wicked and unprovoked attack.

That the war began in eastern Europe was natural because, as has been shown in earlier chapters, the tension in that part of the world is greater, and on that battleground of the ages live a number of race groups of individuals whose fate is settled for them by members of a different race unacceptable to them. Whatever might have happened next year or in the next decade, it is clear that the prime reason for the war of 1914 is to be found in the abnormal relations of the Balkans to the rest of the European powers.

The tale of the present condition of the Balkans may be taken up in the year 1876, just when Henry Watterson was going to raise one hundred thousand men to march to Washington and inau-

gurate Tilden and did not. In that year Turkey still occupied almost all the territory north to the Danube and Save Rivers, except for Greece, then confined to the southern peninsula; and the plucky little country of Montenegro, which was the only part of the Balkans that never bowed the knee to the Turks.

The trouble was made public by certain journalists who discovered that the Turks were sending certain irregular troops called Bashi Bazouks to harry, strip, and torture the Bulgarians. With great difficulty these journalists got access to the English newspapers; that aroused Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister. When in 1877 Russian and Rumanian troops marched southward, freeing Bulgaria, England held off and did not resist. Then a change came about: the Conservatives came to power in England, took the side of Turkey and for their good-nature received the Island of Cyprus. Austria, which was on the flank of Russia, refrained from using the military opportunity of cutting the Russian communications and held off while the Russians penetrated to San Stephano, within sight of the imperial city of Constantinople. Then England took affright and in the Congress of Berlin compelled the Russians to draw back beyond the Danube.

Austria was at last rewarded with the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which com-

pleted a compact block of territory lying between the Adriatic Sea and the Turkish province of Macedonia. On the other side the Bulgarians were allowed to set up a little principality like that of the Servians. The purpose of the Treaty of Berlin, signed July 31, 1878, was to give Austria close contact with the Balkan states and at the same time to prepare the Christian inhabitants of the rest of the Balkans for some sort of governments of their own. Russia was left shut out from the Danube by the buffer state of Rumania, which looks on itself as non-Slav. Anyone can see that this settlement was crude and temporary, yet when Disraeli and Salisbury returned to London from the Congress they rode through the streets in triumph and Disraeli made his brilliant and theatrical remark, "I bring you peace with honor." The only wonder is that this settlement endured for thirty-six years.

BALKAN TROUBLES FROM 1878 TO 1912

It was part of a general disposition not to look Oriental things squarely in the face that the Treaty of 1878 still kept up the fiction of Turkish supremacy over Bulgaria and also over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria was "constituted an Autonomous and tributary Principality under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan." Part of the present Bulgaria was separately or-

ganized as the province of "Eastern Roumelia." As for the western districts, it was provided that "the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary." Montenegro was held to be independent, as was also Servia. Rumania gave up some territory on the Russian border and received other territory on the delta of the Danube. This treaty left Turkey still the strongest power in the Balkans; and the five little Slav or semi-Slav states, Rumania, Servia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece, were left to work out their own salvation. Macedonia and Albania continued integral parts of the Turkish Empire.

The Austrians occupied in Bosnia and Herzegovina a region which had never been theirs, in which the population was Serb, and in which there had been no such things as good order and good government for centuries. The two provinces were not added to Trans-Leithia, though they lay adjacent, but were administered by the Imperial Government in Vienna as a kind of unofficial outside part of Cis-Leithia. It took many years to tranquilize the two provinces in which about a third of the population was intensely Moslem; but the Austrians persevered, built narrow-gauge railroads, stopped the brigandage, encouraged farming and lumbering, and made a handsome little capital out of the old Moslem town of Sarajevo. When the author visited that

place, in 1913, it seemed a peaceful center of a prosperous district.

Meantime across the border Macedonia was year after year the scene of the merciless forays of the Comitadjis. These were professional brigands, armed and aided by committees or associations of Bulgarians or Greeks as the case might be, and their main object was to kill out as many Greek or Bulgarian villages as possible so as to hold as much territory as possible when the break-up came. The Turks had no better morals, but as lords of the land their policy was to keep the peace. Slowly the Turkish authority ebbed; in 1885 the Bulgarians annexed Eastern Roumelia and set up a kingdom. In 1885 the Servians descended on Bulgaria and were smashed in five days' fighting, leaving the belief throughout the world that they were worthless as soldiers.

The traffic on the River Danube has long been open to all nations, but the Upper Danube runs wholly through Austro-Hungarian territory, and the Austrians were the intermediaries between the Balkan Slav powers and the rest of Europe. They were constantly suspected of biding their time till they might safely move down from Bosnia through Macedonia and take possession of Salonica, thus giving them a port on the Ægæan and a land route in the direction of the Orient.

In 1908 the Young Turks revolted and deposed

Sultan Abdul Hamid. Their government everywhere relaxed and the Austrians, on October 5, 1908, issued a declaration to the effect that the Emperor had made up his mind "to exercise my sovereign rights upon Bosnia and Herzegovina," promising the people civil rights, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of the press, and a formal constitution. To the Austrian mind this was simply the formal statement of what had been intended thirty years before by the Treaty of Berlin; they looked upon it as simply a declaration that Turkey no longer had any rights in the provinces. Part of the population considered this action a second and unrighteous conquest, which was intended to remove the last hope of combination with their Serb neighbors in Servia and beyond.

Servia also took it in very ill part till Austria used such threats that on March 31, 1909, the Servian government formally declared that "Servia recognizes that the *Fait Accompli* regarding Bosnia had not affected her rights—Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition—she undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good, neighborly terms with the latter." Notwithstanding this unwilling promise, the Servians were in trouble with Austria much of the time. The Austrians cruelly hampered their exports of

grain, cattle, and timber, which were their only means of livelihood. Belgrade lies, as recent experience shows, a short cannon shot from the Hungarian border and the Austrian Minister and Consul-General were potent forces in Servian affairs.

BALKAN WARS OF 1912 AND 1913

Then in 1912 the unexpected happened. Turkey had gone through several stages of revolution, and, for the moment, seemed impotent. Venizelos, the Greek Premier and the ablest statesman who has appeared in southeastern Europe for many years, laid the foundation for an understanding between Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria. There is every reason to suppose that von Hartwig, Russian Minister to Servia, was the adviser of this movement; he assured them of the good will of Russia and perhaps of the intention of Russia to keep Austria out if necessary. In October, 1912, war began, and by the next June the Turkish power in Europe, after six hundred years of existence, was smashed. The city of Constantinople was too large a prize for any of the allies and remained Turkish, with a narrow belt of territory behind it. Otherwise the whole of the Balkans was apportioned by a treaty (practically dictated by the Great Powers) to the five Christian powers, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and

Greece, and to the mixed Christian and Moslem people of Albania.

At that moment the Balkan alliance was still intact. A quarrel arose as to the portion of Macedonia which should go to Bulgaria. On that issue a second war began on June 30, 1913, between Servia and Greece on one side, aided by Rumania, and Bulgaria on the other. The result was the humiliation of Bulgaria, the loss of perhaps 200,000 additional men and fearful excesses against the non-combatants.

All this time the Austrians were lying along the frontier of Bosnia waiting for the opportunity to step in; and some of the ablest statesmen in the Empire thought the time had then come for a step which would in all probability have brought about the two combinations of opposing powers which are now fighting each other. It was clear that if Austria went into the Balkans, Russia would do the same. The event proved that either the Austrians were not ready to take the step, or had not the assurance of support of Germany which was necessary in such a crisis. War all but came over the question whether the Montenegrins should hold Scutari which they had captured from the Turks with so much blood; but Montenegro and her allies gave way on that point, and the Balkan powers made their own peace at Bucharest on August 10, 1913, without a general European war.

"These Great Powers stir up trouble in the Balkans; they make us fight," said a highly placed Bulgarian. Nobody will ever know how far Russia caused either of the Balkan wars nor how far Russia recommended moderation to the allies. One thing is certain: there is not and never has been any evidence that any Balkan power desired or would have accepted incorporation with Russia, or would have failed to fight with all its strength against any arrangement which meant that Russia should establish a protectorate over them. Probably Russia expected the good will of the Balkan powers in her designs on Constantinople, and the driving out of the Turks from Europe altogether, but the world knows nothing of any agreements, pledges, or treaties upon that subject.

HIGH TIDE FOR SERVIA

The result of the Balkan War was to give the world a new impression of the national and military strength of the Balkan powers. They easily defeated the Turks, who, to be sure, were disorganized and amazingly unprovided. Think of a great modern army taking the field absolutely without any ambulance or hospital service, and leaving to die upon the field all the wounded who could not crawl away! In the second war, when the Bulgarians expected to repeat their triumph of 1885, the Servian armies man for man, regi-

ment for regiment, division for division, stood day after day and week after week against the Bulgarians. The Servian people were naturally elated; their sovereign is a figurehead, the real head of the nation being the Prime Minister Pashitsch, a man of large capacity. Servia is a peasant land, most of the farmers owning their own fields; it has almost no city population. Yet it had fought two victorious campaigns and its area and population were nearly doubled as a result of the war. It is not strange that the people harked back to the ancient Empire of Czar Stephen Dushan, and that they felt hospitable and receptive toward their blood brethren, the Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenian Serbs, who were their next neighbors to the north. Their newspapers preached the likelihood of a new political map of southeastern Europe. Their school children had long been taught to sing about the ancient glories of the Servians and how their country had been kept down by the barbaric Turks.

But what the Servians wished was less significant than what the Serbs in Trans-Leithia thought. Naturally the Austro-Hungarian government has not been generous in producing proof that its people were losing their loyalty. In case of any break-up the pressure would immediately come upon the Magyars, who, as has been pointed out, are only 10,000,000 in an aggregation of

21,000,000. All the circumstances point to the certainty that the Magyar statesmen informed the German statesmen who were carrying on the monarchy in Vienna that unless something were done, the Trans-Leithian part of the Empire would crack in pieces.

ATONEMENT FOR FERDINAND

Now enters upon the scene a personality whose name will always be associated with this war. Franz Ferdinand, heir to the dual monarchy, and very soon expecting to become Emperor, was the only Austrian statesman known to the outside world who favored meeting the grievances of the Slav element by recombining the Empire into three race units—German, Magyar, and Slav—instead of two existing. He was married to a Slav. He naturally wanted to save his Empire and perhaps had hit upon the only peaceful method by which it could have been saved. June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand, while visiting Sarajevo, was assassinated by a band of conspirators. It was a terrible murder, comparable to the assassination of President McKinley in 1901. The world rang with accounts of the tragedy and questions of its effect. For four weeks little was heard from the Austrian government. It was vaguely understood that a judicial commission was examining the case. Then on July 23, 1914, a thunderbolt

crashed from a clear sky in the form of a document which was intended to be virtually a declaration of war on Servia.

This "ultimatum" was practically an indictment of the whole Servian people and government as accomplices in the murder of Franz Ferdinand. It declares in set terms that "the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Servian officers and officials, who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials." It demanded from the Servian government the most humble and complete disavowal of further unfriendliness toward Austria, and the punishment of all persons who in the judgment of Austrian officials were concerned in the murder, in particular the arrest of a Major Tankosic and of a certain Ciganowic—Servian officials, who had been compromised as a result of the investigation.

The basis of this document is the Austrian investigation on Bosnian territory of the circumstances of the murder. That investigation was held in secret and the findings appeared to be founded upon the confessions of the two conspirators who were captured red-handed at the time of the murder. There is such a thing as the

Third Degree in the unwritten jurisprudence of the United States; and there used to be in most European countries a Fourth Degree of physical terror, produced by the fear or application of torture.

The details of the judicial proceeding have not been made public and probably never will be made public. All we know is that the Austrian authorities undoubtedly believed that the whole thing was a Servian plot. The Austrians, leaving in the background the fact that the two assassins who were captured in Sarajevo were Bosnians, and that the Ciganowic, mentioned above, was an Austrian subject, insisted that: (a) the murder had been planned by Servians; (b) that the bombs in the hands of the conspirators "were manufactured for military purposes, and judging from the way they were originally packed were from the Servian arsenal at Kragukejwac"; (c) that the conspirators and their arms were aided across the border by Servian officials; (d) that a secret society, Narodna Odbrana, was at the bottom of it.

That Servians had some hand in the obscure plot for killing Franz Ferdinand is altogether likely; that the Servian government had any knowledge or suspicion of it, is both unproved and improbable. When this crisis came General Potkin, head of the Servian army, was actually in Budapest; so little did the government expect a

breach with Austria. That the Servian people are morally responsible for the murder is preposterous, or would be except for the exceedingly disagreeable fact that the present king of Servia, Peter, came to the throne in 1903 by the murder of a king.

It is a gruesome story! Foreigners in Belgrade tell you how a band of Servian officers, sworn to fidelity to King Alexander, suddenly broke into his little palace at night. As they smashed in the door they put the electric light apparatus out of service; and the King and Queen Draga, in their terror, hid in a dark closet. Then the conspirators broke into a neighboring shop and carried off candles with which they searched the building. The Queen, out of a window, saw officers in Servian uniform and called upon them to defend their sovereign. That revealed the hiding-place, and the man and woman were butchered like cattle in the shambles and thrown out of the window.

Thus was the way prepared for the coward King Peter, who later rewarded these murderers with medals, appointments and honors. They were perfectly well known, but the Servian people let it go at that—apparently on the theory that if you could not remove both Alexander and Peter at the same time, it was still worth while to kill one of them.

Peter has long been a figurehead in his own

country. He is sick, perhaps dying, and lives in fear of the bullet that may cut short his miserable life; but the Servian statesmen and people are not in a position to say that the killing of a lawful sovereign is outside the habits of the Servians. The Austrians have shrewdly mixed up the known and proved Servian murder of Alexander with the possibly Servian murder of Franz Ferdinand.

Whoever wrote the Austrian ultimatum was in such a state of rage and fury that he did not know how to follow up this advantage, for he also charges the Servian people with furnishing out of the royal arsenal the bomb that killed Franz Ferdinand. Perhaps the Austrians believe that the Servians keep a supply of assorted bombs suited to the climates of various countries. As the people of New York too well know, a bomb is a very easy thing to make. It is not easy to believe that Servian military authorities should furnish a ready-made bomb, even if it could be shown that they had planned the assassination. The story sounds like those disjointed confessions which are wrenched from the mouth of a poor wretch upon the rack.

That there are Serb societies having members partly in Servia, and partly in the neighboring Serb-speaking countries, is altogether likely. The crushing weight of the Turkish domination for centuries drove men to such secret and desperate

means. Perhaps some Servian officers (possibly some of King Peter's obliging co-murderers) were in the combine. It is likely also that nothing but fear of immediate consequences would nerve the Servian government up to a searching investigation and punishment of such people. And if the Austrian government had any reasonable proof that the Servians took part in the murder they were entitled to demand redress, quick and drastic.

Anybody who knows the Balkan conditions must, however, believe that the crime of Servia, in the eyes of the Austrians, is not assassination but success. Of all the exasperating things that happened to Austria from the outbreak of war in October, 1912, to the partition of the Balkans among the seven Balkan powers in July, 1913, the most exasperating was the appearance of a strong and victorious Servia. The Serb race has been looked upon as rather mild, not easy to arouse, content with small things. The Austrians had their ministers, their consuls and their spies throughout the Balkans and yet never seem to have suspected that the spirit of the old Servian heroes would show itself again.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ULTIMATUM

That Austria intended drastic action had been for several days rumored in diplomatic circles.

On July 20 Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir William Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, that he was informed that Austria was about to take some steps which might prove warlike. Two days later Goschen reported that the German Secretary of State was aware that Austria was about to act and that the German government considered it an affair in which they could not interfere. The German Ambassador to the United States, Bernstorff, has made the public statement that Germany approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum, and gives the reasons therefor; but he is clearly mistaken, because the German authorities in Berlin explicitly deny any such knowledge and the State Secretary of Germany went so far as to say that the ultimatum left much to be desired as a diplomatic document.

Nevertheless it is perfectly clear that the German government had a previous understanding that in case the Austrian government felt that there was imminent danger of a break-up of the Empire, Germany would, if necessary, back Austria up, leaving to her all the responsibility of deciding what steps were necessary in order to put a stop to the ambition and intrigues of Servia. Furthermore, on July 23, the Chancellor of the German Empire sent a dispatch to the courts of France, England, and Russia to say that "the action as well as the demands of the

Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable," adding, "We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict because every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences." In a communication five days later to the German governments, the German chancellor said: "The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary."

Fifty years hence, when the history of this war can be written from the intimate, official, and private correspondence of this time, it will probably appear that the Hungarian statesmen appealed to their Austrian brethren to come to the rescue. There is no suggestion that Galicia, Bohemia, and the Slav Alpine provinces were infected. The Austrian government probably communicated with Germany and received general assurances of support; and then issued the ultimatum in a form far more caustic than the German Imperial Government had expected. By this time Hungary, Austria, and Germany were all committed to administering a very strong dose of medicine to the Servians.

Von Hartwig, the bellicose Russian Minister to Servia, had been replaced by a more moderate man, who during the forty-eight hours allowed the Servians for an answer to the Austrian message, under instructions from St. Petersburg used all his influence to induce the Servians to make a moderate reply which might obviate war. This influence was strengthened by the English representative, Crackanthorpe. Sir Edward Grey, the ablest foreign minister in Europe, wrote of the ultimatum: "I have never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character."

Under these strong influences, and a sense of their own danger the Servians on July 25 made a reply which to the outsider seems a complete surrender. The only point which they seemed to reserve was an unwillingness to allow delegates of the Austro-Hungarian government to take part in an official Servian investigation relating to the murder plot. At the end of the reply the Servian government offered to refer the matter to the arbitration of the great powers.

To the Austrian mind this reply was simply "a play for time," "disingenuous," dishonest, evasive, and unsatisfactory. For instance, they said, the Servians had used the words "judicial inquiry" instead of the Austrian term "investigation." Again the Servian government in its apology "condemns every propaganda which

should be directed against Austria-Hungary." Whereas the Austrians demanded the phrase "condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary." The conclusion is irresistible, that the Austrians expected war, were preparing for war, and would have been extremely discomfited if the Servians had accepted their demands to the last dotting of an i and crossing of a t. At any rate Sir Edward Grey wrote that "the Servian reply had already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo." July 28 Austria-Hungary formally declared war on Servia, "in order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy." Thus the first formal hostilities were inaugurated. In a few hours skirmishes began on the borders of the two countries.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR BECOMES EUROPEAN

ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA

FROM the first day of the official proceedings, July 23, 1914, it was clear that the crisis deeply affected Russia. On that very day the Austrians attempted to soothe the Russians by the statement that they "had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans." Sir Edward Grey saw more deeply into the matter and remarked a few days later: "If they could make war on Servia, and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but if not, the consequences would be incalculable." It is altogether probable that Germany exercised a pacific influence by making it clear to Austria that the annihilation of Servia would certainly arouse Russia. At any rate as early as July 25 the Germans informed the English representative that "Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory," and apparently about the same time the

Austrians informed Russia that "there is no intention of acquiring Servian territory, nor of threatening the continued existence of the Servian kingdom." Having obtained or sanctioned this declaration, the German government from that time to the end took the ground that what was going on was a local war between two powers in which no other European power had any direct concern. If a nation of fifty millions had occasion to fight a nation of five millions, so much the worse for the smaller one.

The Russian government was once more put into the anxious position which it has occupied at various times during the two preceding years: to the Russian mind the Austrians must have designs beyond the mere thrashing of a saucy neighbor. Was it a revival of the old intention to control a line down through the Balkans to Salonica? Whatever the purpose of Austria, would Russia, the greatest Slav power of the world, stand by and see a neighbor of the same religion and race invaded and thrashed at a probable loss of fifty thousand lives? The Servian offense of trying to enlarge her boundaries by incorporating Austrian Slavs could hardly seem to the Russian government contrary to good morals.

"Don't expect calico to tell you her mind," said the late eminent jurist, Josh Billings; "Calico doesn't know her own mind. Calico of all kinds is the child of circumstances." Perhaps

the Russian government did not know its own mind and was the child of circumstances, but it was clear that Christendom would look upon Russia as unable or unwilling to protect those of her own household if Servia were delivered up to Austria. The Teutonic interpretation of Russia's attitude is that the Russians were afraid that they would lose a chance of incorporating Servia into their Empire. A glance at the map will show that to annex Servia, or to make it a serviceable dependency, would require the previous annexation of Rumania and Bulgaria and war with Greece. Here is the critical point in the whole development of the war: every one of those five Balkan powers would fight Russia with the same intense patriotism that they fought Turkey or would fight Austria, if necessary to keep their independence. Whatever the motives of Russia, they did not include destroying the independence of Servia in the process of preventing destruction of that independence by Austria.

Nor is it clear that the Russians were set in motion by a desire to take either Slav or German territory from Austria and Germany. The only Slavs so situated that they could be conveniently pried off were the Austrian Poles in Galicia and the Prussian Poles in Posen, both of which groups would probably rather stay where they are than take the chances which the Russian Poles have endured. For a week Russia "hung in stays,"

and, as will be seen later, at the very last moment seemed on the brink of an arrangement with Austria that would stop the war altogether.

ENGLISH EFFORTS AT MEDIATION

During the dark days of the Balkan wars when the rivalry between Austria and Russia time after time threatened to bring on a general European war, by common consent Europe looked to Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister of Great Britain, as a sort of clearing house of diplomatic opinion, and as a source of midway measures which in every case prevented the breach. If, as many people believed, England wanted war and had carefully prepared for this moment, it is clear that Sir Edward Grey, the accredited spokesman of the English government, did not want war, and did everything that was humanly possible to bring the two principal parties, Austria and Russia, to an agreement. The time was fearfully brief, chiefly because of the impatience of Austria to wring the neck of her little enemy, Servia. From the first it was perceived that Germany and France and Italy were inseparable parts of the problem; and it was necessary to collect information and apply diplomatic pressure by each power concerned in half a dozen different courts. Grey was ably served by the ambassadors of Great Britain, and by none more faithfully and

energetically than by the Ambassador to Berlin, Goschen, and the Ambassador to Vienna, De Bunsen, both of German extraction. It is one of the curiosities of the controversy that the German Ambassadors to London, Prince Lichnowsky, and to Vienna, von Tschirschky und Bögendorff both bear Slavic names; and that the late Professor von Treitschke, the apostle of Germanism against the Slav, also bore an unmistakable Slav name.

The first effort of Germany was to persuade England to "localize the war by inducing Russia to stay her hand"; but Grey's point of view was that if Russia felt inclined to go into the fray England would neither interpose nor agree to support Russia. On July 24 Grey telegraphed that "in view of the extraordinary stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time limit, I felt helpless as far as Russia was concerned." On the same day he proposed a conference of the four great powers who were not yet drawn in, Germany, France, England, and Italy. Italy and France accepted. At one moment, July 27, the German government accepted in principle "mediation between Russia and Austria by the four powers"; but after a few hours' reflection held off, first, because the "conference suggested would practically amount to a court of arbitration"; and second, for the cogent reason that in such a conference France would be a sort of representative of Russia, and

Germany of Austria, leaving the decision to be made practically by England and Italy. The real objection was the feeling that Austria was making war on an issue of national honor and interest—the same reason that long influenced the United States Senate against arbitration treaties.

Grey now transferred his energies to two other plans: mediation by the German Emperor in person; and an agreement on the Servian question between Austria and Russia through "conversations" in St. Petersburg and Vienna. To the very last Grey still tried to propose anything that would call a halt. As late as July 31 he suggested to Germany that the four outside powers unite in offering to Austria that "they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory"; and on the critical day of August 1 he wrote to Goschen, "I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war."

AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CONVERSATIONS

The breach between Russia and Austria had been foreseen for several years and relations were repeatedly strained during the Balkan wars of

1912 and 1913. The result of these threats of wars which did not come about was that each side seems to have been pretty sure that if the other were pushed to an extremity it would yield on any minor question, rather than go to war. Only the archives of the Austrian War Department could settle the question whether the Austrians had correct information of the state of the Russian army, or of the condition of the Russian diplomatic mind. On the day after the Austrian ultimatum, Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, told the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg that the "Austrian step clearly meant war was imminent . . . Russian mobilization, at any rate, will have to be carried out." July 27 when it was clear that the Austrians were on the point of invading Servia, Sazonof proposed to talk things over with Austria to see if the Austrian ultimatum could not be modified. For these negotiations the word "conversation" was used, apparently to avoid the admission that either power was willing to negotiate or to make any diplomatic concessions. Sazonof added that if that method should fail, "I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict."

Here comes in the question of the proposed guaranty of the integrity of Servia, which the German government urged with some authority

upon Austria. The Austrians publicly announced that they did not intend to destroy Servia. On July 28 the question seemed to have come down to the issue whether Austria would promise to respect not only the "integrity" but the "independence" and "sovereignty" of Servia. When matters were moving to a crisis in St. Petersburg on July 31, Sazonof drew up a so-called formula, in the words:

"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

Next day a modification of this formula was sent out by Sazonof to all the powers:

"(Urgent) Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian government without injury to her sovereign rights as a

State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude!'"

Nevertheless on that very day complete mobilization of the Austrian forces was ordered, though war was not formally declared by Austria on Russia till August 6 and then Austrian troops crossed the Russian border.

MEDIATION OF EMPEROR WILLIAM

So far as notes and conversations of which we now have record are concerned, Russia appears to have endeavored to avoid the war; but the true story of her purposes is to be inferred from the course of the last possible means of preventing a general war—the mediation of the German Emperor. In the present spirit of Europe, where every power looks upon every other power as insincere, bellicose, and devilish, it is the fashion to assert that Germany and the German Emperor desired war and brought it on. To offset this charge a so-called German White-Book has been issued by the German Foreign Office, in which are printed some of the telegrams and dispatches. Another side we know through the similar English White-Book; the two sets supplementing each other. That Emperor William did not expect war is clear from the fact that when the ultimatum was sent out by Austria he was in Norway. Clearly Germany was the key to the whole situa-

tion: as the ally of Austria; as the strongest military power in Europe; and as the power which, during the controversy over Morocco in 1911, the Balkan wars, and other international strains, had distinctly given powerful aid to keep the peace.

It is impossible not to believe that the German Emperor as well as the German government was aware of the fix of Austria-Hungary, and of the purpose to give a bad fall to Servia. On the other hand, it is impossible not to believe that the Emperor was behind the successful effort of Germany to lead Austria to give some sort of guaranty of the integrity of Servia. On their side, the English representatives and apparently other people believed that the German Ambassador to Vienna, von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, was a bitter foe of Russia and aggravated the matter; and that the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, persuaded his government that the Russians could not be induced to fight.

Grey turned to Germany as the only hope of peace. July 28, while the conference of the four powers was still under discussion, he wrote: "I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which those principles should be applied."

The day after William's return to his capital, July 27, he telegraphed to Czar Nicholas, set-

ting forth the necessity of some punishment for the Servians, but adding, "I am therefore exerting all my influence to induce Austria-Hungary to come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia." The next day the Czar replied, asking the Emperor's help: "A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation. The indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure—and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war." William replied suggesting that "Russia remain in the rôle of spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war," and urging that "no military measures be taken by Russia which Austria-Hungary would think threatening." This correspondence is replete with sincerity and clearly shows the German Emperor trying to hold back the tide till Austria and Russia should be able to agree upon a form of accommodation.

MOBILIZATION AND DIPLOMACY

That this attempt failed seems due chiefly to militarism both in Russia and in Germany. Under modern systems of warfare military men lay great stress upon the advantage of a few hours in getting their troops to the front in case war comes on. The German army was distributed throughout the Empire and there were probably

300,000 men east of Berlin. Perhaps, though there is no information at present on that subject, troops of the regular army had been sent toward the Russian frontier for several days; but a formal order of general "mobilization" up to the end of July was not issued by any of the powers involved except Servia. At the beginning of the controversy, Buchanan, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, warned the Russian government not to mobilize; but on July 25 orders were given, which though not technically mobilization, amounted to calling in men who were not a part of the regular army then under the colors; and later military developments show that many thousands must have been pushed westward. As early as July 29 William strongly protested against the Russian mobilization and Nicholas replied that "for technical reasons" the orders given could not be revoked. On the 29th official orders were given for Russian mobilization in the southern provinces, which Austria accepted as an evidence of a warlike purpose. On August 1 the Austrians mobilized.

The crisis with Germany came two days later. July 31 the German Chancellor notified his Ambassador to Russia that "Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also"; and that Germany has been obliged "to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not mean mobilization. Mobil-

ization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within 12 hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary, and gives us definite assurance thereof."

At the last moment (August 1) the Czar telegraphed: "It is technically impossible to discontinue our military operation, which has been rendered necessary by Austrian mobilization. We are far from wishing for war, and so long as negotiations with Austria regarding Servia continue my troops will not undertake any provocative action." The Kaiser replied: "In my endeavors for the maintenance of the peace of the world, I have gone to the extreme limit possible. It is not I that shall bear the responsibility . . . no one menaces the honor and right of Russia, which well might have waited upon the result of my mediation. The peace of Europe can yet be conserved by thee if Russia desires to discontinue her military measures which threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary." The same day Emperor William telegraphed to King George of England: "Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for insuring safety of my eastern frontiers." Next day, August 2, Russian troops crossed the German frontier and war broke out.

So far as the published dispatches and our

imperfect knowledge of the circumstances go, it is proved that Emperor William would have held his hand for a few days if Russian mobilization had not seemed to him a warlike act directed against Germany. Whether Austria would in those few days have come to an understanding which would practically have nullified her ultimatum against Servia is a question to which no answer is written, even in the books of the Fates.

FRANCE

Every power in Europe knew beforehand that if Russia went to war with Germany, France would infallibly attack on the west. Otherwise it would have been suicidal for Russia to challenge or to accept a challenge or to drift into war with both Germany and Austria-Hungary. As has been seen, Russia tried vainly to extract a promise of support from England. Without any question she had such an assurance from France, not only through the long-standing secret agreement of about 1895, but by positive assurance at the time. France also tried to get Grey to promise English aid. The French, foreseeing the danger that war might break out with Germany, beginning with outposts acting without orders, removed all her troops ten kilometers back from the frontier. On August 1, the Germans demanded of France a statement of her intentions

and gave eighteen hours for an answer, at the end of which time the French simply replied that they would do whatever they thought to their interest. Practically at the end of the eighteen hours there was a state of war between the two countries (August 2).

How far the French desired war is hard to estimate. Only a few months ago they voted for a three-year military system, compulsory on all able-bodied Frenchmen. It is fair to infer that they expected war within a year or two at longest; but of all the Great Powers involved, France had the least to do with the Austrian ultimatum. It is hard to see how a combination between France and other powers to bring on war against Germany on the first day of August, 1914, could have prophetically foreseen the action of Austria. The French have been ready for war with Germany whenever they saw a good opportunity for the last forty years, and the whole nation as one mass accepted the opportunity when it came without hesitation and with very little effort to avert it. France's only share in the peace negotiations seems to have been her acceptance of the invitation to a conference of the four powers. France, however, could not fight without Russia, nor Russia without France. Together they hoped to be the two jaws of the vise with which to crush both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

GREAT BRITAIN

The most complicated situation on the European chessboard was that of Great Britain, for she had great interests in the Mediterranean that would be affected by war in southeastern Europe; she was deeply interested in any naval war; and she was in some degree committed by the previous engagement with France and Russia. When the crisis came Italy declined to consider herself bound to aid her two allies in the Triple Alliance because her engagements applied only to a defensive war, and, in the judgment of the Italians, this was an offensive war. In the same manner, though on different grounds, England at the beginning of the fierce hours of negotiation that preceded war made it clear that she did not feel bound to aid either Russia or France, simply because of the Triple Entente; and (as has been seen) declined to give pledges to either of those two powers.

Grey did drop a warning on July 27 that the British fleet happened to be assembled for a naval review and for the time being would remain assembled; but he took pains to emphasize the fact that England was entering in the whole matter not with a view to save Servia but to save the rest of Europe. July 31 he wrote: "Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved." But

at the same time he wrote: "I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it." This is simply a way of saying that England was not bound to go to war because of previous pledges, but was very likely to go to war to protect her own interests.

Nothing can be clearer than that the German government was confident that Great Britain would keep out of the war. In the first place both the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Secretary of the Foreign Office, von Jagow, had for months been working upon a scheme, which, of course, must have been approved by the Emperor, to come to an understanding with Great Britain and through Great Britain with France, under which those three powers (presumably in association with Austria) should become the arbiters of Europe and thereby of Asia and of Africa. There is no evidence of a crisis in the ill-feeling between the people of the two nations previous to July 23. That Germany did not expect war with Great Britain is almost decisively proven by the fact that no hint was given to the two great German steamship lines, the Hamburg and the North German Lloyd. How far this belief rested upon the supposed unwillingness of the British to fight any strong power; how far upon the con-

viction that the English would see it contrary to their interest to fight; and how far upon the assumption of the Germans that the English would think like Germans upon such an issue is impossible to determine.

In all probability Great Britain would speedily have been drawn into the conflict through mere nearness to the scene of it in every ocean; but there were two direct reasons which led England into the war instantly and irrevocably. The first was the geographical fact that the English Channel, command of which means command of the British Islands, narrows down to twenty-two miles at Dover; and a naval war between Germany and France would mean the passing of German fleets within a cannon shot of the British shores, and the bombardment of the French coast within hearing of British seaports. That contingency had so far been foreseen that in 1912 a formal agreement was made that the British would withdraw their Mediterranean fleet and the French would withdraw their Channel fleet to the Mediterranean. This could mean nothing but a guaranty by Great Britain of the French Atlantic coast in case of war.

That question was brought up sharply by a proposition from the German government that England should remain neutral provided the Germans would engage not to annex any of the terri-

tory of Continental France. Grey replied, July 30: "What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."

Two days later Prince Lichnowsky notified his government that Earl Grey had telephoned him suggesting that if Germany would agree not to attack France, France might remain neutral. Emperor William at once replied: "If France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall, of course, refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere." King George at once answered that Lichnowsky must have misunderstood the proposition; if the idea of confining the war to Austria, Germany, and Russia found lodgment in Sir Edward Grey's mind, it would appear from the correspondence that France would enter into no such engagement, and Grey afterward ex-

plained that his idea included the neutrality of Germany.

Germany was still so desirous for English neutrality that, according to Grey, Lichnowsky on August 1 "pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed." Nothing more was heard of French neutrality. On the contrary, on August 2 Grey gave to France the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

The second impetus to England was given by the German entry into Belgium. On July 30 the German government appears to have offered to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided England would agree for that consideration to remain neutral. During the next two days Grey attempted to secure a promise from Germany not

to begin hostilities in Belgium; and secured from France a positive statement that France would respect the neutrality of Belgium unless some other power violated it. On August 2 Luxemburg was entered by German troops, the German government taking pains to notify the Luxemburg Minister of State that:

"The military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire."

On August 3 the German troops entered Belgium in defiance of the protests of the Belgian government; and, on the refusal of the German government to withdraw, the British Minister demanded his passports. At 7 P. M. August 4 Germany formally declared war on England, and at 11 P. M. England reciprocated.

The last chance of peace between Germany and Russia disappeared on August 1, and in the course of the next three days Great Britain came to the point of joining France and Russia. If the German charge is justified, that it was the previous purpose of those three powers to act together in a conspiracy against Germany, Great Britain had not played fair with her allies; for she had assured Russia and France as well as

Germany that she was not under obligations to unite with them. She had made several efforts to secure neutrality for herself and apparently for France; and up to the occupation of Belgium no English interest had been seriously menaced.

The trusted and accredited representative of Great Britain is Sir Edward Grey, and the charge that he hoodwinked Austria and Germany involves the belief that he is capable of leading the statesmen of the other European powers a dance for twelve days; and of persuading the German Chancellor and Emperor that his formal dispatches did not mean what they said. If Grey thus subtly induced Germany to go into war, with the confidence that she would have one ally and only two adversaries, and then at the last moment threw off the mask when Germany could no longer withdraw, then the world is confronted by a greater danger than any Slav Empire or Yellow Peril. For Sir Edward Grey would be established as a statesman with the morals of Metternich, the abandon of Napoleon, and the intellectual power of Bismarck. The only defense for Europe against such a Machiavelli would be another St. Helena!

All the circumstances seem to show that the Germans confidently expected Great Britain to stand neutral, but they expected it on grounds of the probable policy and interest of Great

Britain and not upon any words of Britain's responsible statesman. The English public was delighted with war, partly from an accumulated patriotism, partly from a sense of power in their fleet, and partly from a desire to show that they were still an indispensable factor in the world's affairs; and doubtless behind all that, was the feeling that the time had come to put an end to German commercial and seafaring rivalry.

MONTENEGRO AND JAPAN

Montenegro, which is identical with Servia in language, race, and religion, had for several years been a cockboat in the wake of a steam launch that was fearlessly moving about among ironclads; and on August 7 declared war on Austria in sympathy and alliance with Servia. Japan at the other end of the world seemed not deeply involved in this controversy, but Japan was closely bound to Great Britain by two treaties. By the first, January 30, 1902, it was agreed with regard to China and Korea that:

"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power, . . . in the above event any other power or powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other high contracting party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war

in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

By the second agreement of August 12, 1905, it was provided that:

"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

The English and Japanese governments exchanged views, and on August 23 Japan declared war upon Germany. At first the few Austrian interests in eastern Asia were excepted by the Japanese, but the Austrian government explained that it shared with its ally in the war thus declared. The Japanese in their declaration spoke of the uncertainty of commerce and the number of steamers that were lying in port, not daring to go to sea. There seems, however, no reason to doubt that if Japan had declared her neutrality it would have been respected by Germany, which had no wish to create new enemies at that distance. The real motive of the Japanese is to impress upon the world their vitality as a Western Power, resident in the East, as a power

which shares in the dangers and destinies of the Western world.

BELGIUM

The case of Belgium is peculiar. It is the only one of the eight participating powers which had no quarrel with anybody. Belgium was in no danger from a wave of Slavic barbarism. Belgium, though prosperous, was not envied by other commercial powers; though the possessor of an immense area in Africa, nobody was trying to get her territory. The Belgian ports, particularly Antwerp, were freely and profitably used by German trade. There was no boundary squabble, no special military spirit. No people in Europe were less involved in questions of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente and Balance of Power. They were literally minding their own business up to the day when war broke out between France and Germany.

The peculiar position of Belgium as a specially neutralized power will be considered later, together with the question whether the Belgians had departed from their neutrality. For the present the question is only how Belgium got into the war. On July 30 Grey notified Goschen that in his opinion the Chancellor of the German Empire "in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that

bargain either." Next day he inquired of both French and German governments whether they were "prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium, so long as no other power violates it." The next day he notified Belgium that he assumed she would "maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe." France gave the required assurance at once.

Goschen reported, July 31, "that German government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already." On August 3 the French government offered five army corps to the Belgians in case they should be invaded, but the Belgians intimated that they thought they could take care of themselves. Meanwhile the German government offered the Belgian government "friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested in twelve hours."

Next day, August 4, and three days after the beginning of German mobilization, the German government notified the Belgian government

that since they "have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces." Whereupon the Germans crossed the border and hostilities at once began.

The Germans still sought to hold back Great Britain from declaring war, by the formal assurance that "even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgium territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by the fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Leaving aside for the moment the question whether Germany was under a special pledge not to disturb Belgium, the question of responsibility is perfectly simple. Four suggestions were made

that Belgium had incurred invasion by hostile acts: (1) by holding up a grain cargo; (2) by permitting her forts to be designed by a French engineer; (3) by building forts on the German frontier, which was an evidence of hostile feeling; (4) by the passage of a number of French officers in automobiles across Belgium on the second or third of August; (5) by negotiations with England several years previous for English defense and use of Belgium in case of war. This is said to be based on documents discovered after the fall of Antwerp. Every observer and reader may decide for himself how far those complaints are sustained by the evidence that is adduced.

In any case all the world knows that they were not the determining factors in the action of Germany. Belgium was attacked because it lay across a roundabout, but supposedly easy, road to Paris, and might eventually come into the circle of the Allies. The German military engineers had decided that the French fortified frontier from Switzerland to Luxemburg was too strong to be forced in any brief time. Hence, the Germans entered by the Belgian frontier, south of which the only strong French fortress was Maubeuge. The French expected to stand on the defensive; and "life or death" to the Germans meant the success or failure of the plan to break down that defense and capture Paris before the Russians could get up in force on the eastern frontier.

The consequences of this act must be to impress all the small European powers with apprehension. Switzerland appreciated the circumstances and instantly called out her army and lined her northern frontiers. Nothing but a conviction of imperious and military necessity would have driven Germany to an act which was bound to create consternation among small powers and surprise among neutrals throughout the world.

CHAPTER VIII

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

THE SOVEREIGNS

TO read some of the utterances of the day one would think that the European war that is now raging is being fought by automatons. We picture to ourselves "We William" or "We Nicholas" busily unpacking cardboard boxes of soldiers and winding up the spring in the back of each one, and setting him marching toward Paris, or toward Berlin. It is a convenient way of simplifying the problem to look upon it as a war of dynasties, due to the ambition of a little group of men, who have nothing personally to lose, and stand a good chance of getting on the front page of the metropolitan dailies.

Nothing could be further from the truth than the idea that ten million men are tearing each other to pieces because their sovereigns so bid them do. The days are long gone by when some German princes sold their subjects in batches to serve in far-off America at a bonus of $35 per

man, and more if they were killed. Not in a thousand years has Europe been so free from the professional mercenary, selling his sword to the highest bidder. And though hundreds of thousands of men would joyfully risk their lives in defense of Emperor or King or Grand Duke, the only king in Europe who has a close touch, and the personal friendship of his subjects, is King Nicholas of Montenegro. That is not so difficult, because he could gather most of his loving subjects within the area of Madison Square.

The personality of the sovereigns is an important factor in the conflict, but simply as Kings only one of them occupies the center of the stage. Kaiser Francis Joseph cannot possibly have made the decision to send to Servia the ultimatum that was a spark to the powder. King Peter of Servia is a worthless figurehead, who has hardly been mentioned in the proceedings. The Kings of Bulgaria and Rumania are both imported Germans. Ferdinand of Bulgaria seems to have been overridden by the military men in the second Balkan war of July, 1913. Charles of Rumania was a remarkably handsome and courtly man, who was at best one of a group of guiding statesmen in his country. The Sultan of Turkey is a signature machine, who does what he is told by the combination of men, who for the time being have taken upon themselves the responsibilities of the Ottoman Empire. King Albert of Belgium is new

to the throne, and though he has shown himself a bold and manly sovereign, the last thing for which he would claim authority is the coming on of war with Germany. As for France, there is not even the shadow of a Bourbon or Bonaparte cast athwart the public sentiment of the country; and the President of the Republic is in reality only the chairman of a national committee of defense.

The three sovereigns who stand out in relief against the dark background of the war are King George, and his two cousins, Emperor William and Czar Nicholas. As for George V, the English people exercise the inalienable right of gossiping about royalty. One set tells the visitor that the King's sense and carefully modulated influence over English statesmen make him a power in the realm. Another set, equally well uninformed, assure you that he only puts things in a mess, and undoes the work of his father. The weight of evidence is that King George is a man who possesses the manly virtues of sense and steadfastness. In the correspondence between the courts in the crisis of July, 1914, we find a personal letter to Cousin William; but nobody for a moment supposes that it contains a syllable which had not been read and approved by Asquith, the responsible head of the British government. No personal desire of the King for war or to prevent war deflected the decisions of the British cabinet.

George V cannot take the field in command, as did the great William of Orange in 1689. He cannot construct a majority in the House of Commons, as did George III, and thus keep alive a war even after it became repugnant to the people of the realm. The only ambition which he can cherish is to hand down his crown undiminished; and the war somewhat endangers that modest hope.

The Czar Nicholas much resembles his cousin George in person and in character; but by the laws of Russia he is endowed with tremendous power in time of peace, and still more in time of war. "Autocrat of all the Russias," "Great White Czar," supreme and unquestioned monarch of the largest and most populous European country, his word is law, his ministers are his servants, the people are his serfs! All this sounds magnificent; but has Czar Nicholas actually exercised any of these pyramidal prerogatives in the present crisis?

Read the telegrams which he exchanged with Emperor William, and see whether you can discover there this imperial and unquestionable will. Instead, between the lines appears the evidence that if Nicholas could have bent the resolution of those who stood nearest to him, he would have held up the mobilization of Russia till there was time to discover whether Austria would give way on the Servian question sufficiently to reassure

Russia. That might not have stopped the war, but it would have relieved the Czar from the reproaches of William, when he solemnly held him up before God and man as responsible for the breach. The truth is that the Czar of Russia is inclosed in a palisade of officials every one of whom is nominally his servitor; but he is only a reservoir of power; they control all the distribution pipes; and it is they, and not the Czar, who decided that war was better for Russia than the previous state of things.

The Emperor William is the one genuinely commanding royal figure in Europe. He lives under the same political roof as the Reichstag, which makes laws and votes men and money for military purposes, but under the German Constitution he has immense sovereign powers. He directs the seventeen votes of Prussia in the Bundesrath, and unofficially controls enough more votes to make up the majority of the votes of the Bundesrath which are necessary for formal action. He is a military monarch inured to camp and saddle, familiar with the deep-laid plans of the military experts. In the negotiations and cross-correspondence of that age-long and fearfully brief eight days, from the Austrian ultimatum to the German declaration of war on Russia, he appears as the one independent statesman who might perhaps speak the restraining word to the Austrians, and who did counsel moderation to that power.

THE MINISTERS

William II, German Emperor, cannot act without the support and aid of the Chancellor and other statesmen who summarize and interpret the national will. He could not control the course of events which, as the publications of the dispatches show, swept him and his Chancellor away from the policy which they had been cultivating of friendship and perhaps eventual alliance with England and then with France. There is a voice of the German nation which is more powerful than that of all the Hohenzollerns. The Emperor leads Germany in the direction towards which the current flows. He has not the power, if he had the will, either to make war or to keep the peace against the decided sweep of German public opinion.

Yet the final decisions have undoubtedly been made by small groups of statesmen in each country. Not a single parliament, assembly, diet, duma, or skuptshina decided the action of any one of the countries involved. The English Parliament and the German Reichstag accepted and approved what each understood to be an inevitable state of facts. France took the ground that the war was defensive, and needed no declaration of war by the Chamber. In England Sir Edward Grey was the dominant figure, and the dispatches reveal him as calm, patient and re-

sourceful. To the very last moment he strove to find some influence, or combination, or personality which would stay the flood. He pleaded for the few little hours of delay that would perhaps make possible an understanding between Russia and Austria. Though he once referred to the fact that his decisions were subject to the will of Parliament, he announced the position of his country, and committed Great Britain to a point of view which led that country to the side of the Allies, without a previous vote of Parliament.

The two other foreign ministers who affected the decision were Sazonof, the Russian, and Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire. Both of them preferred peace, if they could reach their ends without war. Another individual stands out from the group of diplomats and ambassadors because of the tragic responsibilities of presenting the ultimatum of Germany to Russia. This was De Pourtalès, German Ambassador to Russia. The dispatches tell us that when the fatal moment arrived he broke down, as the mighty Bismarck once broke down when the military men had almost persuaded the old Emperor William to take territory from Austria after the war of 1866. Almost heart-broken he pleaded with Sazonof to give him a "formula"—that is, a condensed statement of what would satisfy Russia. As has been described above, a memorandum was handed to him, and subse-

quently modified, which came near preventing the war. The German foreign minister also with anguish spoke to the English minister to Berlin of the wrecking of his hopes for an understanding with England.

THE MILITARY MEN

To accuse these statesmen and the other diplomats who loyally strove to prevent the conflict, of being influenced by personal or dynastic motives would be a great injustice. The natural disposition of diplomats is to adjust matters. The ministers and ambassadors who in every country finally urged or agreed with a declaration of war, had around them, and behind them, another ring of persons exercising influence upon them. Here comes in the tremendous weight of the military men.

Almost any soldier whom you meet will tell you that the object of his life is to prevent war, but the soldier is an immense political force throughout every European country. Great Britain has the social custom, followed by the United States, that it is unsuitable for a military or a naval man to appear in uniform, unless he is on duty. Everywhere on the Continent a man almost lives in his uniform; a favorite subject for the German comic papers is the young officer

who tries to sneak out of barracks in "mufti." The Continental military element is not only always before the public eye, it is deep in the councils of state. The ministers of military and naval affairs are almost always men who have seen military or naval service, or who are actually in service. In the modern armies the high officer is not simply the recipient of honors and titles, gold braid and medals, but is an essential part of the machinery of state. Every officer from lieutenant to field-marshal (except in England) is a daily sharer in the hard work of drill and administration.

Militarism has been a tremendous force in this crisis, partly by a steady emphasis put on war as a means of settling disputes, which accustoms a whole community to think in terms of Krupp guns and Zeppelins; partly because the high military officers are a part, and often the strongest part, of the combination of those who make decisions. We are accustomed to think of Germany as a country saturated with militarism, but it is much the same in every European country down to little Montenegro. The present war only accents the general belief that any nation and any of its citizens may be called upon to fight for the nation's right to live. Everybody is taught that the only rational method of self-defense is to hit the other fellow before he can get his fists doubled.

MOBILIZATION

Hence in the crisis which terminated in war "mobilization" has been a frequent word. The term hardly came into being till the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866, for it means the frantically rapid calling together of men liable for service, and putting them on the enemy's frontier. Every American knows that when two football rush lines oppose each other, the one that is first in motion is more likely to break through the other line. The amazing success of the Germans in 1870 in concentrating their army on the border before the French could organize their forces, has led to a fetish worship of mobilization. It is like a football trick tried for the first time: in the next game the other side is practising the same trick. The first great lesson of the present war at Liège was that a comparatively small force behind fortifications can "break up the formation" of the charging forwards, and even halt their rush, no matter how swift their mobilization.

Behind mobilization is the effect of the fear of mobilization on the other side, which played a great part in the diplomatic preliminaries of the war. The Austrians followed up their ultimatum on Servia with their armies within three days after it expired, expecting to catch the Slavs napping; and were furious because the Servians mob-

ilized at the same time that they were preparing the apology which Austria ignored. Emperor William, occupying the powerful place of the mediator who alone could dispose the hard hearts of the Austrians and Russians to an accommodation, telegraphed with passionate earnestness to the Czar that if the Russians mobilized, his mission was at an end. His point was that mobilization disturbed the delicate balance of military force, and that he could not permit the Russians the slightest tactical advantage. The Russians on their side doubtless felt that the Germans were in a position to throw troops on the border in forty-eight hours, while it would take them seven times as long, and they would give no advantage.

Another of the psychical elements of the problem is that all the great countries felt compelled to prove that they were ready to fight; and that probably accounts for the Russian mobilization in the midst of the Emperor's mediation. The question whether Russia would intervene in case Austria attacked a Balkan power had been many times raised, and came to a test last year, when the Austrians were ready to go to war to drive the Montenegrins out of Scutari. Russia held off at that time, and it probably was the belief of the Austrians in 1914 that Russia was either not ready or not willing to confront the Dual Monarchy. There was a general exhibition of

mouthfuls of sharp teeth. Even the English pointedly called the attention of the other powers to the fact that their most powerful fleet happened to be assembled, and would remain assembled.

PUBLIC SENTIMENT

The newspapers played a smaller rôle than usual in such controversies; the crisis came too swift, too concentrated. Intimations were given out from time to time of the series of attempts either to stop or to "localize" the strife. But nobody was sufficiently informed of the play of international forces to arouse public sentiment upon them. Questions of men and ships and forts were withheld from the press. Even government organs, such as some of the great German newspapers, were muffled. From the secession of South Carolina, in December, 1860, to the breaking out of Civil War the next April, there were four months of discussion and exchange of views. In Europe, from the time the public realized the danger of great war till the great war began, was less than five days.

It had been confidently supposed that should such a danger arise, the great money powers of Europe would deflect it. We have been told that they really put an end to the war between Russia and Japan, by refusing to lend any more money. Capital was international; the enormous com-

mercial interests would never allow a war. In fact the business interests of Europe were either not consulted or not heeded. Of nothing has Germany been more justly proud than of its two rich and powerful steamship companies—the Hamburg and the North German Lloyd, but so little did the astute semi-official managers of this line expect war, that some of their greatest liners were saved from capture only by heading away from their ports of destination.

In this country the small business men would have a great influence over such a question, because they could see ruin staring them in the face, but the Austrian manufacturer, the German chemist, the Russian landowner, the English shipowner, have been swept away by a tide against which they have hardly seemed to struggle. The small investors, the depositors in post offices and banks in every country accept and passionately support a war which is likely to sweep away their savings.

KISMET

The conclusion is irresistible that practically every nation interested accepts the war as a thing for which it was not responsible, and which it could no more avoid than it could avoid an avalanche. The Austrians, without the slightest doubt, believed that their empire would fall to

pieces unless they once for all stopped the growth of Servia. The Servians saw no escape except to call out their army for the third time in two years. The Russians were genuinely convinced that the crushing of Servia would mean the control of the Balkans by Germany and Austria. The Germans were sure that the Russians in attacking Austria were attacking Germanism, and that they must take up the challenge. The French had less direct cause than other powers for offensive action, but had been waiting for forty years for the opportunity to get back their lost provinces. The Belgians lay in the most direct path of a great power, and had no choice but to expiate their geography with blood. The English kept up the greatest navy in the world in order that they might be ready to prevent the lodgment of any rival power on their shores or on the coast opposite them. Everybody, thinking and unthinking, seemed absolutely certain that his state must fight or be destroyed.

Not everybody—the peasantry, the helpless noncombatants, the foreigners caught in the cogs of the infernal machine of war, have been strongly for peace. Little wayside villages, country churches, orphan asylums, at an hour's notice found themselves between fiercely battling and enraged armies. Whatever the national convictions of the necessity of this war, there are still pathetic protestors who cannot be silenced,

who in anguish wonder whether some way out of the labyrinth might not have been found. But they appear to be the only active members in Europe of the universal World Peace Society.

CHAPTER IX

QUESTIONS OF NEUTRALITY

WHAT IS A NEUTRAL?

SINCE the Napoleonic times there has been no war in central Europe which involved more than two or at most three Great Powers. In 1854 it was two small French and English armies rather than France and England that attacked the small Russian post of Sebastopol rather than Russia. In 1849 it was a Russian army, not the Russian nation, which aided the Austrians to overcome the Hungarians. The Prussian wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 were each directed against one antagonist, except that in 1866 the Prussians had to fight the South Germans at the same time as the Austrians. In the war of 1877 the main antagonists were Russia and Turkey. The old practice of a body of allies clustering together against another group or power was realized in the two recent Balkan wars, which at the same time brought out the difficulty of keeping allies side by side throughout a war and still more throughout a peace.

In every war after 1815 there was a large group of countries which took no part in the hostilities, but which maintained so far as was possible while war was going on their previous relations of trade and intercourse with the belligerents. Gradually by custom, by treaties which involved neutral and belligerent powers, and by treaties made beforehand between later belligerents, the rights and duties of neutrals were laid down. In the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1908 numerous conventions were drawn up, many of which have been signed by a large number of powers, clearly setting forth these rights and duties. The penalty of deliberately aiding one of the belligerents is for the other side to treat the offender as a party to the war. The reward of standing by the duties of neutrals is to enjoy trade and intercourse with all the belligerents. One of the most important privileges is to remain in a foreign country after it goes to war, but that right is subject to many limitations. Every government in time of peace as well as in time of war has the right to decide whether any foreigner or any kind of foreigner shall be allowed to come into the country, or having come, shall be allowed to stay there. Nevertheless the expulsion of well-behaved foreigners for any but grave reasons is usually taken up as a grievance by any self-respecting government of which the exile was a national. The present war broke out

so suddenly that great numbers of people were caught unawares, particularly Americans, who are a traveling people; on August 1, 1914, about 100,000 of them were on the Continent of Europe. The knowing ones took early trains, for the moment mobilization was proclaimed every government seized the railroad system and civilians were allowed to ride only on sufferance. Many Germans, Frenchmen, or Austrians were caught away from home in their own country. At the same moment the system of travelers' credits broke down, and when trains began to run again irregularly, many travelers could not raise the money to get out. The United States government took an unprecedented step in appropriating 2,750,000 dollars for the relief of "marooned" Americans; by undertaking to forward deposits made in the State Department to persons abroad, and by sending a ship of war to carry the money and give assistance. As a matter of fact not one in ten of the Americans thus caught was left entirely without means.

Hundreds of these returning participants in the fringes of the war have published their experiences. Few of them seem to have had much trouble in France, for it was easy to get to England from that country. In Russia, Austria, and Germany, however, many people went through hardships, aggravated sometimes by the fact that they spoke English and were taken for English;

that is, for nationals of an enemy power. As always happens in such confusion and excitement, and as happened frequently in our Civil War, some people were harshly and brutally treated, but that is not to be laid to any nation or to any government. No systematic hostility to Americans was shown in any country; and in individual cases of oppression or abuse it must be presumed that after the war proper indemnity will be secured by the United States government. Some automobiles were "impressed," subject to later payment; thousands of trunks were stranded; but no authentic case has been reported of an American losing life or being put in peril because he was a neutral.

MILITARY SERVICE

A clear neutral personal right is to be free under all circumstances from service in a foreign army. Some cases have been reported where chauffeurs who claimed to be American have been commissioned with their machines, either because it was handy to have the keeper with the beast, or because he looked like material for a soldier. The general drag-net of the army includes three classes: (1) citizens of the belligerent countries; (2) former citizens who have lived elsewhere but cannot make out a clear case of naturalization in a foreign country and happen to

be in their old homes; (3) residents in other countries (particularly the United States) who are entirely out of the physical power of their government. Neutrals will make no attempt to protect a man not their citizen who is in his native country when war breaks out. The few instances of Americans born who are forced into service will undoubtedly be disposed of as soon as the overburdened military offices can be prodded to investigating the cases. Naturalized citizens who have a clear case would also be set free, but a mere claim to naturalization without any papers or other proof will probably be dismissed until the war is over, which in hundreds of cases is certain to be too late for them—poor fellows! By special treaties with Germany and some other powers, beginning in 1868 the United States has secured the principle that a foreigner who remains in the United States five years loses that foreign citizenship by naturalization. If, however, he returns to reside in his original country, he thereby loses his American citizenship. In such instances the military governments will probably take the benefit of the doubt if the man has once been a French, German, or Russian citizen.

The pressure upon nationals of other countries living in the United States during the last three years has been terrible. Servians, Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Turks, and Greeks went home in masses in 1912 to take

advantage of the remarkable opportunity to get killed in defense of their country. The sea road was open to them and the total number of these volunteers who traveled five thousand miles is probably over a hundred thousand. In 1914 similar calls produced a less result because it was almost impossible for men to get home to any countries except England, France, and Italy. The point is a very serious one for thousands of these men; because if their country is engaged in war and they fail to respond to a call they are liable to be posted as deserters, branded in public estimation as cowards, and subject to punishment or exclusion if in the future they try to go home.

On the other hand the laws of the United States are very explicit that no American shall become an officer or soldier in a foreign army and that no troops for any foreign army shall be recruited within the United States. In the Boer War there was a small contingent of Americans who braved the penalties of this law and it is said that large numbers have gone to Canada and enlisted there on their own statement that they were Canadians, for the love of adventure and the glamour of a soldier's life.

FOREIGN TRADE

The general principle that a neutral is not precluded by war from carrying on regular trade with a belligerent power is subject to many limi-

tations. In the first place any belligerent has the right to fortify the coast by submarine mines within his own territorial three-mile limit; and merchant ships attempting to enter such ports do so at their own peril. In the second place when a neutral vessel attempts to enter a port outside of which there are blockading vessels, it may be captured and confiscated. In the third place, a vessel which carries contraband of war bound to one belligerent port may be captured by the cruisers of any enemy belligerent. No neutral is bound to prevent the shipment of contraband goods, even guns and ammunition, but the vessel owner takes his own risk of capture; his government will do nothing for him.

By modern practice this doctrine of contraband has been extended in two ways. First, provisions are "conditional contraband" if the likelihood is that they will be used to feed soldiers in the field. Furthermore, goods, including food, which are to be landed at a neutral port but are intended to pass from that neutral port to a belligerent are contraband, and may be seized on the high seas. This principle is very important in the present war because grain shipments to Holland can be seized before they reach that country if they are destined for the German army. The Dutch government has made itself safe by providing that such shipments shall not be forwarded to Germany at all. Inasmuch as

the whole German coast from the Dutch boundary to the Danish is practically under blockade by the British fleet and the route through the Skagarack and the Sound into the Baltic is also blocked to hostile vessels, Germany can at present receive no food shipments from outside of Europe, a factor which may have a great weight in the war.

This situation has greatly interfered with American shipments of grain because of the uncertainty of cargoes reaching port and therefore the difficulty of assuring payment for the cargo on delivery. The forwarding of cotton also is hampered by much the same causes.

Some of the belligerent powers, especially Germany, have applied very strict rules to the mails. No letter is mailable in the German post office unless written in German and postmasters have the right to satisfy themselves that it is written in German. Even letters directed in English to German civil officials from the United States appear in some cases to have been held back. Nobody can complain of a precaution which applies to Germans as well as to foreigners.

Similar restrictions have been applied to submarine cable lines. The Germans made the just complaint that cablegrams were sent to the United States and re-telegraphed to Canada from Great Britain, while the Germans had no direct cables in operation. The result was a general rule

that no cablegram should be sent in cipher and none in any form which would convey military intelligence to the representatives of belligerent powers. Some submarine cables have been cut, which is a recognized right of war; but down to October most of the cables to Europe were in operation.

The wireless telegraph presented novel difficulties as to neutral rights. One system worked from the eastern United States to Great Britain; another from Long Island to Germany. Marconigrams could be received or transmitted not only across the sea but to the cruisers and merchant ships of the various belligerent powers. The United States finally took the bold but reasonable step of putting government inspectors into all the wireless stations and refusing to allow the transmission of anything that would be useful to ships of war. The Germans have keenly felt their lack of direct and unrestricted communication from Germany to the United States, because it deprives them, as they feel, of the chance to present their case and their cause to the American people.

NEUTRALITY OF ITALY

All the circumstances point to the conclusion that neither Germany nor Austria put much dependence on the position of Italy as the third member of the Triple Alliance. So long as he

could, Bismarck adhered to the old Three Emperor Alliance of Russia, Germany, and Austria, and he turned to Italy and admitted that new power in 1882 because Russia was no longer cordial and Italy could offer a considerable army, a small, but at that time effective, navy, and great commercial advantages. By the completion of the Gotthard Tunnel in 1882, Genoa became an important collecting point for the Mediterranean and the Oriental trade on one side and for Germany on the other side.

This admission into the highest society of nations was a great feather in the cap of Italy which had so recently become a nation; and at that time the Italians were on bad terms with the French, partly for commercial reasons and partly because the French blocked the ambitions of Italy in North Africa. The Austrians had beaten the Italians at the sea fight of Lissa in 1866, and had at least broken even in the land battles. Unfortunately for good feeling between those two powers the language boundary, which in the Eastern Alps is almost the same as the race boundary, does not coincide with the political boundary. The so-called Trentino, a southern district of the Tyrol, including the city of Trent, is almost entirely Italian in speech, and Trieste is in population, and apparently in sympathy, overwhelmingly Italian. Hence there have been many popular demonstrations against the Austrians in

Italy, and this feeling was much heightened by rivalries between the two powers at the time of the Balkan wars on the other side of the Adriatic.

When war broke out, therefore, the Italian government on August 1 declared that Italy was not bound to assist her allies in an "offensive war," and that Italy would remain neutral. Nevertheless the regular army of 700,000 was directed toward the northern frontier, and was probably reinforced, though up to the middle of October the reserves had not been called out in full and there was, as yet, no formal mobilization.

The Germans were very anxious that Italy should join the two powers and it is the current belief that offers were made of territorial advantages to Italy, probably out of the colonies of France and England. Italy refused the offer and appears to have maintained neutrality in honorable fashion. Italy, however, has large ambitions in the eastern Balkans and in Africa, and since the people are apparently very hostile in spirit toward the Austrians, it is likely that that country will be drawn into the war sooner or later. At present Italy is the only European commercial power that has a large army and navy which is not engaged in hostilities.

NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

Switzerland was neutralized by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815; which has so far been respected. Holland has no special protection by European treaties, but her neighbor Belgium at the beginning of the war was able to show three documents guaranteeing her freedom from disturbance by the belligerent powers. The first of these treaties was a result of revolution. In 1815 the Powers at Vienna made an artificial combination of the former Dutch Confederation (commonly called Holland by the English) and the former Austrian provinces, both of which had for a time been incorporated in France by Napoleon. These two elements differed in religion, and had no common interest in the sovereign who was given to them. In 1830, when the French Bourbon monarchy was overthrown by a revolution, the southern part of Holland also revolted, and by hard fighting made it clear that it could not be kept down by the Dutch part of the kingdom.

Hence, after the revolution, by the treaty of November 15, 1831, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Prussia, Russia, and Belgium united in a treaty establishing the boundaries of the present Belgium and providing that "Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state, which shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states."

April 19, 1839, the same powers, with the addition of Holland, again put their signatures to a treaty setting forth in the same words that "Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states." For a third time, on August 9, 1870, three weeks after the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, Great Britain and Prussia united in a treaty which set forth that "His Majesty, the King of Prussia, having declared that notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France." Great Britain pledged herself to defend Belgium against any infringement by the French. Two days later a treaty in almost identical terms was signed with France, engaging to respect the neutrality so long as it was observed by Prussia and her allies. In both cases the special treaties were to expire a year after the end of the war, but "on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Principal Treaty of the nineteenth of April, 1839."

Switzerland, by special provision of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, and some other small powers

in Europe enjoy—or up to August 4, 1914, did enjoy—the same presumption that they would not be drawn into war against their national will. Switzerland has a commanding military situation toward all four of her great surrounding neighbors, none of which could permit either of the other three to take possession of this magnificent natural fortress.

Belgium is a country without natural defenses and in more than a score of wars has been a battleground for other people, because it lies between the German and French centers of population. It is not an accident that Waterloo and Liège are almost in sight of each other: because of Waterloo and fifty earlier battles the Belgians desired to have the five nations which were most likely to go to war exempt her from their contests; and Belgium has therefore had a longer stretch of peace than any other nation of Europe. This freedom from alarms has made it possible to devote the energies of the people to making themselves one of the most prosperous states in the world. Nevertheless of late years Belgium has grown uneasy, has organized a system of citizen soldiery and has built the powerful fortresses of Liège, Namur, and Antwerp.

When on August 4 Goschen had his last interview with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, he conveyed the direction of the British government

that he should offer war to Germany if Belgium were to be invaded; and the Chancellor "expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France." . . . He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a nation who desired nothing better than to be left alone. The German statesman's phrase will go down to history, for it indicates a frame of mind which was not that of the first Chancellor of the German Empire, Prince Bismarck.

Manifestly there was a difference in the circumstances of 1870 and 1914. The treaty of Belgian neutrality was signed the day after the decisive battle of Gravelotte, when the Germans were making their way straight across the eastern frontier of France; and in 1914 that road was closed by powerful French forts. Bismarck was always a thrifty diplomat; he had as few scruples as any man in Europe, and would have torn up any treaty which he thought was a noose around the neck of his country. Nevertheless it is a question whether he would have been willing to pay the price of the loss of public confidence

as to the binding force of inconvenient treaties which were made long in advance in order to prevent the operation of sudden necessities or passion.

Some defenders of Germany have characterized the step as "a breach of international good manners." A German professor justifies the action of his country on the ground that "this neutrality had some time previously actually been violated by France. Before the war broke out French officers traveled through Belgium and French troops reached Belgian territory before the declaration of war. For all this there are the most convincing proofs, and since this was known in Germany and the danger of being throttled from Belgium by France and England had to be met, nothing else remained for Germany but on her side to disregard the neutrality of Belgium."

The "convincing proofs" have not yet been laid before the world, and the refusal to execute the treaties stands on just the same footing as the invasion of Belgium, which is discussed earlier in this volume. Neither is justified under the ordinary principles of international law. Both might be justified by the Law of National Existence if necessary to save Germany from destruction. Neither can be justified at all except by showing to the satisfaction of impartial and neutral persons that the continued existence of Germany was

endangered; and that the only safety was by making war on the nation that happened to hold a territory convenient for the invasion of France.

Would the English government have protested against the occupation of Belgium by the French had the French taken that step? On July 31 England sought and received the assurance of the French that they would not invade Belgium; and when the question was later raised in Parliament Sir Edward Grey issued a statement to say that England would unquestionably have interfered to protect Belgium's freedom against France. In such a crisis every nation must declare for itself what sacrifices it will make and what enmities it will encounter in order to carry out its military plans. That decision remains subject to the judgment of mankind as to the paramount necessity of a policy which involves the ruin of an innocent third party. The materials are not yet at hand for a final decision in the minds of neutrals of the bedrock responsibility for this undesirable state of things.

CHAPTER X

METHODS OF WARFARE

RECRUITING

THE object of the military systems of Continental Europe is first of all to put as large a part as possible of the male population through a military training; and then in case of war to enroll as active soldiers as large a part of these trained men as possible. The first result is brought about by universal military service which varies all the way from the Swiss method of six months for each man to the extreme French service just enacted of three years for every man.

In practice there are many exemptions. Germany has a system of "one-year volunteers" which means that every youth who can pass examinations somewhat more serious than the stiffest entrance examinations to an American college is allowed to serve one year at his own expense under favored conditions. A sharp young man can carry on some work in a university while

serving in the same town as a soldier, and young doctors get off with six months' service. For a long time clergymen were exempted, till in France one of the items in the long struggle with the Church was the rigid inclusion of theological students. In practice no government has been able to take care of all the young men who in a particular year arrive at the military age of twenty or thereabouts; and a portion of them are excused for the time being. Those physically deficient, as shown by examination, are commonly relieved outright.

At the moment when war broke out on an unexampled scale, a certain number of men in all the great Continental countries, averaging about one per cent of the population, were "under the colors"; that is, for the time being members of the regular army. Even before war broke out the "reserves" were in some cases called. These are men who have finished their immediate military service, but remain on the books, subject to a call at any moment. Next comes in Germany the call for the Landwehr; that is, all able-bodied men up to thirty-nine years of age. Behind that is the Landsturm of men from thirty-nine to forty-five. These clockwork regulations, if carried out completely, would enroll all the able-bodied men from seventeen to forty-five, which is about between a fourth and a fifth of the total population; but exceptions are manifold. Men

in the transportation service must stick to their jobs, although they are soldiers: otherwise the army could not be carried and kept supplied. No government can possibly put into the field more than six to seven per cent of the population, unless to defend the country for a brief period from invasion; and of these not over half could be on the firing lines.

The levies take no account of education or wealth except that the one-year volunteers usually become officers of the reserve and Landwehr, and thus in case of war see service as officers. It is told that a German-American millionaire who had never been naturalized and always poohpoohed at American citizenship happened to be in Germany when the war broke out, and was immediately drawn into the ranks as a private. In Great Britain for several centuries troops have been raised by volunteering. Even in Germany the government has announced that more than a million volunteers have offered themselves. This can mean only that men belonging to levies not yet called have volunteered for immediate service; and that those who are physically incapable of serving in the field volunteer for some less exacting function.

The result of this general liability to service is that the weight of the war has instantly come down on every community and almost every family. There are no patriots who take upon them-

selves the defense of their country and there are also no skulkers. The German or Frenchman has no claim to a pension except for loss of limb or health; in those countries there is no class of ex-soldiers; no soldier vote. Going to war is like paying one's taxes, except that it reachest the poorest in the land. Hence, any sort of internal opposition to war is almost impossible. There can be no peace party in the national or local legislatures. Criticisms on the conduct of the war may be treated as treason. The whole vitality, passion, and endurance of each country are thrown into the struggle, under the direction of the military organization. The result is the marching to war of the most enormous forces ever arrayed against each other.

INFORMATION

In the old wars it was nobody's business to keep the public informed of what was going on in the field and accounts of disasters sometimes were weeks in leaking out. After the destruction of Napoleon's Grand Army in Russia in 1812 the dispatches to France were encouraging till the famous number of the *Moniteur* in which the terrible truth was told, ending with the phrase "the health of the Emperor was never better." From the Crimean to the Boer War there was half a century of war correspondents who looked

upon themselves as irregular generals who made war by describing it. They were the same sort of men, in some cases the same men, as the explorers in Africa and Central Asia, daring anything; and some of them, especially "Bull Run Russell," correspondent of the London *Times*, had much influence on public sentiment and action. In our Civil War the correspondents rose to the maximum of importance; so much so that General Sherman expressed the opinion that the proper way to deal with them was to stand them up and shoot the lot. He was nettled by the fact that the movements and plans of his army were printed within twenty-four hours; and those newspapers within forty-eight hours were in the hands of the enemy. The power of the correspondents to make or break commanders in the field was alarming.

Nevertheless in the Spanish War the newspapermen again undertook to carry on the campaigns and one of them modestly boasted that he himself brought on the war. When General Shafter, after the surrender of Santiago, sent an officer to the top of the government building to run up the American flag the officer found a reporter there, and answered over the parapet, "Man here already, sir." To which the General replied, "Tell him to come down." "He won't come down." "Throw him down!" But no private citizen can ever "throw down" a newspaperman.

The first people to discover that an army was more likely to be successful if its movements were not made known to the world until after they had been successful, were the Japanese in the Russian war of 1905. Then in 1912, the Bulgarians completed the destruction of the foundations of modern civilization by corralling the correspondents miles back of the battlefield, and furnishing them with desiccated items of news which of course must be true because they came from headquarters.

The advantage of operating on plans unknown not only to the enemy, but to the armies of the home country were such that almost the first guns in the campaigns of 1914 were opened against the newspapermen and newspapers. Each country treated the war, not as an international event in which all newspaper buyers were interested, but as its private concern. Few regular correspondents were allowed from the French, German, Austrian, or Russian newspapers. Even Great Britain, which is little accustomed to such restrictions, recognized that the first necessity was national defense, and accepted, in some cases under pretty strong pressure, the muzzling of the newspapers.

Correspondents of various nations, especially American and English, have put these restrictions to the test; and so far it does not appear that any of them has been shot, although any man who

skirmishes about in the rear of a fighting army picking up such information as he can from the peasants and the wounded runs a risk of falling into the wrong hands. The result has been that the most tremendous battles in history have been fought without anything but the most general and inevitable facts being made known to the world. The Germans got within three days' march of Paris without the Parisians knowing the imminence of the danger. Part of the German army was then swept back sixty miles without the German people realizing that there had been a check.

This concealment is a great relief to the commanders and enables them to shift troops and undertake complicated movements without their own men knowing what is going on. This is a very important point, because if some of those men are captured they may carry to the enemy much desired information. It is curious how eagerly the newspapers and even military authorities seize upon such facts as that since no Austrians have been captured in Alsace, it must be that they are not on the front. The Germans take English prisoners on the center of their line; and hence infer that troops are probably being shifted from west to east.

In battles raging along a continuous front of a hundred and twenty miles the Recording Angel could not intelligently set down the movements

of all the different commands; and even those who are on the firing line are often unable to communicate with their own friends at home in regard to their personal safety. The postal card was invented for the benefit of the German soldiers in 1870, but in this war most of the armies seem to have followed the Bulgarian method of forbidding any soldier to write home anything that would throw light on the location of troops. Indeed, the Bulgarians were forbidden to put a date or a place name in their letters. Such a thing as a military or naval officer writing an account of a fight in detail, which should afterwards appear in print, is almost unthinkable in the present war. In fact precautions go to the extent of forbidding the circulation of English newspapers or extracts from English newspapers in the part of Belgium occupied by the Germans.

ATROCITIES

Whatever the military advantage of getting out from under the correspondents' searchlight, the process deprives the fighting powers of a valuable protection. So long as correspondents rode in and out of battles, hobnobbed with officers on the march, visited field hospitals and talked with prisoners, they knew what the troops were doing to each other and to the noncombatant population. If they had accompanied the Greek, Bul-

garian, and Servian armies in 1913 the fearful barbarities of that war simply could not have happened; for neutral correspondents, accustomed to note what was going on and to take pictures, would have roused the civilized world. The charges of atrocities committed by soldiers of one or another army in the present war would have much less effect upon the world if correspondents were in a position to affirm or deny their truth. It is a serious responsibility for the military authorities to dry up the sources of information, or to confine them entirely to persons directly under their own orders. The Austrians are reported to have forbidden their wounded who return home to tell the tale of their own experiences and sufferings.

In the field all the commanders accuse their enemies of barbarous and illegal practices. The Germans are sure that the French are using dum-dum or soft-nosed bullets; the French are convinced that the Germans massacre prisoners. In both cases there is probably a substratum of fact. It is no answer to such charges to say that this or that army is comprised of men who are incapable of such outrages. A volunteer army may include many bad men—an army of universal military service is bound to contain the worst men in the nation because it takes them all. A French officer has recently written: "I found myself quite a different man when at the front. I

recognize savage instincts. I live like a savage." In our Civil War the newspapers on both sides abounded in instances of cruelty, many of them well founded. We learned then that war brutalizes men, and that Christian husbands and fathers in the fury of battle will do things that would shock a wild Indian.

Charges of killing the wounded of the other side are made in every war and it often happens, frequently because the wounded keep up the fight. In some of the Continental armies the non-commissioned officers strike and abuse their own men and prisoners may come in for the same kind of treatment. When the question comes to be carefully investigated, it will probably be found that the bullets and massacres were used without orders and against orders. Though in and near the Balkans there seems to be a kind of minus-morality which makes war not only hell but "beneath the lowest deep a lower deep."

NONCOMBATANTS

The same thing is true in general with regard to the treatment of noncombatants, except that the feeling between the civil population of an invaded country and the soldiers of an invading army is much more hostile than that between opposing soldiers. The German looks on the Russian private as the representative of a bad sys-

tem, but after all as doing his job under orders: the German peasant looks on the Russian Cossack as a devil let loose and sometimes the cavalryman tries to deserve his reputation. In former wars, even as late as Napoleon's time, the population was harried, robbed, and sometimes tortured. Milder principles now prevail and the fundamental notion is that civilians in occupied territory are entitled to be protected in their lives and property.

The Germans in 1870 initiated a system of seizing supplies right and left and giving certificates; and at the end of the war the French government took up and paid those certificates, on the ground that the loss was a national one and ought not to fall solely on the unhappy residents of an occupied district. The same system seems to be now in use by the German army. It may be laid down as a certainty that the Germans in France or Russia, the French in Germany and the Russians in Austria will take possession of all the food and supplies that they can lay their hands on; though a humane commanding general will not bring the population to a starvation point within his lines. Such rights of seizure seem to be recognized by The Hague Convention of 1899, and however harsh they must be they are not an infraction of the laws of nations or the practice of civilized war, provided compensation is made.

War involves from first to last a fearful de-

struction of property. The energies of nine nations are just now directed toward supporting millions of their men whose sole business is to destroy. Railroads carry heavy guns to the frontier which are to be used in tearing to pieces railroads beyond the frontier. Any town or city is subject to attack; and for a great many years a favorite method has been to throw shells which demolish and set on fire the buildings. Under the laws of war this is allowable only in case of cities which resist attack or are fortified; but every bombshell means the killing of noncombatants. "If you object," the military authorities answer, "very well, then evacuate the town. We shall not destroy it, if you will give it up without a fight." Grant before Vicksburg and Gillmore outside of Charleston deliberately threw shells into the inhabited portions of those cities.

It is generally regarded as inhumane to fire upon hospitals, museums, churches, and like buildings which are not used for military defense, and it was strongly forbidden by The Hague treaties. In the siege of Strassburg in 1870, the Germans avoided the Cathedral which came through the siege intact. In 1914 the Germans shelled Rheims which was practically unfortified, and according to their own account deliberately fired on the Cathedral, a marvel of Gothic art which had escaped damage in numerous sieges and captures during seven hundred years. The act was ex-

cused on the ground—denied by the French—that the Cathedral towers were used for signaling. The same argument, if valid, would of course apply if the French got within range of Cologne Cathedral.

The state of things in Belgium brings back some of the worst passions of old-fashioned warfare. The Belgians knew that the Germans were likely to march by their right flank if they ever got into war with France, but they hoped that day was far off and expected that France and Great Britain would come to their aid if the Germans crossed their boundary. When on August 4 the German armies arrived in front of Liège, they expected that the Belgians would give way, perhaps with a little show of force. They could not hope to repulse the Germans, and it seemed to the German mind inevitable that they would, after a few hours, be able to press on to their invasion of France.

Mankind was astonished that the Belgians, who had previously had no special military reputation, should for many days block the road. They looked on the invaders not simply as enemies, but as monsters; just as the Germans looked on the Huns in ages past; as western Europe looked on the Croatian horsemen who served Austria and harried the territory of the Prussians till mothers frightened their children to sleep with threats of the Croats. The Belgian population was nerved

with the intensest national hatred. On the other side this disturbance of their plans seemed to the Germans a futile proceeding which would cause great loss of time and men without saving Belgium. To their minds the Belgians were engaged in a kind of civil war, and were almost traitors.

Under these conditions of exasperation the Germans spread over the Belgian territory, occupying villages and cities. From the first they exacted the severest penalties against noncombatants who joined in the fray. The Belgians were disposed to do as their ancestors did under like circumstances—to call on the whole population to resist—but the freedom of noncombatants from being attacked depends on their willingness to keep their hands off the guns. In 1862 when the Union troops were fired upon, "under cover of the houses" of Fredericksburg, General Sumner simply announced that unless a satisfactory answer was received, he would "bombard" the town. On the promise of Longstreet that the Confederates would not make use of the town, Sumner respected the place. The civilian who takes up arms is liable to be captured and then treated not as a prisoner but as a brigand. The house which harbors "snipers" is liable to be destroyed.

There most authorities think the penalty stops. If a peasant fires at a German soldier, that is a reason for shooting him, but not his family

and his neighbors. If a house keeps up the fight, that does not give the right to destroy the village. Hence, in neutral nations there was a feeling of horror when it was announced that the city of Louvain had been given over to the flames by the Germans because shots were fired from some of the houses. The German defense of this act is briefly set forth in a letter from Emperor William to President Wilson, dated September 4:

"Some villages, and even the old town of Louvain, with the exception of its beautiful town hall, had to be destroyed for the protection of my troops.

"My heart bleeds when I see such measures inevitable, and when I think of the many innocent people who have lost their houses and property as a result of the misdeeds of the guilty."

This is another of the cases in which the moral responsibility can be affixed only in the light of actual circumstances. The Belgian government and the German government have radically divergent beliefs as to what actually happened. If, as the Germans insist, there was a deliberate and systematic plan to take advantage of the temporary absence of a part of the German troops to attack the other part by the civilians, men and women, firing from houses on a prearranged signal,—that was an act of bad faith which would justify the severest measures toward

those who are actually concerned. It would not justify a destruction of buildings which were the heritage of mankind, or of men, women and children who had no part or responsibility in the outbreak. Both Belgians and Germans produce testimony which seems unimpeachable that the other side has been guilty of fearful excesses. Some German wounded were blinded, or mutilated. Some German officers were shot in the houses in which they had been billeted, but politely received. On the other side the Belgian Commission and correspondents describe the maiming and murder of men, women, and some children and the destruction and loot of buildings, villages, towns, and cities which the Belgians assert had not been guilty of any hostile acts.

Up to October the people of the United States were not provided with even such conflicting statements as to the treatment of the civil population in enemies' countries occupied by the various armies in the East. To judge from the accounts of the behavior of the Russian contingent in China in 1900, and from the undeniable reports of the Commission on the atrocities in the Balkans last year, we shall by and by have a new crop of horrors from that part of the world. There race hatreds are accented and savage methods of warfare are traditional. The Russians are reported to be on the point of declaring that they will give no quarter to Germans. That principle is con-

trary to the recognized laws regulating civilized warfare, and to the plain principles of humanity. The object of modern warfare is not to destroy a country, or a city, or a village, but to break up military resistance. A wounded man, a prisoner, or a noncombatant who does not attack the troops, is not in a position to affect military operations, and common humanity demands that his life shall be spared.

FORCED CONTRIBUTIONS

An incident of wars as late as Napoleon's time was the "Brandschatzung," or payment by a city of a ransom in cash or valuables, to avoid being burned by a victorious army. The system was based on the idea that burning a captured city was the righteous and normal thing. With the disappearance of the notion that the private property of the people in a conquered area is the lawful spoil of the conquerors, the Brandschatzung had almost died out in civilized countries. It was revived by Germany in Belgium and France by the laying of a penalty upon provinces and cities which they occupied. According to newspaper accounts, Liège was assessed 50,000,000 francs for the privilege of being knocked to pieces; Brussels was assessed 200 million francs and the money was paid by four wealthy citizens who of course look to their government to reim-

burse them. Smaller amounts were laid on other towns and districts. There seems to have been no statement as to what would happen if these amounts were not paid: presumably the Germans would seize private property on their own responsibility to the amount of the levy, and refer the former owners to their own government for relief. In the case of the city of Ghent an agreement was made by civic authorities to pay over 50,000,000 francs in supplies if the Germans would keep their troops out of the city, but the Belgian government did not carry it out.

Such levies during the campaign are a convenient way of getting at part of the resources of occupied territory without overthrowing the civil government. Somewhat similar levies were made on a few of the French towns; but in the first phase of the campaign few of them were occupied long enough to secure a systematic payment. It seems to be accepted that in case any of the powers is laid prostrate by the war a huge money indemnity will be exacted from it, like the 5,000 million francs paid by France to Germany in 1871; the purpose being partly to repay the expenses of the war and partly to cripple the power upon which such immense sums are assessed.

AIRSHIPS

For the first time the air has been the scene of contests for supremacy among nations. Per-

haps with some premonition of what was going to happen, nearly all the European countries within the last two years have been busy constructing fleets of air vessels, partly of the aeroplane type which depends on its own power to keep it up, and partly of the dirigible type which is kept up by the inflation of gas bags. International law was not prepared for this new kind of weapon and there have been no general international agreements on the subject. A convention of The Hague Conference in 1907 provided that "the contracting powers agree to prohibit for a period extending to the close of the Third Peace Conference the discharge of explosives and projectiles from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature." But this treaty was not to bind in any war participated in by a non-signatory power.

Hence, all the belligerents have used aeroplanes, first of all for scouting; and they have proved of great service in detecting the positions of the enemy, pointing out their lines of defense and giving notice of movements of troops. Rival aeroplanes have occasionally fought battles overhead and numbers of them have been brought down by firing from the earth.

A second use has been to skirmish over hostile territory. The French claim that one of their aeroplanes passed over the German city of Nuremberg the first day of the war (the Germans say

it was previous to the war) and the French have dropped bombs on some of the German airship stations. On their side the Germans have dropped bombs into Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent and Paris. The aeroplanes carry very little weight and apparently have to descend to within gunshot in order to make sure of their mark. The Zeppelins can hover over a place for an indefinite time. The German method is for them to take a position out of range, then let down a man hundreds of feet on a wire cable, who drops the bomb. A Zeppelin can carry a ton of explosives and has a range of hundreds of miles. Hence it is known to be a part of the German plan of offense to send a fleet of Zeppelins some night to range over London.

Upon the face of it, a bomb dropped by an airship is not morally different from a bomb propelled by a mortar. Down to October no serious destruction was caused by any airship, but the wrecking of hospitals and other private buildings in Antwerp by bombs dropped from a Zeppelin raised the question of the right under international law to drop bombs on anything but fortresses. Perhaps a fortified city may be considered as one fortress and the terror of the civil population has always been counted on as a desirable thing for the besiegers. The German theory is that women and children and other noncombatants ought to be sent out of a fortified place

before the enemy begins his attack. The difficulty is that nobody knows at first whether the fall of a shell means simply a threat or the beginning of a bombardment that may last for days; and it is a serious matter to turn thousands of people out of their homes and into a country which is already devastated by war.

H. G. Wells in one of his novels pictures the effect upon the United States of an invasion by aircraft which systematically destroys the towns, camps, and other points where troops are trying to collect, till they have uprooted civilization. The thing is physically possible in Europe, if an enemy can only get complete control of the air. The only defense is to fight the devil with fire, the aeroplane with another airship. This makes a fearful kind of warfare in which there are no wounded, but every man or craft that is hit goes to instant destruction. The percentage of loss in any well-contested air fight would not be less than half of all the crews, which is about ten times the risk of the ordinary infantryman engaged in a land battle.

SUBMARINES AND MINES

Land-fighting is safer also than sea-fighting under present conditions, for the losses of men per thousand engaged in a fleet action would probably be about as great as in a land battle,

and the sailor is exposed to the additional danger that, though up to that moment unhurt, he is likely to be drowned if the ship goes down. A still more terrible danger comes from the torpedoes. In our Civil War Lieutenant Cushing drove a steam launch over a boom and got near enough to torpedo and destroy the Confederate ironclad *Albemarle*. That kind of open attack can no longer be made, because the quick-firing guns would destroy any torpedo craft afloat before it could get within torpedo range; but what of the new submarines which creep up to within a few thousand feet and drive home their terrible weapon? This is the first war in which submarines have played any part and several cruisers, most of them British, have been sunk. Here again there is no protection in international law. If it is good morals to shoot an enemy above water it is good morals to shoot under water. Just before the war broke out, Scott, the English naval expert, wrote an article to prove that submarines would henceforth decide naval war; and Sir Conan Doyle published a lurid tale based on the supposed extermination of the British merchant fleet by a pair of bold submarines. The destruction of three British cruisers within an hour, apparently by the same German submarine, late in September, showed that this apprehension was not a dream; but all the naval powers engaged have submarines and an equal opportunity to use them.

When Farragut attacked the forts below Mobile in 1864 one of his ships was sunk by a "torpedo." That was the same kind of infernal machine that we now call a mine. It is the right of every power in time of war to protect its own harbors and coasts by anchoring these infernal machines, some of which go off when touched by a passing vessel and others can be fired by electricity from watchers on the shore. All the harbors, French, English, German, Russian, and Austrian, are doubtless protected by mines, through which there are lanes available for the home vessels of war and commercial ships. In addition, mines have in several recent wars been sown in the open sea. The Japanese were accused of doing it in 1905. The Turks did it in 1912, and several merchantmen were blown up in entering or leaving the port of Smyrna. A German mine-layer was destroyed by an English ship which shortly after was blown up, probably by a submarine. In October the British gave notice of the laying of a mine field in a specified region of the North Sea. The English later warned all comers that a certain arm of the North Sea was mined by them. This sowing of mines on the high seas and in the track of neutral vessels is contrary to international law and commonsense. Russia, for instance, has no right to make it dangerous for Swedish ships to traverse the open Baltic.

RIGORS OF WAR

Submarines and mines are only part of the evidence of a determination by all the powers engaged to push the war with every energy, even at the expense of loss and suffering to neutrals and noncombatants. The day has long passed when, as at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745, the English commander rode forward, drank to the health of the French and called on his troops for a cheer. Germany, by its marvelous training, discipline, and power over the national resources, has set an example of fierce and unrelenting war which the other powers do their best to reciprocate. It is this spirit which seems to have caused most of the trouble in Belgium, the feeling of the invaders that the war must be fought; that all obstacles must be overcome; that any nation, army, fortress, or people who stand in the way must be crushed. It is the spirit of the old-fashioned football; the teams are sent out to win and not to give examples of the restrictions laid down by the rules.

One unusual element in the war is the appearance of cavalry far beyond the armies. This method of warfare was apparently suggested by the Cossacks, long known as the finest cavalry in Europe, and the German Uhlans who both in the war of 1870 and 1914 have shown amazing boldness. Troops and squads of them have appeared

fifty miles beyond their lines, taking villages, cutting telegraphs, living on the country and filling whole provinces with terror. Should the French and English armies move into an enemy's country, they would doubtless try the same adventurous tactics. The only remedy seems to be a patrol of armored automobiles.

The use of heavy artillery in the field adds much to the din and something to the destruction of war. The Servians two years ago were the first to prove to the world that large guns could be carried anywhere with an army, guns that would drop their missiles four miles from the point of departure. All the present large armies are equipped with similar large cannon, many of them using high explosives. Then the Germans have for the first time in war brought into the field big guns with a caliber of fourteen inches, sending a shot weighing a ton, which, if it strikes the earth, will blow out a hole in which five horses can be entombed. Such a shot striking the concrete or steel roof of a fort may smash it into a rubbish heap. The use of these guns brought about the capture of the great ring fortress of Liège and Namur in Belgium and Maubeuge in France; while the French evacuated the powerful fort of LaFère without a stand because they were satisfied it was untenable.

All the armies have learned the art of burrowing, which was first practised on a large scale

in our Civil War and was used with much effect in the Boer, Japanese, and Balkan wars. A straight, open trench can be located by airships and cleared out with shrapnel; but troops in the field build practical bombproofs which protect great numbers of the men even from artillery fire. This must be the reason why the reported losses are so low in proportion to the men engaged. General Grant in 1864 started into the Wilderness with about 125,000 men and added 50,000 more by reinforcement during the next six weeks, but out of these he lost 70,000 dead, wounded, and missing. If the Allies had suffered losses in this proportion, they would have sacrificed 500,000 men during August and September, but there is no evidence of an actual loss of half that number. In spite of the terrific hardships of marching every day for weeks and then fighting every day for a fortnight, neither army seems in October to be worn down. Perhaps when the official returns are made after the war we shall find out that, like the Japanese in 1905, the officials have made remarkable mistakes in their totals. In a two months' campaign in fine weather there has been no opportunity for disease to set in; but in most previous wars twice as many men have died without a wound as have been killed or disabled by bullets or shells.

CHAPTER XI

EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES

NATIONAL SYMPATHIES

THE neutral powers of Europe watch the progress of the war with some prejudices. The Turks, who are much influenced by Germany, at one time seemed on the point of going in as an ally on that side. The Italians show symptoms of taking up the cudgels against Austria-Hungary. The Spaniards would probably sympathize with their Latin neighbors, the French. Rumania is pro-Russian, for if Russia is victorious, there may be a chance to incorporate into Rumania part of the 3,300,000 Rumanians who live at present in the Austrian Empire.

The United States as a nation is sympathetic with all of the contestants; we have nothing to ask from any of them; whichever group is successful, that group has nothing to give which the United States desires. Our people is made

up of race strains which include every religion, race, and nationality now engaged in the war. The President issued on August 5 a proclamation of absolute neutrality and on August 18 sent out another proclamation urging his fellow-countrymen not to take sides even among themselves. The war is a cause of grief not only to the 9,000,000 people who have come to this country from Austria, Servia, Russia, and all the other countries now fighting, but also to the 78,000,000 who were born in America and who are appalled at the woe which has fallen upon the world.

These ties of interest and sympathy are stronger because of the great number of Americans who in recent years have visited Europe. There were a hundred thousand in 1914, and there have been nearly as many every summer during some years. Over a million American citizens have set foot upon the mother continent. Hundreds of men and women have been students in the universities, technical and art schools of France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia, and England. Exchange professors have gone from the United States to Germany, France, and England; and Germans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen have in return come over here. Every nation at war is a sister nation of this country.

The United States has been interested in every European war for a century; first came the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, which drove to this

side of the water some of the best citizens that we have ever had; then the Crimean War of 1854 which led to a controversy about British enlistments in the United States. The four succeeding wars from 1859 to 1871 were overshadowed for us Americans by our own Civil War. The battle of Tilden against the Tweed Ring in 1870 was at the time more absorbing than the battles of Worth or Gravelotte between the Prussians and the Frenchmen. Of the powers concerned in those four wars, Austria, Denmark, Italy, and France sent us at that time few immigrants; and the numerous German-Americans turned the sympathies of the public toward the Germans. Americans felt that their own experience of war might be useful to these foreign armies. The chief way in which war, the war spirit, and preparations for war abroad were pressed upon the attention of this country was the discovery about 1867 that several foreign governments had introduced a system of universal military service; and that therefore Germans or others who had lived years in this country and even some who were naturalized, were seized if they returned to their native country, and compelled to perform their service or to suffer the penalty of evading it.

The war of 1877 in the Balkans, the Russian campaigns in central Asia, the Boer War in 1899, the Tripolitan war of 1911, and even the two

fierce and dreadful Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, all passed over us as a tale that is told, a spice in the morning newspaper, a vague notion that "those fellows away out there are waking up." The first distant war that really came home to the American people was that between the Japanese and the Russians in 1904-1905; and part of the interest arose from the fact that Japan was a near neighbor to our insular possessions in the Philippines. It never seems to have occurred to anybody that a European war could ever take place which would tremendously concern and alarm the people of North America. We hardly realize now that we are next neighbors along a frontier of 3,000 miles to one of the great military powers engaged in this struggle. It is rather an agreeable bit of excitement that German and English cruisers stop vessels going in or out of New York, as the English used to do a century ago. The terrific thunders of a world contest are still so distant that we look upon ourselves as happily outside the field of conflict. Whatever happens, a broad and blessed ocean is our entrenchment. And have we not an army and navy that can protect us from any accident?

All these notions of remoteness from Europe, of living in "our own sphere," of never interfering in foreign relations, of expecting foreign nations to keep out of our hemisphere, are blown to the winds by the actualities of this tremendous war.

First of all, the hundred thousand Americans who were enjoying their holiday in all parts of Europe, have been caught as people are caught by a cloudburst. Modern military mobilization lays its hands upon the whole transportation system of central Europe. Think of our Civil War, when from the firing on Sumter to the first attempt to move on Richmond, a whole year elapsed! Think of our leisurely movements in the Spanish War! Compare them with the colossal engine of mobilization which catches between its cogs the traveler and sojourner, whether native or foreigner! European travel is no longer a pastime! It is a business necessity—a part of the world's commerce of which we have been so proud: yet it is liable to paralysis at any moment so far as the tourist and the business man are concerned.

TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION

Aside from personal sympathies, the United States is mightily moved by the disturbance of commerce. There has been nothing like it since modern commerce arose, for even in the Napoleonic wars when Napoleon attempted to close the coasts of Europe to English trade, just as England is now attempting to close it to German trade, neutral vessels plied from port to port. No coast was completely closed and the United States as the principal neutral power possessing

a large shipping, had special advantages and special profits in the European trade. To-day the United States has for the time being lost a commerce to Germany and Russia which mounted up, out and in together, to 575 million dollars a year. In certain lines very important to American manufacturers, such as dyestuffs, the Germans have close to a monopoly. Some American steel works are closed down because they can no longer get a mineral from Austria which was necessary for their product. Predictions are made that southern states next year will raise only half a cotton crop because of the lack of kainite, the German potash product used as a basis for the necessary fertilizers.

In the other direction, American exports are heavily hit, first by the lack of communication with Germany, Austria, and Russia, and second, by the weakening of demand caused by the stopping or short time of foreign factories which use our raw material. There is bound to be a strong demand for food, for any one of the great armies now in the field would perish if its enemies could cut off its food supply for six continuous days; but Europe can get on a year or two with half the cotton fiber that it has been using. This gap can be filled in part by selling to those world markets which can no longer be reached by the great Continental powers. The English trade to Africa and Asia and South

America is disturbed but can probably about hold its own unless the Germans decisively defeat the British fleet and thus get command of the sea. It is not enough for them to let loose additional cruisers, though those random vessels have sunk a respectable number of British merchantmen all over the world. Germany can destroy English trade only by destroying the fleet. That is the great principle of Mahan's theory of Sea Power.

The difficulty in the way of the United States taking up the slack, so to speak, of the German trade is that South Americans and Chinese and other nations can only buy to about the amount which they can sell. It will take years to readjust the great currents of world trade, for international commerce depends upon the physical fact that most nations have a staple which they can raise to better advantage than their neighbors and with that product they buy the surplus from other countries. The United States cannot absorb all the Brazilian coffee or Chilean nitrates or Peruvian rubber or Argentine wool and meat.

On the other hand, can the United States make South African diamonds, Honduras mahogany, Indian opium, or fine Limoges china, while the production of those articles is disturbed by the war? If not, this country stands to lose a large segment of its international trade; and though only about one-tenth of the goods used in the United States are produced outside of the coun-

try, and though we could get along without those imports which may be classed as luxuries, we must also get on without the profits and the employment which has gone to make our exports: for if we do not buy we cannot sell.

All the theories of international trade are much disturbed by international loans. When New York City bonds to the amount of over $100,000,000 fell due in September and were found to be owned abroad, the banks had to hustle about to make arrangements for taking them up; and in the course of a few months hundreds of millions of American securities will be sent over from Europe, either to raise cash on them or to settle balances of trade. If only two or three countries were involved in the war and all the rest were neutral and had their ordinary purchasing power, the United States would suffer very little; but when all Europe is disturbed and most of it engaged in war, the United States is bound to lose trade. That means to give up also any large schemes for capturing German or English or French trade; because there must be an end to war some time and then our new customers are likely to drift back to their old connection.

THE AMERICAN ARMY AND NAVY

The war cannot fail to change the point of view, both of military men and of statesmen, with regard to the nature and size of our military

force. In comparison with the figures given in earlier chapters for foreign armies our regular force is a bagatelle. The Continental United States has a population of over 100,000,000, which is about that of Germany and Italy together, but those two powers keep up peace forces which together amount to about 1,000,000 men while the United States army has an enlisted strength of 80,000 rank and file besides 5,000 officers. Our army is less than one-tenth of one per cent of the population; we had fewer soldiers ready for service in July, 1914, than Belgium with its 7,000,000 people.

This does not mean that the American army is at present too small for the tasks that are put upon it. It is ample for garrisoning the forts, for police duty in states which have not the public spirit and sand to take care of themselves, and for small expeditions outside the country, like that to Cuba in 1906 and to Vera Cruz in 1914. The United States is prodigal in the amount it spends for this force. The military appropriations for the last complete year were $110,000,000, which is almost as much as was spent by Austria-Hungary in the same year. If disarmament can be secured with a good prospect of world peace the army need not be greatly enlarged for present purposes, but the campaigns in the Balkans and still more in central Europe show that any future war is likely to be fought

by big units. General von Moltke, General Joffre, General Rennenkampff before entering into actual warfare handled in maneuvers or otherwise forces considerably larger than the whole army of the United States. If we can come to some agreement for a "Pax Americana" among all the western powers we shall not need to take account of these enormous numbers, because none of the powers engaged except England has ever carried any considerable number of soldiers across the sea; but if European wars are to be as numerous in the future as they have been in the past, the United States will have to enlarge its army.

This country is not likely to adopt the idea that it can afford to give or need give two or three years out of the most productive part of a young man's life to learn the art of war; but there is much to be said for the Swiss system of universal service for brief periods, counting together to about six months, and more for the officers. The Swiss are very like the Americans in their individuality and democracy and neither of those qualities has been cut down by such service. In spite of the undesirable side of barrack life, which is a severe test of a young man's morals, such a universal service would do much to set up American youth, to push back their shoulders, inflate their lungs, train their leg muscles, teach them to do what they are told, make them aware that every man-child in the world is

born to perform service at the behest of older people. It will take the boys out of the slums and the schools and the farms and the shops for a few months, show them how large their own country is, give them the feeling that they are responsible for its welfare and defense. If the European war directs the United States toward that course, it will not have been altogether evil.

Upon the navy the effect of the war must be much more immediate and startling. There has been no ironclad fighting of much significance since the Civil War except in the Russo-Japanese war; and this is the first opportunity to test the new naval engines of destruction. Whatever the United States builds henceforth must be determined by the results of the war. If the heavy first line of powerful ships wins in the naval battles that are impending, then we must build dreadnoughts or nothing. If the submarines play the havoc that many naval critics expect from them, we must build submarines. If the fast, light-armored cruiser can dodge about its heavier opponents and run away from the submarines, then that is the type to build. There are some almost comical cross-bracings in the naval warfare. For instance an airship can see a submarine below the surface; and perhaps in future every great cruiser will carry a nest of detective aeroplanes.

Again if Europe settles down to partial disarmament and Japan is included, the United

States will naturally accommodate itself to that system; but if Germany or England comes out of the struggle with a powerful and permanent navy there will be nothing for it but that the United States should build ships enough to maintain its power and dignity. It is not in the least necessary to pay attention to Hobson's clamor that the United States should have the most powerful navy in the Atlantic and another most powerful navy in the Pacific; but the experience of this war shows that the most peaceful nations may suddenly wake up to find an enemy within their borders; that henceforth every power that makes war will aim to strike with the intensity and suddenness with which Austria and Russia have struck. Politeness, consideration, willingness to listen to explanations are not a part of modern war and the United States must govern itself accordingly. A world organization for keeping the peace is the only other thing that can protect peaceful nations.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

It is necessary for the United States to think about its defense, because a failure to provide for the future would be a terrible calamity for the cause of popular government. We have put all our money into the bank of free government; we have assumed that the voter is bound to look

out for the interests of the whole community; that the taxpayer will cheerfully make sacrifices to maintain a government which he in part controls. That confidence has been justified in the history of the American Republic, and particularly in the Civil War where both sides showed a splendid power of combination and ability to organize on a great scale, and a patriotic spirit which gave immense aid to democracy throughout the world.

Nevertheless the Civil War in comparison with the war to-day seems wasteful of treasure and life. It took us a year to enlist and drill armies such as appeared in Germany and France within three days of the mobilization order. In the following twelve months the Army of the Potomac four times advanced, delivered its blow, and retired to the shelter of field works; while the French army went on fighting in line for thirty days out of thirty and still held its ground. It was three years before the Eastern Army found in General Grant a general who could utilize it: the German commanders were designated and proved in maneuvers years before the crash came. Both North and South had to make generals out of middle-aged civilians: there is not an officer in any one of the European armies holding an important command who has not had a lifetime of military experiences.

The English democracy is showing its capacity to deal with tremendous problems, and its first

military line is showing splendid stuff; but military critics are extremely anxious about the second line of volunteers who have never before handled a musket, who are short of trained officers, and yet who must shortly take the field against the most highly trained and best equipped armies that have ever marched. The United States might as well awake to the fact that we shall be ruined if we have nothing better than the organization of 1861, or the organization of 1898, when a nation of eighty millions was able, after seven weeks' delay, to send a military force of 17,000 men to take Cuba, in a state of confusion and disharmony.

Otherwise the day of our great democracy will pass; for either some centralized monarchy will descend upon us with its battalions of infantry and squadrons of ships, aeroplanes, and submarines, every detail thought out beforehand, every contingency considered, and teach us the cost of poor preparation; or else the American people will rise and create a dictator who may save them from destruction. Whatever the American force, large or small, whatever the warships and forts and regiments, we must learn the lesson that in war or in peace the great results are accomplished by those who think beforehand, make preparations, accumulate materials, develop commanders and submit to the guidance of experts in all technical matters.

This does not mean that the people shall have less voice in their own government, but that they shall aim to keep in public life those who show a capacity to serve their country. It means longer terms for members of the House of Representatives, more coöperation between Congress and all the departments of government; more carefully planned expenditure and less appropriation for the improvement of Higgle-Piggledy Creeks and military posts in the Wyoming Mountains. It means a more intelligent public interest in the use of the national resources for national purposes. Germany is an imperial country in which, we Americans think, a few people have far too great power; but Germany is the schoolmaster of the world in the honest, frugal, and intelligent application of a nation's means to the nation's weal. Germany would be stronger still if it called more upon the knowledge, public spirit, and patriotism of the average man. The United States will be stronger when it looks the future squarely in the face and instructs its public men to justify democracy by showing that it knows how to take care of itself in the midst of the tremendous forces of our time.

On the other hand, the United States is in the most favorable situation to urge some kind of international agreement, which shall depend not only on solemn treaties but on a world-police of some sort. The problem is almost unsolvable, but

the country can lead the way, when the war is over, if other nations will join.

MONROE DOCTRINE

Whatever the outcome of the war, it is certain to have a serious effect upon the relations of the United States with Latin-American neighbors. It is for a moment a relief because it gives to the government at Washington free-hand for months to come in Mexico and any other storm centers; but when the peace is made there is certain to be a redistribution of power in Europe which will react upon the rest of the world. If the Allies are victorious they may carve up the German African colonies, and presumably will put Germany for a long time out of condition to take part in the politics of the western hemisphere. Should Germany win, she may take Jamaica from Great Britain, or some of the French West India Islands. This is contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, but the United States would hardly be in a position to test that doctrine against a power which had just beaten Great Britain, France, and Russia.

In either case sooner or later some European power will cast desirous eyes on South America. Sooner or later, probably through some well-founded quarrel with a Latin-American state, some European power will send a military expedi-

tion, and even a punitive squadron would come under the ban of President Roosevelt's correspondence with Germany in 1901. Any prospect, even remote, of more official colonies in America would lead to an understanding between the United States and its neighbors to the southward. If the Monroe Doctrine is to be given up, the end of this war will be a good time to take that step. If it is to be maintained, it must be maintained in the teeth of new circumstances and a new distribution of the world's forces.

In this as in all other matters we must look in the face the new dangers revealed by the outbreak and conduct of this war. If Austria can invade a neighboring country which six days before supposed itself at perfect peace with its neighbor, Russia might conceivably do the same thing some time with the United States. If it would be justifiable for the English, having occupied the Austrian coast province of Dalmatia, to shoot women because other women had fired on the troops, any enemy which might reach the United States would have the right to shoot our innocent sisters under like conditions. If the Russians would be justified in bombarding and destroying a church in Breslau on the ground that a military use might be made of it, then it is equally justifiable for any power that has the military force, to land on the Jersey coast and bombard the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York. If the

Servians capture Temesvar and demand a "contribution of 200,000 crowns," some day the East Indians may put the city of New York to a ransom of 2,000 million dollars. If Germans make war on Belgium on the ground that it is "a matter of life or death" to use Belgian territory, they have an equal military right to cross Switzerland in order to get at Italy, or to cross New England in order to invade Canada. Such extreme uses of war power are controlled only by the discretion of the strongest party. The United States and all other powers must take notice that their neutrality in great world wars is dependent upon their ability to protect themselves. The rights of war are now defined not so much by international law, or by previous treaties, as by the extent to which a great and victorious power deems it desirable to push its physical powers, and wise nations will take precautions that these extreme principles of civilized warfare are not put into practice within their boundaries.

CHAPTER XII

OUTCOME OF THE WAR

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

NO prophet is sufficiently daring, after two or three months of such a war, to risk his reputation on a statement of what the final result will be. The first element in that problem is the number of soldiers engaged on each side; and no mortal man knows what are the forces actually on foot at any given time, and still less what is the size of the armies which deploy against each other in the field. All we know is that Germany and France have the machinery and organization to put under the colors for the first series of battles something like three per cent of their whole population, which would be, roughly speaking, 2,000,000 Germans and 1,200,000 French; but these figures lost their relation as soon as the Germans invaded France, for it takes not less than twenty-five per cent more men to

carry on war on something like equal terms in an enemy's country. Then arises the question of what proportion of the second line can be raised, transported, and made available.

The other three great powers are not so well organized for getting out their men. The Austrian regular army is smaller in proportion than the German. England had only 100,000 troops available at the first send-off, and in the first three months Great Britain could not have raised more than 400,000 serviceable men in all. The Servians and Belgians have been fighting at very close range and must have been able to use not less than 200,000 men apiece. The great mystery is Russia, which probably pushed 500,000 men to the frontiers in the first month and another 500,000 in the second month; but Russia is a giant which gets new strength every time he touches the ground. Out of that far-extended soil spring levy after levy, and the final result of the war depends more upon the capacity of Russia to feed, clothe, arm, and transport the millions of available men than on any other element of the conflict.

Another main element is the capacity and intelligence of the soldiers; and it is on this that Germany builds her hopes of success. The German armies have in three previous wars driven their enemies before them like chaff before the wind, partly because of their superior quality;

quite as much because their highly organized transport makes it possible for them to concentrate and outnumber their foes at critical points. That superiority now seems threatened. A thousand men against a thousand men, the Belgians seem to have given a good account of themselves; and the French, regiment for regiment, and army corps for army corps, seem to have been about as good as the Germans. An element in the contest which was apparently quite unexpected to Continental critics has been the dash and success of the British. So far as can be judged, it seems probable that, without their aid, the French would have been forced back of Paris within the first month, which would have probably caused the caving in of their line of defense on the German frontier.

In the Boer War and Balkan Wars it was proved that the crude and uneducated Cape Dutchman or Servian when properly handled might be about as good a soldier as the best. He is accustomed to hard work and simple fare; he is a good marcher, will stand cannon fire, and has learned the art of "digging himself in." The two rival weapons of modern warfare are the heavy field gun and the trench. It is not an accident that there appears to have been neither in the east nor west a complete defeat of any army by any other army. Good armies with even an irregular supply of food cannot be broken up,

crumpled up, and reduced to fragments as they were in 1866 and 1870.

Apparently the modern long-range rifles and cannon do less killing than the old-fashioned, near-at-hand weapons. One may guess that the Germans have had 500,000 men engaged in battles on the eastern frontier and 1,000,000 on the western frontier during the campaign; but down to September 1, the official reports of killed, wounded and missing aggregated only about 100,000, or less than seven per cent of the troops—only one in fourteen. This is nothing like the similar losses in the battles of our Civil War, and is less than the total losses of little Bulgaria during the campaigns of 1912 and 1913. There is no lack of bravery in the almost continuous fighting, and hand to hand attacks with cold steel have occurred, though nothing like as often as the correspondents would have us believe. The fighting is very hard for both sides because the men have to stand terrible cannonading directed by aeroplanes; but with any sort of deep protection they hold their ground tenaciously, or yield slowly and in order.

The newspapers have been filled with accounts of the disruption of the Austrian armies, and nothing but bad defeat could account for the capture of a place like Lemberg; but the Germans pressed back the French through half a dozen important towns, and then yielded the ground

gained. The air is full of flying reports of tremendous numbers of killed and prisoners, going so far as an assertion that the Germans had captured 92,000 Russians and killed 250,000! That sort of abject and overwhelming defeats have not been seen in modern warfare, except over such adversaries as the Turks in 1912; and it is doubtful whether any considerable army throughout the war will be put to flight and thus destroyed as a tactical unit.

TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLIES

Another factor is the relative ease and ingenuity of transportation. The French and British have been operating on very short lines of communication: probably no British soldier has been more than two hundred and fifty miles from London, and no French division more than a hundred and fifty miles from Paris. This advantage of closeness to supplies, reinforcements, and headquarters is much diminished by the German transport. In the first place the railroads have been constructed with a view to the concentration of troops upon the frontiers. In the center of Germany you find a railroad line which seems to have no commercial reason and are told, "Oh, yes. That is a War Road." Not only are there lines radiating from Berlin, Bremen, Frankfort, Munich, Leipzig, and other centers, but

throughout the Empire the stations, junctions, and sidings are arranged to allow the easiest and least interrupted passage from one line to another. The Germans have made every provision against a congestion of traffic or rolling stock.

All the contestants in central Europe are making great use of modern methods of transit. The cavalry, which a few years ago was thought to be superseded, has recovered its prestige as a scouting and covering force, and there have been some cavalry charges as parts of pitched battles. There are also bicycle regiments, motor cycles, armored automobiles carrying quick-firing guns, and a great use of motors for transporting both men and supplies. That is the reason why thousands of private automobiles, including those in use by foreign tourists, were commandeered at the beginning of the war. The killing fatigue of the march is lightened by loading men upon machines; motors tow provision and ammunition wagons; powerful motors draw the heavy guns, and particularly the siege guns which have been so significant in the war. No horse teams could have been depended upon to do the work. The automobile, like the horse, requires fodder, and one of the serious questions of the war is whether the gasoline supply of the various nations is going to be sufficient for their needs. Russia and Rumania are the only European countries that have a large production of their own.

Quite as important as the number and efficiency of soldiers is the question of their food, for if any of the nations, as is the case of Great Britain, does not regularly raise food enough for its people, it must get supplies from other countries or yield. Russia, Austria, and Servia raise their own food supplies, and if Austria has succeeded in harvesting her magnificent grain crop she will probably have a surplus to send over to Germany. No wheat can get out of Russia while the Turks hold the Bosphorus and the Germans control the Baltic. France, England, and Italy all have good sea connections to grain- and meat-producing countries, such as the United States and the Argentine. The doubtful quantity is the actual condition of the German food supply; that country has imported considerable quantities regularly from over-sea, and may have been laying up a store; though it is incredible that there should be enormous warehouses full of grain kept for emergencies without so many people knowing it that everybody would know it.

As for military material, all the countries have their own factories, except Servia. So long as the Creusot Works in France, the Armstrong Works in London, and the Krupp Works near the Rhine are in the hands of their friends, that supply will be kept up; still it takes an immense amount of ammunition to supply the modern

quick-firers; some authorities declare that two to three tons of projectiles are fired off for every man that is hit.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

All calculations and predictions of the relative force and efficiency of the various nations are touched by the great issue of sea power. When the war broke out Great Britain had about as much ship tonnage as all the rest of Europe together, four times as much as Germany, and a navy which was equal to that of Germany and France combined. In number of ships, experience in building, tradition of naval discipline, and record of naval successes Great Britain is the most powerful naval nation that the world has ever seen. While the Continental powers have spent their energies on armies, with side allowance for navies, the British have made the navy for years their principal care. Further, the British have their own coaling stations all over the world—for instance, Esquimalt on Vancouver's Island in British Columbia; a number of Pacific Islands; Weihaiwei in north China, and Hongkong in south China; Aden; Port Said; Malta; and Gibraltar. That means that the British can easily recoal and supply their ships in all seas, while their enemies are compelled to resort to the difficult expedients of sending out

ships with coal and provisions to meet their cruisers at sea.

Sea power depends on the ability to maintain a fleet which can move at its will; and that means that it must either destroy any large hostile fleet on the ocean or shut it in by blockade. The Germans have shown themselves bold and skilful sailors, for only one or two of their vessels of war have been captured on the open sea. One of them, the *Emden*, succeeded, two months after the war broke out, in sinking eleven British ships on the coast of India. Others have ranged up and down the Pacific. The actual position of the main fleet is probably not known to the German people, but has doubtless been reported by British spies, for you cannot hide a first-class modern fighting ship behind a warehouse.

So long as the German fleet remains in its own ports or the Kiel Canal it is safe, because it is practically impossible for a fleet to attack a coast which is protected by mines. Therefore the old-fashioned attacks on a coast or river, like that of Farragut on New Orleans in 1862, are now almost impossible. The only way actually to reach the German fleet would be to land an army at some distance which was powerful enough to march overland and seize the canal or harbor, thus capturing the warships or forcing them to sea.

Of course the English fleet could in the same way take refuge in the English estuaries, but that

would mean to let loose a fleet of hornet ships which would sting Great Britain all over the world. No ironelad fleet has ever kept the sea during the winter storms such as rage in the North Sea. The English fleet is the stopper in the bottle, a stopper very likely to be loosened by too mueh motion. If the bloekade is onee raised for a single day the Germans can get out, though onee out they take the risk of being eut off from the very narrow streteh of home eoast to whieh they have aeeess.

The real naval contest, apparently, is to be fought in the air and under water. The Germans are the only power that have a eonsiderable number of Zeppelin dirigible airships, and without doubt they are building more with all their might. Their hope is that those craft will be able to soar above the English fleet, out of range of its guns and yet able to drop pitiless bombs among the ships. The only proteetion would seem to be a fleet of English aeroplanes which should fire or ram the bigger eraft. Any day may bring the news that the feat of destroying the English sea power has been accomplished; on the other hand the war may pass without sueh a battle; the Zeppelins cannot operate in stormy weather and have shown little offensive power on land.

If that fails, there is still the opportunity of the submarine. The English have more submarines and more submarine experienee than the

Germans, but they cannot do execution in the shallow coast waters protected by mines; while the Germans can send their submarines out at any time in good weather. These underwater ships cannot operate in rough seas, for they must use their periscopes to get an occasional outlook. Nobody outside the service quite knows what precautions have been taken. All large modern warships have booms and use torpedo nettings and searchlights, watch every moment for the periscopes; and very likely surround themselves with a curtain of floating mines. In such a long-continued struggle, lasting for months, the advantage of position is on the side of the blockaded country.

VARIED FIELDS OF WARFARE

No war has ever been fought upon so many fields and in so many complications at the same time. As a matter of fact the following campaigns are being waged:

(1) Germans with Allies in France and Germany.
(2) Germans with British, naval warfare on the North Sea and all over the globe.
(3) Germans with Belgians aided by English.
(4) Germans with Russians in East Prussia, Posen, and Poland.

(5) Austrians with Russians in Poland, Galicia, and Hungary.
(6) Austrians with Servians in Servia and the neighboring Austrian provinces.
(7) Austrians with Servians and Montenegrins in Bosnia.
(8) Austrians with French and perhaps British in the Adriatic and on its coast.
(9) Germans with Japanese and some English aid in China.
(10) Germans and Australians and New Zealanders in the Pacific.
(11) Germans with French and English in Africa.

To these may perhaps be added at any time: (12) a land campaign between the Italians and Austrians along their common frontier; (13) a naval attack by Italian, French, and British ships against the Austrian vessels and coasts; (14) an attack by Rumanians and Bulgarians on the Austrians; (15) war between the Turks and Russians on the Black Sea; (16) a corresponding fight between the Greeks and Turks by land and sea.

Manifestly these various campaigns affect each other, particularly as most of the belligerents and possible belligerents are in a ring around Germany and Austria-Hungary. This leaves it possible for the central contestants to shift armies on the inside line, and it appears to have

been the original German campaign to smash France in a few weeks, leave an occupying force there, and then transfer the bulk of the army to the Russian frontier. As matters now stand it is entirely possible that the Germans might win a decisive victory over the English fleet or the Allies' army, and almost at the same moment be crushed in by the Russians; or Austria might be quite overwhelmed by the Servians and Russians, while her ally, Germany, was everywhere able to hold her ground.

Warfare in the Far East is in a curious condition. The English and their colonies have easily picked up most of the German islands in the Pacific Ocean, and the Japanese are besieging Kiao-Chao, the one German colony on the continent of Asia. The Chinese are eager to have the Germans turned out of that colony, but stand helpless while the Japanese march through their neutral territory to reach the German possessions. The case is in many respects like the disregard of the neutrality of Belgium. The Germans hold China responsible for this invasion, and announce that in due time they will claim an indemnity from China, besides the return of the colony. The only indemnity that China could possibly pay would be more territory. There seems every likelihood that the greatly superior force of the Japanese will take Kiao-Chao, and the Japanese government has notified the powers

that the territory will be restored to China. In acknowledging this information Secretary Bryan took pains to intimate that the United States expected that promise to be kept.

FORTUNE OF WAR

For such a conflict between two powerful groups of nations there is hardly any precedent except the coalition against Napoleon, from 1812 to his final downfall in 1815. When that struggle began, France controlled the subordinate kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) besides several German kingdoms which Napoleon had created. Gradually there was formed against him a coalition of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England. It required three terrible years to decide the strife, including the battles of Leipzig and Dresden in 1813; the campaign of 1814 in France over much of the ground now again plowed up by armies, and the Waterloo campaign of 1815.

None of those campaigns was so destructive of the industry and wealth of the countries concerned as in the few months of the present war. Europe cannot now carry on war for three years or for two years, simply because it has not the means to keep on foot so long the kind of armies that alone can hope to win. Abraham Lincoln

was deeply concerned because the Civil War was costing the Federal government a million dollars a day. The western campaign in France must require a consumption of food, munitions and cost of transportation amounting for both parties together to not less than seven millions a day, and the eastern campaigns require almost as much. This is a rising expenditure, for there will be constant increase in the expense for care of the sick and wounded; and the more soldiers that are raised, the more money must be provided to support them. Victory will be almost as costly as defeat and there is no likelihood that the war will stop before 10,000 million dollars have gone into the chasm.

Of course the governments will all borrow. During the last half-century of wars there was always some neutral power which had cash for the contestants. Japan and Russia were fighting each other in 1905 with money derived from French and English capitalists. Of whom shall the contesting countries borrow now? The only neutral which has large sums to lend is the United States, which has no desire to invest in support of the war. The only resource of the European powers is their own people, and the Germans have shown the splendid pluck of subscribing 1,000 million dollars to a new national war loan. There is, however, only one place from which such a loan can be taken and that is the savings of the people.

In a hundred and fifty or two hundred days that thousand million dollars will have disappeared in pay, rations, forage, ammunition, care of sick and wounded, and support of destitute families of the soldiers. And then what? Another loan or an enormous war tax, perhaps in the end forced contributions, all of which will absorb more and more of the movable capital in the country. Germany and France are frugal nations except for the modern class of rich merchants and manufacturers, but they can save something, perhaps a third, on their annual cost of living. That saving also is bound to go into the national treasury or else the war must flag and eventually stop. If it goes on long enough, every nation that holds out will have squeezed away the quick capital of its people. Farms, buildings, mines, cities, railroads, wharves, factories, vessel property, will remain so far as that particular country has not been actually crossed and ravaged by hostile armies; but stocks of goods, raw materials and the cash of the country will be gone.

Among the various powers Austria is likely to be the first to come to this state of exhaustion, because it is poorer than its western neighbors and because it stands more chance of invasion and capture of its capitals than any other power. Germany, though a very rich nation, has the most expensive, because the most efficient, army; and unless it can get control of the sea has the least

chance of relief from outside. France has great accumulated capital, but very large sums have been lent to Russia. Still the French peasants' traditional stocking may furnish means to keep on when other nations are exhausted. Great Britain has enormous productive industries in all parts of the world; but if her fleet should be crippled, would collapse sooner than any Continental country, because the United Kingdom could not then feed or defend itself. Russia alone of all these countries can keep up war for several years without ruin; because while several million men are fighting, 140 million people will be working to support them.

POSSIBLE TERMS OF PEACE

Whatever the sufferings and losses of the people, in the end the war must come to one of three results:

(1) It is possible, though unlikely, that the whole of warring Europe may be brought into the pitiable condition of Germany in 1648, when gaunt and starving bands of men, calling themselves armies, passed to and fro across the country, eating up the scanty supplies of food and leaving the inhabitants to starve. In that time of horror a poor Protestant pastor relates that he was in such misery that he felt sure the good Lord would cause some rich man to die, so that

he might have a rex-daller for performing the funeral services; and the Almighty answered his prayer.

In such a case the probable result would be that Europe would make a peace restoring, as nearly as possible, the conditions of July, 1914. The boundaries would be little disturbed; trade and commerce would be again opened to all nations on about the same terms as before. The surplus of a hundred years' labor would be swept away, and Europe would begin a process of hard work and saving, rebuilding, slow rising in population. That task might not be so long as it was after the Napoleonic wars. The example of France after 1871 shows what a nation can do by "sitting tight" for a few years, earning much and spending little. The control of the forces of nature and the use of machinery would perhaps enable Europe in thirty years to come back to its previous wealth and population.

(2) The Allies may win a general and decisive victory; and, on the doctrine of chances, that is the most probable result. For in a wearing-down process the maritime nations and Russia have a decided advantage; and if the Allies should be worsted, it is not unlikely that Italy would come to their aid. If the time comes when resistance by Germany and Austria is no longer possible, what terms will probably be meted out to the vanquished?

Austria by that time would presumably be so crushed and the unity of the Empire so affected that no further punishment need be inflicted, except that Italians might take Trieste and the Trentino; and Servia might take Bosnia and Herzegovina with a sea-front on the Adriatic; probably Montenegro would voluntarily come into this combine. If the Rumanians joined in the war they might perhaps get the province of Bukowina, which includes so many of their people. The Russians would undoubtedly claim Constantinople with the control of both banks of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and perhaps Western Asia Minor; they would also probably expect Galicia. At that point, however, there might well be so much squabbling over fragments of the Empire, and so much objection on the part of the people of the Austrian provinces to being shuffled out like a deck of cards, that by common consent Austria would be left with a territory not much diminished; but would be compelled to reorganize so as to give the Slavs an opportunity of self-development.

As for Germany, Alsace-Lorraine is practically already mortgaged by the Allies to France; and Russia might claim Posen and perhaps east Prussia. There is just the same objection to taking that territory that there was to slicing off Alsace-Lorraine from France: it would leave a permanent scar in the consciousness of the German

people. Neither the Germans nor the Austro-Germans nor the Magyars can be removed from their land, and they will stay as neighbors, presumably friends and probably more anxious than ever for a political union of all the German-speaking people, to which union the Magyars would have to adhere or be submerged.

Germany would lose in such a peace all or nearly all her colonies; and probably the Allies with their colonies would thereafter lay discriminating duties on German ships for the purpose of keeping down their carrying trade. Such a peace, imposed by the will of conquerors, would probably bind Germany to keep up none but a greatly reduced army. It does not seem likely, in view of the terrible passions of the war, that the Allies would take the broad and statesmanlike view that a hundred million people of like views and aspirations are bound to occupy a place in the world; and that it is better for the conquerors to treat them as equals rather than as subjects.

One possibility is that the Allies will quarrel over the division of the spoils, and that Germany will be admitted, as France was admitted in 1814, as a power which must be reckoned with in the settlement.

(3) The third alternative is that the German-Austrian combination may win a decided victory. If another Frederick the Great should unexpect-

edly arise, he might double the forces of the country by adding his genius; and there is always the chance of getting complete command of the sea, which would probably mean the invasion of England. That would nearly destroy France's ally, and if France were then conquered there would be more than an equal chance of defeating Russia. Allowing that Germany comes out possessed of sufficient power to dictate, what would probably be her will? As to European territory, Austria might receive Servia and Macedonia with the seaport of Salonika; but would hardly wish either German or Russian territory. Germany would certainly annex Belgium and not unlikely Holland, but would probably leave the boundaries of France about as they were. The Scandinavian powers might be untouched if they had not joined in the war. Germany would probably take such of the English colonies as pleased her fancy, especially any in which Germans might like to settle. This would not include Canada or Australia, but not unlikely would include South Africa. If England were brought to her knees she would have to give up her chain of fortresses from Gibraltar to India; Hongkong and the Straits Settlements would go; probably not India, for it would be a serious thing for Germany to take on 300 million unwilling subjects. Restrictions and special taxes would be laid on English commerce. England would be obliged to keep down her navy be-

low any danger to the Germans. The Germans would not be likely to keep their hands off Asia Minor, which in climate, productions and markets would be a good field for German colonization.

BASIS OF A TRUE PEACE

If Europe is wise it will, whoever is the victor, avoid these harsh terms, because they would simply mean a truce. The defeated and humbled party would simply wait for an opportunity to get its revenge, just as Napoleon's cruel and contemptuous treatment of Prussia from 1806 to 1812 led to his overthrow. Passions calm down after the greatest war; nations recognize the right of other nations to be. Slav and Teuton have dwelt side by side without much interference with each other for half a thousand years and they can live in harmony again. Among the things that ought to be done to make the peace permanent are the following:

(1) Europe must recognize the blood kinship of people of the same race, and must cease to try to destroy the language and traditions of race groups. Here in the United States we have pursued the other policy with great success because the race elements are so scattered over the whole country that we can make English the common language of courts and commerce; but the Magyars cannot impose their language upon the Slav

fractions of their Empire. Perhaps the most serious cause of the war is the feeling of wrath due to these attempts to destroy national languages, traditions, and religions. A European peace ought to offer not only toleration of religions but of race existence.

(2) Europe must also give up the idea of compelling large racial units to accept a government which is hateful to them. The German accusation of the Russians finds an echo in other parts of the world, because of the stupid cruelty of the Russian government toward Finland, Poland, and the Baltic provinces. Somewhere there must be a limit to the right of a group within a country to demand independence. The United States has within half a century compelled a third of its members to remain in the Union with the other two-thirds, and there is now no more loyal part of the country than the once hostile section. We have found the solution of our questions in federation. So have Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Perhaps that is the solution for countries like Austria-Hungary and Russia in which there are large separate racial units.

(3) Europe must admit a larger and more effective share of the whole community to decisions as to their own destiny. It is a fearful thing for any nation to allow half a dozen or half a hundred persons to decide upon peace or

war, and to put their country into a position where it must fight, without discussion or vote, or the opportunity for public opinion to make itself felt. Even in England war was decided upon by the Cabinet before Parliament was allowed to discuss it. In Germany the Reichstag acquiesced, with a few negative Socialist votes. In Austria-Hungary there is no federal parliament. In Russia the Duma has no voice in such an important matter. In a sense popular government is on trial in this war. If the British and French armies are beaten the militarists will all assert that it was because their power was weakened by their popular governments.

(4) Above all no peace can be durable that does not provide in some way against the causes which have brought about the present war. Chief among them is the feeling, fostered by great armaments, that war is a proper and a manly way of settling national differences. War and more war is inevitable so long as there is any power or group of powers which keeps war always in the foreground. If you have paid a million dollars for an automobile of the biggest, most complicated, fastest, strongest, most durable type, you will not be satisfied to leave it in the garage year after year. You will want to mount it, ride it, and show the world that you have an unapproachable automobile. No nation with an army and navy can help thinking that they ought

to be used, or concluding that at last the time has come to use them.

(5) The only remedy is to prohibit fast death-dealing automobiles and armies to everybody. The coming on and course of the present war are absolute proofs that war can only be prevented by some sort of world federation in which every nation shall have an armed force upon a fixed proportion, to be used as part of a contingent of a world police force. That must be provided, for mankind can never be free from two dangers: the first is the possible rise of a barbaric power which recognizes no law, like the hordes led by Attila and Tamerlane; the second is the danger from some highly civilized power which may suddenly adopt the barbarians' method of ruthless warfare. No human kindness, no treaties, can prevent those dangers; and unless Europe can find some way of creating a public force which shall in no country be sufficient to destroy a neighbor and yet for all countries shall be strong enough to provide against the ungovernable forces of the world, the greatest war of history will after a few years be followed by a greater one. Perhaps Macaulay's New Zealander may yet have the opportunity to muse over the broken arch of London Bridge.

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